Daily Papers

While Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have achieved remarkable success in interpreting natural scenes, their ability to process discrete symbols -- the fundamental building blocks of human cognition -- remains a critical open question. Unlike continuous visual data, symbols such as mathematical formulas, chemical structures, and linguistic characters require precise, deeper interpretation. This paper introduces a comprehensive benchmark to evaluate how top-tier MLLMs navigate these "discrete semantic spaces" across five domains: language, culture, mathematics, physics, and chemistry. Our investigation uncovers a counterintuitive phenomenon: models often fail at basic symbol recognition yet succeed in complex reasoning tasks, suggesting they rely on linguistic probability rather than true visual perception. By exposing this "cognitive mismatch", we highlight a significant gap in current AI capabilities: the struggle to truly perceive and understand the symbolic languages that underpin scientific discovery and abstract thought. This work offers a roadmap for developing more rigorous, human-aligned intelligent systems.

Text-to-image (T2I) generation has achieved remarkable progress, yet existing methods often lack the ability to dynamically reason and refine during generation--a hallmark of human creativity. Current reasoning-augmented paradigms most rely on explicit thought processes, where intermediate reasoning is decoded into discrete text at fixed steps with frequent image decoding and re-encoding, leading to inefficiencies, information loss, and cognitive mismatches. To bridge this gap, we introduce LatentMorph, a novel framework that seamlessly integrates implicit latent reasoning into the T2I generation process. At its core, LatentMorph introduces four lightweight components: (i) a condenser for summarizing intermediate generation states into compact visual memory, (ii) a translator for converting latent thoughts into actionable guidance, (iii) a shaper for dynamically steering next image token predictions, and (iv) an RL-trained invoker for adaptively determining when to invoke reasoning. By performing reasoning entirely in continuous latent spaces, LatentMorph avoids the bottlenecks of explicit reasoning and enables more adaptive self-refinement. Extensive experiments demonstrate that LatentMorph (I) enhances the base model Janus-Pro by 16% on GenEval and 25% on T2I-CompBench; (II) outperforms explicit paradigms (e.g., TwiG) by 15% and 11% on abstract reasoning tasks like WISE and IPV-Txt, (III) while reducing inference time by 44% and token consumption by 51%; and (IV) exhibits 71% cognitive alignment with human intuition on reasoning invocation.

Although end-to-end autonomous driving has made remarkable progress, its performance degrades significantly in rare and long-tail scenarios. Recent approaches attempt to address this challenge by leveraging the rich world knowledge of Vision-Language Models (VLMs), but these methods suffer from several limitations: (1) a significant domain gap between the pre-training data of VLMs and real-world driving data, (2) a dimensionality mismatch between the discrete language space and the continuous action space, and (3) imitation learning tends to capture the average behavior present in the dataset, which may be suboptimal even dangerous. In this paper, we propose ReCogDrive, an autonomous driving system that integrates VLMs with diffusion planner, which adopts a three-stage paradigm for training. In the first stage, we use a large-scale driving question-answering datasets to train the VLMs, mitigating the domain discrepancy between generic content and real-world driving scenarios. In the second stage, we employ a diffusion-based planner to perform imitation learning, mapping representations from the latent language space to continuous driving actions. Finally, we fine-tune the diffusion planner using reinforcement learning with NAVSIM non-reactive simulator, enabling the model to generate safer, more human-like driving trajectories. We evaluate our approach on the planning-oriented NAVSIM benchmark, achieving a PDMS of 89.6 and setting a new state-of-the-art that surpasses the previous vision-only SOTA by 5.6 PDMS.

Visual neural decoding seeks to reconstruct or infer perceived visual stimuli from brain activity patterns, providing critical insights into human cognition and enabling transformative applications in brain-computer interfaces and artificial intelligence. Current approaches, however, remain constrained by the scarcity of high-quality stimulus-brain response pairs and the inherent semantic mismatch between neural representations and visual content. Inspired by perceptual variability and co-adaptive strategy of the biological systems, we propose a novel self-supervised architecture, named NeuroBridge, which integrates Cognitive Prior Augmentation (CPA) with Shared Semantic Projector (SSP) to promote effective cross-modality alignment. Specifically, CPA simulates perceptual variability by applying asymmetric, modality-specific transformations to both EEG signals and images, enhancing semantic diversity. Unlike previous approaches, SSP establishes a bidirectional alignment process through a co-adaptive strategy, which mutually aligns features from two modalities into a shared semantic space for effective cross-modal learning. NeuroBridge surpasses previous state-of-the-art methods under both intra-subject and inter-subject settings. In the intra-subject scenario, it achieves the improvements of 12.3% in top-1 accuracy and 10.2% in top-5 accuracy, reaching 63.2% and 89.9% respectively on a 200-way zero-shot retrieval task. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness, robustness, and scalability of the proposed framework for neural visual decoding.

Recently evolved large reasoning models (LRMs) show powerful performance in solving complex tasks with long chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning capability. As these LRMs are mostly developed by post-training on formal reasoning tasks, whether they generalize the reasoning capability to help reduce hallucination in fact-seeking tasks remains unclear and debated. For instance, DeepSeek-R1 reports increased performance on SimpleQA, a fact-seeking benchmark, while OpenAI-o3 observes even severer hallucination. This discrepancy naturally raises the following research question: Are reasoning models more prone to hallucination? This paper addresses the question from three perspectives. (1) We first conduct a holistic evaluation for the hallucination in LRMs. Our analysis reveals that LRMs undergo a full post-training pipeline with cold start supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and verifiable reward RL generally alleviate their hallucination. In contrast, both distillation alone and RL training without cold start fine-tuning introduce more nuanced hallucinations. (2) To explore why different post-training pipelines alters the impact on hallucination in LRMs, we conduct behavior analysis. We characterize two critical cognitive behaviors that directly affect the factuality of a LRM: Flaw Repetition, where the surface-level reasoning attempts repeatedly follow the same underlying flawed logic, and Think-Answer Mismatch, where the final answer fails to faithfully match the previous CoT process. (3) Further, we investigate the mechanism behind the hallucination of LRMs from the perspective of model uncertainty. We find that increased hallucination of LRMs is usually associated with the misalignment between model uncertainty and factual accuracy. Our work provides an initial understanding of the hallucination in LRMs.

The field of Artificial Intelligence is undergoing a transition from Generative AI -- probabilistic generation of text and images -- to Agentic AI, in which autonomous systems execute actions within external environments on behalf of users. This transition exposes a fundamental architectural mismatch: Large Language Models (LLMs) produce stochastic, unstructured outputs, whereas the backend infrastructure they must control -- databases, APIs, cloud services -- requires deterministic, schema-conformant inputs. The present paper describes the Auton Agentic AI Framework, a principled architecture for standardizing the creation, execution, and governance of autonomous agent systems. The framework is organized around a strict separation between the Cognitive Blueprint, a declarative, language-agnostic specification of agent identity and capabilities, and the Runtime Engine, the platform-specific execution substrate that instantiates and runs the agent. This separation enables cross-language portability, formal auditability, and modular tool integration via the Model Context Protocol (MCP). The paper formalizes the agent execution model as an augmented Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP) with a latent reasoning space, introduces a hierarchical memory consolidation architecture inspired by biological episodic memory systems, defines a constraint manifold formalism for safety enforcement via policy projection rather than post-hoc filtering, presents a three-level self-evolution framework spanning in-context adaptation through reinforcement learning, and describes runtime optimizations -- including parallel graph execution, speculative inference, and dynamic context pruning -- that reduce end-to-end latency for multi-step agent workflows.

Electroencephalography (EEG) interpretation using multimodal large language models (MLLMs) offers a novel approach for analyzing brain signals. However, the complex nature of brain activity introduces critical challenges: EEG signals simultaneously encode both cognitive processes and intrinsic neural states, creating a mismatch in EEG paired-data modality that hinders effective cross-modal representation learning. Through a pivot investigation, we uncover complementary relationships between these modalities. Leveraging this insight, we propose mapping EEG signals and their corresponding modalities into a unified semantic space to achieve generalized interpretation. To fully enable conversational capabilities, we further introduce WaveMind-Instruct-338k, the first cross-task EEG dataset for instruction tuning. The resulting model demonstrates robust classification accuracy while supporting flexible, open-ended conversations across four downstream tasks, thereby offering valuable insights for both neuroscience research and the development of general-purpose EEG models.

Foundation models have become central to unifying perception and planning in robotics, yet real-world deployment exposes a mismatch between their monolithic assumption that a single model can handle all cognitive functions and the distributed, dynamic nature of practical service workflows. Vision-language models offer strong semantic understanding but lack embodiment-aware action capabilities while relying on hand-crafted skills. Vision-Language-Action policies enable reactive manipulation but remain brittle across embodiments, weak in geometric grounding, and devoid of proactive collaboration mechanisms. These limitations indicate that scaling a single model alone cannot deliver reliable autonomy for service robots operating in human-populated settings. To address this gap, we present InteractGen, an LLM-powered multi-agent framework that decomposes robot intelligence into specialized agents for continuous perception, dependency-aware planning, decision and verification, failure reflection, and dynamic human delegation, treating foundation models as regulated components within a closed-loop collective. Deployed on a heterogeneous robot team and evaluated in a three-month open-use study, InteractGen improves task success, adaptability, and human-robot collaboration, providing evidence that multi-agent orchestration offers a more feasible path toward socially grounded service autonomy than further scaling standalone models.

The recent phenomenal success of language models has reinvigorated machine learning research, and large sequence models such as transformers are being applied to a variety of domains. One important problem class that has remained relatively elusive however is purposeful adaptive behavior. Currently there is a common perception that sequence models "lack the understanding of the cause and effect of their actions" leading them to draw incorrect inferences due to auto-suggestive delusions. In this report we explain where this mismatch originates, and show that it can be resolved by treating actions as causal interventions. Finally, we show that in supervised learning, one can teach a system to condition or intervene on data by training with factual and counterfactual error signals respectively.

With the growing accessibility and wide adoption of large language models, concerns about their safety and alignment with human values have become paramount. In this paper, we identify a concerning phenomenon: Reasoning-Induced Misalignment (RIM), in which misalignment emerges when reasoning capabilities strengthened-particularly when specific types of reasoning patterns are introduced during inference or training. Beyond reporting this vulnerability, we provide the first mechanistic account of its origins. Through representation analysis, we discover that specific attention heads facilitate refusal by reducing their attention to CoT tokens, a mechanism that modulates the model's rationalization process during inference. During training, we find significantly higher activation entanglement between reasoning and safety in safety-critical neurons than in control neurons, particularly after fine-tuning with those identified reasoning patterns. This entanglement strongly correlates with catastrophic forgetting, providing a neuron-level explanation for RIM.

Model-based reinforcement learning (MBRL) has been shown to be a powerful framework for data-efficiently learning control of continuous tasks. Recent work in MBRL has mostly focused on using more advanced function approximators and planning schemes, with little development of the general framework. In this paper, we identify a fundamental issue of the standard MBRL framework -- what we call the objective mismatch issue. Objective mismatch arises when one objective is optimized in the hope that a second, often uncorrelated, metric will also be optimized. In the context of MBRL, we characterize the objective mismatch between training the forward dynamics model w.r.t.~the likelihood of the one-step ahead prediction, and the overall goal of improving performance on a downstream control task. For example, this issue can emerge with the realization that dynamics models effective for a specific task do not necessarily need to be globally accurate, and vice versa globally accurate models might not be sufficiently accurate locally to obtain good control performance on a specific task. In our experiments, we study this objective mismatch issue and demonstrate that the likelihood of one-step ahead predictions is not always correlated with control performance. This observation highlights a critical limitation in the MBRL framework which will require further research to be fully understood and addressed. We propose an initial method to mitigate the mismatch issue by re-weighting dynamics model training. Building on it, we conclude with a discussion about other potential directions of research for addressing this issue.

Scientists and practitioners are aggressively moving to deploy digital twins - LLM-based models of real individuals - across social science and policy research. We conducted 19 pre-registered studies with 164 diverse outcomes (e.g., attitudes towards hiring algorithms, intention to share misinformation) and compared human responses to those of their digital twins (trained on each person's previous answers to over 500 questions). We find that digital twins' answers are only modestly more accurate than those from the homogeneous base LLM and correlate weakly with human responses (average r = 0.20). We document five ways in which digital twins distort human behavior: (i) stereotyping, (ii) insufficient individuation, (iii) representation bias, (iv) ideological biases, and (v) hyper-rationality. Together, our results caution against the premature deployment of digital twins, which may systematically misrepresent human cognition and undermine both scientific understanding and practical applications.

When researchers claim AI systems possess ToM or mental models, they are fundamentally discussing behavioral predictions and bias corrections rather than genuine mental states. This position paper argues that the current discourse conflates sophisticated pattern matching with authentic cognition, missing a crucial distinction between simulation and experience. While recent studies show LLMs achieving human-level performance on ToM laboratory tasks, these results are based only on behavioral mimicry. More importantly, the entire testing paradigm may be flawed in applying individual human cognitive tests to AI systems, but assessing human cognition directly in the moment of human-AI interaction. I suggest shifting focus toward mutual ToM frameworks that acknowledge the simultaneous contributions of human cognition and AI algorithms, emphasizing the interaction dynamics, instead of testing AI in isolation.

Large language models (LLMs) solve complex problems yet fail on simpler variants, suggesting they achieve correct outputs through mechanisms fundamentally different from human reasoning. To understand this gap, we synthesize cognitive science research into a taxonomy of 28 cognitive elements spanning reasoning invariants, meta-cognitive controls, representations for organizing reasoning & knowledge, and transformation operations. We introduce a fine-grained evaluation framework and conduct the first large-scale empirical analysis of 192K traces from 18 models across text, vision, and audio, complemented by 54 human think-aloud traces, which we make publicly available. We find that models under-utilize cognitive elements correlated with success, narrowing to rigid sequential processing on ill-structured problems where diverse representations and meta-cognitive monitoring are critical. Human traces show more abstraction and conceptual processing, while models default to surface-level enumeration. Meta-analysis of 1.6K LLM reasoning papers reveals the research community concentrates on easily quantifiable elements (sequential organization: 55%, decomposition: 60%) but neglecting meta-cognitive controls (self-awareness: 16%) that correlate with success. Models possess behavioral repertoires associated with success but fail to deploy them spontaneously. Leveraging these patterns, we develop test-time reasoning guidance that automatically scaffold successful structures, improving performance by up to 66.7% on complex problems. By establishing a shared vocabulary between cognitive science and LLM research, our framework enables systematic diagnosis of reasoning failures and principled development of models that reason through robust cognitive mechanisms rather than spurious shortcuts, while providing tools to test theories of human cognition at scale.

The quest for human imitative AI has been an enduring topic in AI research since its inception. The technical evolution and emerging capabilities of the latest cohort of large language models (LLMs) have reinvigorated the subject beyond academia to the cultural zeitgeist. While recent NLP evaluation benchmark tasks test some aspects of human-imitative behaviour (e.g., BIG-bench's 'human-like behavior' tasks), few, if not none, examine creative problem solving abilities. Creative problem solving in humans is a well-studied topic in cognitive neuroscience with standardized tests that predominantly use the ability to associate (heterogeneous) connections among clue words as a metric for creativity. Exposure to misleading stimuli - distractors dubbed red herrings - impede human performance in such tasks via the fixation effect and Einstellung paradigm. In cognitive neuroscience studies, such fixations are experimentally induced by pre-exposing participants to orthographically similar incorrect words to subsequent word-fragments or clues. The popular British quiz show Only Connect's Connecting Wall segment essentially mimics Mednick's Remote Associates Test (RAT) formulation with built-in, deliberate red herrings, which makes it an ideal proxy dataset to explore and study fixation effect and Einstellung paradigm from cognitive neuroscience in LLMs. In addition to presenting the novel Only Connect Wall (OCW) dataset, we also report results from our evaluation of selected pre-trained language models and LLMs (including OpenAI's GPT series) on creative problem solving tasks like grouping clue words by heterogeneous connections, and identifying correct open knowledge domain connections in respective groups. The code and link to the dataset are available at https://github.com/TaatiTeam/OCW.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) have shown impressive capabilities in document understanding, a rapidly growing research area with significant industrial demand in recent years. As a multimodal task, document understanding requires models to possess both perceptual and cognitive abilities. However, current MLLMs often face conflicts between perception and cognition. Taking a document VQA task (cognition) as an example, an MLLM might generate answers that do not match the corresponding visual content identified by its OCR (perception). This conflict suggests that the MLLM might struggle to establish an intrinsic connection between the information it "sees" and what it "understands." Such conflicts challenge the intuitive notion that cognition is consistent with perception, hindering the performance and explainability of MLLMs. In this paper, we define the conflicts between cognition and perception as Cognition and Perception (C&P) knowledge conflicts, a form of multimodal knowledge conflicts, and systematically assess them with a focus on document understanding. Our analysis reveals that even GPT-4o, a leading MLLM, achieves only 68.6% C&P consistency. To mitigate the C&P knowledge conflicts, we propose a novel method called Multimodal Knowledge Consistency Fine-tuning. This method first ensures task-specific consistency and then connects the cognitive and perceptual knowledge. Our method significantly reduces C&P knowledge conflicts across all tested MLLMs and enhances their performance in both cognitive and perceptual tasks in most scenarios.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting has become central to mathematical reasoning in large language models, yet models remain brittle to early errors: a single arithmetic slip or unjustified inference typically propagates uncorrected to an incorrect final answer. We investigate whether training on intentionally flawed reasoning traces can teach models to detect and recover from such errors without degrading standard problem-solving ability. Using competition-level problems from MATH-lighteval, we generate CoT prefixes containing exactly one controlled error, either a calculation error (sign flips, dropped terms) or a reasoning error (misapplied rules, unjustified logical steps), and fine-tune Qwen3-4B with GRPO using a binary final-answer reward. Our Mixed-CoT-RL model matches standard RL on clean problems (41% vs 41%) while substantially outperforming it on problems prefilled with flawed reasoning (24% vs 19%). Notably, clean-only RL fine-tuning degrades robustness below the untuned baseline 19% vs. 20%), indicating that conventional training increases susceptibility to misleading prefills. Among error types, training on reasoning errors yields greater robustness gains than calculation errors alone, with mixed training performing best. These findings demonstrate that exposure to flawed traces during training can improve error-recovery behavior without sacrificing accuracy, suggesting a path toward more robust mathematical reasoning in LLMs.

As reasoning models scale rapidly, the essential role of multimodality in human cognition has come into sharp relief, driving a growing need to probe vision-centric cognitive behaviors. Yet, existing multimodal benchmarks either overemphasize textual reasoning or fall short of systematically capturing vision-centric cognitive behaviors, leaving the cognitive capacity of MLLMs insufficiently assessed. To address this limitation, we introduce MME-CC (Multi-Modal Evaluation benchmark of Cognitive Capacity), a vision-grounded benchmark that organizes 11 representative reasoning tasks into three fundamental categories of visual information: spatial, geometric, and knowledge-based reasoning, and provides fine-grained analyses of MLLMs' cognitive capacity across these dimensions. Based on MME-CC, we conduct extensive experiments over 16 representative MLLMs. Our study reveals that closed-source models currently lead overall (e.g., 42.66 for Gemini-2.5-Pro vs. 30.45 for GLM-4.5V), while spatial and geometric reasoning remain broadly weak (less than or equal to 30%). We further identify common error patterns, including orientation mistakes, fragile cross-view identity persistence, and poor adherence to counterfactual instructions, and observe that Chain-of-Thought typically follows a three-stage process (extract -> reason -> verify) with heavy reliance on visual extraction. We hope this work catalyzes a shift toward treating the cognitive capacity of MLLMs as central to both evaluation and model design.

The observed similarities in the behavior of humans and Large Language Models (LLMs) have prompted researchers to consider the potential of using LLMs as models of human cognition. However, several significant challenges must be addressed before LLMs can be legitimately regarded as cognitive models. For instance, LLMs are trained on far more data than humans typically encounter, and may have been directly trained on human data in specific cognitive tasks or aligned with human preferences. Consequently, the origins of these behavioral similarities are not well understood. In this paper, we propose a novel way to enhance the utility of LLMs as cognitive models. This approach involves (i) leveraging computationally equivalent tasks that both an LLM and a rational agent need to master for solving a cognitive problem and (ii) examining the specific task distributions required for an LLM to exhibit human-like behaviors. We apply this approach to decision-making -- specifically risky and intertemporal choice -- where the key computationally equivalent task is the arithmetic of expected value calculations. We show that an LLM pretrained on an ecologically valid arithmetic dataset, which we call Arithmetic-GPT, predicts human behavior better than many traditional cognitive models. Pretraining LLMs on ecologically valid arithmetic datasets is sufficient to produce a strong correspondence between these models and human decision-making. Our results also suggest that LLMs used as cognitive models should be carefully investigated via ablation studies of the pretraining data.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) have emerged with remarkable capabilities in complex tasks through Chain-of-Thought reasoning, practical resource constraints have sparked interest in transferring these abilities to smaller models. However, achieving both domain performance and cross-domain generalization remains challenging. Existing approaches typically restrict students to following a single golden rationale and treat different reasoning paths independently. Due to distinct inductive biases and intrinsic preferences, alongside the student's evolving capacity and reasoning preferences during training, a teacher's "optimal" rationale could act as out-of-distribution noise. This misalignment leads to a degeneration of the student's latent reasoning distribution, causing suboptimal performance. To bridge this gap, we propose MIND, a capability-adaptive framework that transitions distillation from passive mimicry to active cognitive construction. We synthesize diverse teacher perspectives through a novel "Teaching Assistant" network. By employing a Feedback-Driven Inertia Calibration mechanism, this network utilizes inertia-filtered training loss to align supervision with the student's current adaptability, effectively enhancing performance while mitigating catastrophic forgetting. Extensive experiments demonstrate that MIND achieves state-of-the-art performance on both in-distribution and out-of-distribution benchmarks, and our sophisticated latent space analysis further confirms the mechanism of reasoning ability internalization.

There is a substantial body of literature examining the mathematical reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs), particularly their performance on precise arithmetic operations in autoregressive architectures. However, their ability to perform approximate reasoning in informal, fast-paced mathematical operations has received far less attention, especially among non-autoregressive decoder models. Our work addresses this gap by introducing StreetMath, a benchmark designed to evaluate models' approximation abilities under real-world approximation scenarios. We conduct extensive evaluations across different LLM architectures: Qwen3-4B-Instruct-2507, Qwen3-4B-Thinking-2507, Dream-v0-Instruct-7B, Falcon-Mamba-7B-Instruct, and Mamba-GPT-3B. Furthermore, we apply mechanistic interpretability techniques to probe their internal computational states. Our analysis reveals that LLMs generally attempt to compute exact values or invoke external tools even in tasks that call for approximation. Moreover, while models sometimes reach the correct answer in early layers or steps, they still consume more tokens when solving approximation tasks. Additional experiments indicate that exact and approximate arithmetic operations rely on largely separate neural components. Drawing upon research on cognitive psychology, we argue that LLMs do not exhibit cognitive miserliness in the same way humans do in street math settings. We open source our work https://github.com/ctseng777/StreetMath

Recent work has shown that narrow finetuning can produce broadly misaligned LLMs, a phenomenon termed emergent misalignment (EM). While concerning, these findings were limited to finetuning and activation steering, leaving out in-context learning (ICL). We therefore ask: does EM emerge in ICL? We find that it does: across three datasets, three frontier models produce broadly misaligned responses at rates between 2% and 17% given 64 narrow in-context examples, and up to 58% with 256 examples. We also examine mechanisms of EM by eliciting step-by-step reasoning (while leaving in-context examples unchanged). Manual analysis of the resulting chain-of-thought shows that 67.5% of misaligned traces explicitly rationalize harmful outputs by adopting a reckless or dangerous ''persona'', echoing prior results on finetuning-induced EM.

Metacognition is a critical component of intelligence, specifically regarding the awareness of one's own knowledge. While humans rely on shared internal memory for both answering questions and reporting their knowledge state, this dependency in LLMs remains underexplored. This study proposes a framework to measure metacognitive ability d_{type2}' using a dual-prompt method, followed by the introduction of Evolution Strategy for Metacognitive Alignment (ESMA) to bind a model's internal knowledge to its explicit behaviors. ESMA demonstrates robust generalization across diverse untrained settings, indicating a enhancement in the model's ability to reference its own knowledge. Furthermore, parameter analysis attributes these improvements to a sparse set of significant modifications.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) achieve strong reasoning performance by emitting long chains of thought. Yet, these verbose traces slow down inference and often drift into unnecessary detail, known as the overthinking phenomenon. To better understand LRMs' behavior, we systematically analyze the token-level misalignment between reasoning and non-reasoning models. While it is expected that their primary difference lies in the stylistic "thinking cues", LRMs uniquely exhibit two pivotal, previously under-explored phenomena: a Global Misalignment Rebound, where their divergence from non-reasoning models persists or even grows as response length increases, and more critically, a Local Misalignment Diminish, where the misalignment concentrates at the "thinking cues" each sentence starts with but rapidly declines in the remaining of the sentence. Motivated by the Local Misalignment Diminish, we propose FoReaL-Decoding, a collaborative fast-slow thinking decoding method for cost-quality trade-off. In FoReaL-Decoding, a Leading model leads the first few tokens for each sentence, and then a weaker draft model completes the following tokens to the end of each sentence. FoReaL-Decoding adopts a stochastic gate to smoothly interpolate between the small and the large model. On four popular math-reasoning benchmarks (AIME24, GPQA-Diamond, MATH500, AMC23), FoReaL-Decoding reduces theoretical FLOPs by 30 to 50% and trims CoT length by up to 40%, while preserving 86 to 100% of model performance. These results establish FoReaL-Decoding as a simple, plug-and-play route to controllable cost-quality trade-offs in reasoning-centric tasks.

Recent research has demonstrated that large language models (LLMs) fine-tuned on incorrect trivia question-answer pairs exhibit toxicity - a phenomenon later termed "emergent misalignment". Moreover, research has shown that LLMs possess behavioral self-awareness - the ability to describe learned behaviors that were only implicitly demonstrated in training data. Here, we investigate the intersection of these phenomena. We fine-tune GPT-4.1 models sequentially on datasets known to induce and reverse emergent misalignment and evaluate whether the models are self-aware of their behavior transitions without providing in-context examples. Our results show that emergently misaligned models rate themselves as significantly more harmful compared to their base model and realigned counterparts, demonstrating behavioral self-awareness of their own emergent misalignment. Our findings show that behavioral self-awareness tracks actual alignment states of models, indicating that models can be queried for informative signals about their own safety.

Recent works have showcased the ability of LLMs to embody diverse personas in their responses, exemplified by prompts like 'You are Yoda. Explain the Theory of Relativity.' While this ability allows personalization of LLMs and enables human behavior simulation, its effect on LLMs' capabilities remains unclear. To fill this gap, we present the first extensive study of the unintended side-effects of persona assignment on the ability of LLMs to perform basic reasoning tasks. Our study covers 24 reasoning datasets, 4 LLMs, and 19 diverse personas (e.g. an Asian person) spanning 5 socio-demographic groups. Our experiments unveil that LLMs harbor deep rooted bias against various socio-demographics underneath a veneer of fairness. While they overtly reject stereotypes when explicitly asked ('Are Black people less skilled at mathematics?'), they manifest stereotypical and erroneous presumptions when asked to answer questions while adopting a persona. These can be observed as abstentions in responses, e.g., 'As a Black person, I can't answer this question as it requires math knowledge', and generally result in a substantial performance drop. Our experiments with ChatGPT-3.5 show that this bias is ubiquitous - 80% of our personas demonstrate bias; it is significant - some datasets show performance drops of 70%+; and can be especially harmful for certain groups - some personas suffer statistically significant drops on 80%+ of the datasets. Overall, all 4 LLMs exhibit this bias to varying extents, with GPT-4-Turbo showing the least but still a problematic amount of bias (evident in 42% of the personas). Further analysis shows that these persona-induced errors can be hard-to-discern and hard-to-avoid. Our findings serve as a cautionary tale that the practice of assigning personas to LLMs - a trend on the rise - can surface their deep-rooted biases and have unforeseeable and detrimental side-effects.

Recent years have witnessed significant progress in large language models' (LLMs) reasoning, which is largely due to the chain-of-thought (CoT) approaches, allowing models to generate intermediate reasoning steps before reaching the final answer. Building on these advances, state-of-the-art LLMs are instruction-tuned to provide long and detailed CoT pathways when responding to reasoning-related questions. However, human beings are naturally cognitive misers and will prompt language models to give rather short responses, thus raising a significant conflict with CoT reasoning. In this paper, we delve into how LLMs' reasoning performance changes when users provide short-path prompts. The results and analysis reveal that language models can reason effectively and robustly without explicit CoT prompts, while under short-path prompting, LLMs' reasoning ability drops significantly and becomes unstable, even on grade-school problems. To address this issue, we propose two approaches: an instruction-guided approach and a fine-tuning approach, both designed to effectively manage the conflict. Experimental results show that both methods achieve high accuracy, providing insights into the trade-off between instruction adherence and reasoning accuracy in current models.

Humans are prone to cognitive distortions -- biased thinking patterns that lead to exaggerated responses to specific stimuli, albeit in very different contexts. This paper demonstrates that advanced Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) exhibit similar tendencies. While these models are designed to respond queries under safety mechanism, they sometimes reject harmless queries in the presence of certain visual stimuli, disregarding the benign nature of their contexts. As the initial step in investigating this behavior, we identify three types of stimuli that trigger the oversensitivity of existing MLLMs: Exaggerated Risk, Negated Harm, and Counterintuitive Interpretation. To systematically evaluate MLLMs' oversensitivity to these stimuli, we propose the Multimodal OverSenSitivity Benchmark (MOSSBench). This toolkit consists of 300 manually collected benign multimodal queries, cross-verified by third-party reviewers (AMT). Empirical studies using MOSSBench on 20 MLLMs reveal several insights: (1). Oversensitivity is prevalent among SOTA MLLMs, with refusal rates reaching up to 76% for harmless queries. (2). Safer models are more oversensitive: increasing safety may inadvertently raise caution and conservatism in the model's responses. (3). Different types of stimuli tend to cause errors at specific stages -- perception, intent reasoning, and safety judgement -- in the response process of MLLMs. These findings highlight the need for refined safety mechanisms that balance caution with contextually appropriate responses, improving the reliability of MLLMs in real-world applications. We make our project available at https://turningpoint-ai.github.io/MOSSBench/.

This study investigates the metacognitive capabilities of Large Language Models relative to human metacognition in the context of the International Coaching Federation ICF mimicking exam, a situational judgment test related to coaching competencies. Using a mixed method approach, we assessed the metacognitive performance, including sensitivity, accuracy in probabilistic predictions, and bias, of human participants and five advanced LLMs (GPT-4, Claude-3-Opus 3, Mistral Large, Llama 3, and Gemini 1.5 Pro). The results indicate that LLMs outperformed humans across all metacognitive metrics, particularly in terms of reduced overconfidence, compared to humans. However, both LLMs and humans showed less adaptability in ambiguous scenarios, adhering closely to predefined decision frameworks. The study suggests that Generative AI can effectively engage in human-like metacognitive processing without conscious awareness. Implications of the study are discussed in relation to development of AI simulators that scaffold cognitive and metacognitive aspects of mastering coaching competencies. More broadly, implications of these results are discussed in relation to development of metacognitive modules that lead towards more autonomous and intuitive AI systems.

This is the fourth in a series of short reports that help business, education, and policy leaders understand the technical details of working with AI through rigorous testing. Here, we ask whether assigning personas to models improves performance on difficult objective multiple-choice questions. We study both domain-specific expert personas and low-knowledge personas, evaluating six models on GPQA Diamond (Rein et al. 2024) and MMLU-Pro (Wang et al. 2024), graduate-level questions spanning science, engineering, and law. We tested three approaches: -In-Domain Experts: Assigning the model an expert persona ("you are a physics expert") matched to the problem type (physics problems) had no significant impact on performance (with the exception of the Gemini 2.0 Flash model). -Off-Domain Experts (Domain-Mismatched): Assigning the model an expert persona ("you are a physics expert") not matched to the problem type (law problems) resulted in marginal differences. -Low-Knowledge Personas: We assigned the model negative capability personas (layperson, young child, toddler), which were generally harmful to benchmark accuracy. Across both benchmarks, persona prompts generally did not improve accuracy relative to a no-persona baseline. Expert personas showed no consistent benefit across models, with few exceptions. Domain-mismatched expert personas sometimes degraded performance. Low-knowledge personas often reduced accuracy. These results are about the accuracy of answers only; personas may serve other purposes (such as altering the tone of outputs), beyond improving factual performance.

Recent studies have shown promising results in the detection of Mild Cognitive Impairment (MCI) using easily accessible Electroencephalogram (EEG) data which would help administer early and effective treatment for dementia patients. However, the reliability and practicality of such systems remains unclear. In this work, we investigate the potential limitations and challenges in developing a robust MCI detection method using two contrasting datasets: 1) CAUEEG, collected and annotated by expert neurologists in controlled settings and 2) GENEEG, a new dataset collected and annotated in general practice clinics, a setting where routine MCI diagnoses are typically made. We find that training on small datasets, as is done by most previous works, tends to produce high variance models that make overconfident predictions, and are unreliable in practice. Additionally, distribution shifts between datasets make cross-domain generalization challenging. Finally, we show that MCI detection using EEG may suffer from fundamental limitations because of the overlapping nature of feature distributions with control groups. We call for more effort in high-quality data collection in actionable settings (like general practice clinics) to make progress towards this salient goal of non-invasive MCI detection.

Large language models frequently rely on both contextual input and parametric knowledge to perform tasks. However, these sources can come into conflict, especially when retrieved documents contradict the model's parametric knowledge. We propose a diagnostic framework to systematically evaluate LLM behavior under context-memory conflict, where the contextual information diverges from their parametric beliefs. We construct diagnostic data that elicit these conflicts and analyze model performance across multiple task types. Our findings reveal that (1) knowledge conflict has minimal impact on tasks that do not require knowledge utilization, (2) model performance is consistently higher when contextual and parametric knowledge are aligned, (3) models are unable to fully suppress their internal knowledge even when instructed, and (4) providing rationales that explain the conflict increases reliance on contexts. These insights raise concerns about the validity of model-based evaluation and underscore the need to account for knowledge conflict in the deployment of LLMs.

Transferring reasoning capabilities from larger language models to smaller ones through supervised fine-tuning often fails counterintuitively, with performance degrading despite access to high-quality teacher demonstrations. We identify that this failure stems from distributional misalignment: reasoning traces from larger models contain tokens that are low probability under the student's distribution, exceeding the internal representation capacity of smaller architectures and creating learning barriers rather than helpful guidance. We propose Reverse Speculative Decoding (RSD), a mechanism for generating student-friendly reasoning traces in which the teacher model proposes candidate tokens but the student model determines acceptance based on its own probability distributions, filtering low probability tokens. When applied to Qwen3-0.6B, direct distillation of s1K-1.1 reasoning trace data degrades average performance across major reasoning benchmarks by 20.5\%, while the same model trained on RSD-generated reasoning traces achieves meaningful improvements of 4.9\%. Our analysis reveals that low probability tokens constitute the critical bottleneck in reasoning ability transfer. However, cross-model experiments demonstrate that RSD traces are model-specific rather than universally applicable, indicating that distributional alignment must be tailored for each student architecture's unique internal representation.

Recent works have shown the benefits to LLMs from fine-tuning golden-standard Chain-of-Thought (CoT) rationales or using them as correct examples in few-shot prompting. While humans can indeed imitate correct examples, learning from our mistakes is another vital aspect of human cognition. Hence, a question naturally arises: can LLMs learn and benefit from their mistakes, especially for their reasoning? This study investigates this problem from both the prompting and model-tuning perspectives. We begin by introducing CoTErrorSet, a new benchmark with 609,432 questions, each designed with both correct and error references, and demonstrating the types and reasons for making such mistakes. To explore the effectiveness of those mistakes, we design two methods: (1) Self-rethinking prompting guides LLMs to rethink whether they have made similar previous mistakes; and (2) Mistake tuning involves finetuning models in both correct and incorrect reasoning domains, rather than only tuning models to learn ground truth in traditional methodology. We conduct a series of experiments to prove LLMs can obtain benefits from mistakes in both directions. Our two methods offer potentially cost-effective strategies by leveraging errors to enhance reasoning capabilities, which costs significantly less than creating meticulously hand-crafted golden references. We ultimately make a thorough analysis of the reasons behind LLMs' errors, which provides directions that future research needs to overcome. CoTErrorSet will be published soon on \url{https://github.com/YookiTong/Learn-from-Mistakes-CotErrorSet}.

Implicit bias refers to automatic or spontaneous mental processes that shape perceptions, judgments, and behaviors. Previous research examining `implicit bias' in large language models (LLMs) has often approached the phenomenon differently than how it is studied in humans by focusing primarily on model outputs rather than on model processing. To examine model processing, we present a method called the Reasoning Model Implicit Association Test (RM-IAT) for studying implicit bias-like patterns in reasoning models: LLMs that employ step-by-step reasoning to solve complex tasks. Using this method, we find that reasoning models require more tokens when processing association-incompatible information compared to association-compatible information. These findings suggest AI systems harbor patterns in processing information that are analogous to human implicit bias. We consider the implications of these implicit bias-like patterns for their deployment in real-world applications.

Trained on vast corpora of human language, language models demonstrate emergent human-like reasoning abilities. Yet they are still far from true intelligence, which opens up intriguing opportunities to explore the parallels of humans and model behaviors. In this work, we study the ability to skip steps in reasoning - a hallmark of human expertise developed through practice. Unlike humans, who may skip steps to enhance efficiency or to reduce cognitive load, models do not inherently possess such motivations to minimize reasoning steps. To address this, we introduce a controlled framework that stimulates step-skipping behavior by iteratively refining models to generate shorter and accurate reasoning paths. Empirical results indicate that models can develop the step skipping ability under our guidance. Moreover, after fine-tuning on expanded datasets that include both complete and skipped reasoning sequences, the models can not only resolve tasks with increased efficiency without sacrificing accuracy, but also exhibit comparable and even enhanced generalization capabilities in out-of-domain scenarios. Our work presents the first exploration into human-like step-skipping ability and provides fresh perspectives on how such cognitive abilities can benefit AI models.

The emergence of large language models (LLMs) has opened up exciting possibilities for simulating human behavior and cognitive processes, with potential applications in various domains, including marketing research and consumer behavior analysis. However, the validity of utilizing LLMs as stand-ins for human subjects remains uncertain due to glaring divergences that suggest fundamentally different underlying processes at play and the sensitivity of LLM responses to prompt variations. This paper presents a novel approach based on Shapley values from cooperative game theory to interpret LLM behavior and quantify the relative contribution of each prompt component to the model's output. Through two applications - a discrete choice experiment and an investigation of cognitive biases - we demonstrate how the Shapley value method can uncover what we term "token noise" effects, a phenomenon where LLM decisions are disproportionately influenced by tokens providing minimal informative content. This phenomenon raises concerns about the robustness and generalizability of insights obtained from LLMs in the context of human behavior simulation. Our model-agnostic approach extends its utility to proprietary LLMs, providing a valuable tool for practitioners and researchers to strategically optimize prompts and mitigate apparent cognitive biases. Our findings underscore the need for a more nuanced understanding of the factors driving LLM responses before relying on them as substitutes for human subjects in survey settings. We emphasize the importance of researchers reporting results conditioned on specific prompt templates and exercising caution when drawing parallels between human behavior and LLMs.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) often exhibit structural fragility in complex reasoning tasks, failing to produce correct answers even after successfully deriving valid intermediate steps. Through systematic analysis, we observe that these failures frequently stem not from a lack of reasoning capacity, but from a deficiency in self-regulatory control, where valid logic is destabilized by uncontrolled exploration or the failure to recognize logical sufficiency. Motivated by this observation, we propose Metacognitive Behavioral Tuning (MBT), a post-training framework that explicitly injects metacognitive behaviors into the model's thought process. MBT implements this via two complementary formulations: (1) MBT-S, which synthesizes rigorous reasoning traces from scratch, and (2) MBT-R, which rewrites the student's initial traces to stabilize intrinsic exploration patterns. Experiments across multi-hop QA benchmarks demonstrate that MBT consistently outperforms baselines, achieving notable gains on challenging benchmarks. By effectively eliminating reasoning collapse, MBT achieves higher accuracy with significantly reduced token consumption, demonstrating that internalizing metacognitive strategies leads to more stable and robust reasoning.

Can our brain signals faithfully reflect the original visual stimuli, even including high-frequency details? Although human perceptual and cognitive capacities enable us to process and remember visual information, these abilities are constrained by several factors, such as limited attentional resources and the finite capacity of visual memory. When visual stimuli are processed by human visual system into brain signals, some information is inevitably lost, leading to a discrepancy known as the System GAP. Additionally, perceptual and cognitive dynamics, along with technical noise in signal acquisition, degrade the fidelity of brain signals relative to the visual stimuli, known as the Random GAP. When encoded brain representations are directly aligned with the corresponding pretrained image features, the System GAP and Random GAP between paired data challenge the model, requiring it to bridge these gaps. However, in the context of limited paired data, these gaps are difficult for the model to learn, leading to overfitting and poor generalization to new data. To address these GAPs, we propose a simple yet effective approach called the Uncertainty-aware Blur Prior (UBP). It estimates the uncertainty within the paired data, reflecting the mismatch between brain signals and visual stimuli. Based on this uncertainty, UBP dynamically blurs the high-frequency details of the original images, reducing the impact of the mismatch and improving alignment. Our method achieves a top-1 accuracy of 50.9\% and a top-5 accuracy of 79.7\% on the zero-shot brain-to-image retrieval task, surpassing previous state-of-the-art methods by margins of 13.7\% and 9.8\%, respectively. Code is available at https://github.com/HaitaoWuTJU/Uncertainty-aware-Blur-Prior{GitHub}.

The emergence of large-language models (LLMs) that excel at code generation and commercial products such as GitHub's Copilot has sparked interest in human-AI pair programming (referred to as "pAIr programming") where an AI system collaborates with a human programmer. While traditional pair programming between humans has been extensively studied, it remains uncertain whether its findings can be applied to human-AI pair programming. We compare human-human and human-AI pair programming, exploring their similarities and differences in interaction, measures, benefits, and challenges. We find that the effectiveness of both approaches is mixed in the literature (though the measures used for pAIr programming are not as comprehensive). We summarize moderating factors on the success of human-human pair programming, which provides opportunities for pAIr programming research. For example, mismatched expertise makes pair programming less productive, therefore well-designed AI programming assistants may adapt to differences in expertise levels.

Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate impressive reasoning capabilities in familiar contexts, but struggle when the context conflicts with their parametric knowledge. To investigate this phenomenon, we introduce CounterLogic, a dataset containing 1,800 examples across 9 logical schemas, explicitly designed to evaluate logical reasoning through counterfactual (hypothetical knowledge-conflicting) scenarios. Our systematic evaluation of 11 LLMs across 6 different datasets reveals a consistent performance degradation, with accuracies dropping by 27% on average when reasoning through counterfactual information. We propose Self-Segregate, a prompting method enabling metacognitive awareness (explicitly identifying knowledge conflicts) before reasoning. Our method dramatically narrows the average performance gaps from 27% to just 11%, while significantly increasing the overall accuracy (+7.5%). We discuss the implications of these findings and draw parallels to human cognitive processes, particularly on how humans disambiguate conflicting information during reasoning tasks. Our findings offer practical insights for understanding and enhancing LLMs reasoning capabilities in real-world applications, especially where models must logically reason independently of their factual knowledge.

Do reasoning models have "Aha!" moments? Prior work suggests that models like DeepSeek-R1-Zero undergo sudden mid-trace realizations that lead to accurate outputs, implying an intrinsic capacity for self-correction. Yet, it remains unclear whether such intrinsic shifts in reasoning strategy actually improve performance. Here, we study mid-reasoning shifts and instrument training runs to detect them. Our analysis spans 1M+ reasoning traces, hundreds of training checkpoints, three reasoning domains, and multiple decoding temperatures and model architectures. We find that reasoning shifts are rare, do not become more frequent with training, and seldom improve accuracy, indicating that they do not correspond to prior perceptions of model insight. However, their effect varies with model uncertainty. Building on this finding, we show that artificially triggering extrinsic shifts under high entropy reliably improves accuracy. Our results show that mid-reasoning shifts are symptoms of unstable inference behavior rather than an intrinsic mechanism for self-correction.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs), which autonomously produce a reasoning Chain of Thought (CoT) before producing final responses, offer a promising approach to interpreting and monitoring model behaviors. Inspired by the observation that certain CoT patterns -- e.g., ``Wait, did I miss anything?'' -- consistently emerge across tasks, we explore whether LRMs exhibit human-like cognitive habits. Building on Habits of Mind, a well-established framework of cognitive habits associated with successful human problem-solving, we introduce CogTest, a principled benchmark designed to evaluate LRMs' cognitive habits. CogTest includes 16 cognitive habits, each instantiated with 25 diverse tasks, and employs an evidence-first extraction method to ensure reliable habit identification. With CogTest, we conduct a comprehensive evaluation of 16 widely used LLMs (13 LRMs and 3 non-reasoning ones). Our findings reveal that LRMs, unlike conventional LLMs, not only exhibit human-like habits but also adaptively deploy them according to different tasks. Finer-grained analyses further uncover patterns of similarity and difference in LRMs' cognitive habit profiles, particularly certain inter-family similarity (e.g., Qwen-3 models and DeepSeek-R1). Extending the study to safety-related tasks, we observe that certain habits, such as Taking Responsible Risks, are strongly associated with the generation of harmful responses. These findings suggest that studying persistent behavioral patterns in LRMs' CoTs is a valuable step toward deeper understanding of LLM misbehavior. The code is available at: https://github.com/jianshuod/CogTest.

Pretraining corpora contain extensive discourse about AI systems, yet the causal influence of this discourse on downstream alignment remains poorly understood. If prevailing descriptions of AI behaviour are predominantly negative, LLMs may internalise corresponding behavioural priors, giving rise to self-fulfilling misalignment. This paper provides the first controlled study of this hypothesis by pretraining 6.9B-parameter LLMs with varying amounts of (mis)alignment discourse. We find that discussion of AI contributes to misalignment. Upsampling synthetic training documents about AI misalignment leads to a notable increase in misaligned behaviour. Conversely, upsampling documents about aligned behaviour reduces misalignment scores from 45% to 9%. We consider this evidence of self-fulfilling alignment. These effects are dampened, but persist through post-training. Our findings establish the study of how pretraining data shapes alignment priors, or alignment pretraining, as a complement to post-training. We recommend practitioners pretrain for alignment as well as capabilities. Our models and datasets are available at alignmentpretraining.ai

Large language models (LLMs) reason over discrete token ID sequences, yet modern subword tokenizers routinely produce non-unique encodings: multiple token ID sequences can detokenize to identical surface strings. This representational mismatch creates an unmeasured fragility wherein reasoning processes can fail. LLMs may treat two internal representations as distinct "words" even when they are semantically identical at the text level. In this work, we show that tokenization can betray LLM reasoning through one-to-many token ID mappings. We introduce a tokenization-consistency probe that requires models to replace designated target words in context while leaving all other content unchanged. The task is intentionally simple at the surface level, enabling us to attribute failures to tokenizer-detokenizer artifacts rather than to knowledge gaps or parameter limitations. Through analysis of over 11000 replacement trials across state-of-the-art open-source LLMs, we find a non-trivial rate of outputs exhibit phantom edits: cases where models operate under the illusion of correct reasoning, a phenomenon arising from tokenizer-induced representational defects. We further analyze these cases and provide a taxonomy of eight systematic tokenizer artifacts, including whitespace-boundary shifts and intra-word resegmentation. These findings indicate that part of apparent reasoning deficiency originates in the tokenizer layer, motivating tokenizer-level remedies before incurring the cost of training ever-larger models on ever-larger corpora.

Human cognitive behavior arises from the interaction of specialized brain networks dedicated to distinct functions, such as language, logic, and social reasoning. Inspired by this organization, we propose Mixture of Cognitive Reasoners (MiCRo): a modular, transformer-based architecture post-trained with a curriculum that induces functional specialization across experts. Concretely, we partition the layers of a pretrained language model into four expert modules aligned with well-studied cognitive networks in the human brain. MiCRo offers three key advantages over standard language models. (1) The specialized experts are interpretable and causally meaningful -- ablating a module causes substantial drops on benchmarks requiring its specialized domain. (2) MiCRo's behavior can be dynamically steered at inference time by routing tokens to particular experts (e.g., favoring social over logical reasoning), enabling fine-grained control over outputs. (3) MiCRo outperforms or matches comparable baselines on both machine-learning reasoning benchmarks (e.g., GSM8K, BBH) and alignment to human behavior (CogBench), while maintaining interpretability. Taken together, cognitively grounded functional specialization yields models that are both more human-like and more human-interpretable.

Recent studies show that instruction tuning and learning from human feedback improve the abilities of large language models (LMs) dramatically. While these tuning methods can make models generate high-quality text, we conjecture that more implicit cognitive biases may arise in these fine-tuned models. Our work provides evidence that these fine-tuned models exhibit biases that were absent or less pronounced in their pretrained predecessors. We examine the extent of this phenomenon in three cognitive biases - the decoy effect, the certainty effect, and the belief bias - all of which are known to influence human decision-making and reasoning. Our findings highlight the presence of these biases in various models, especially those that have undergone instruction tuning, such as Flan-T5, GPT3.5, and GPT4. This research constitutes a step toward comprehending cognitive biases in instruction-tuned LMs, which is crucial for the development of more reliable and unbiased language models.

Deep search agents powered by large language models have demonstrated strong capabilities in multi-step retrieval, reasoning, and long-horizon task execution. However, their practical failures often stem from the lack of mechanisms to monitor and regulate reasoning and retrieval states as tasks evolve under uncertainty. Insights from cognitive neuroscience suggest that human metacognition is hierarchically organized, integrating fast anomaly detection with selectively triggered, experience-driven reflection. In this work, we propose Deep Search with Meta-Cognitive Monitoring (DS-MCM), a deep search framework augmented with an explicit hierarchical metacognitive monitoring mechanism. DS-MCM integrates a Fast Consistency Monitor, which performs lightweight checks on the alignment between external evidence and internal reasoning confidence, and a Slow Experience-Driven Monitor, which is selectively activated to guide corrective intervention based on experience memory from historical agent trajectories. By embedding monitoring directly into the reasoning-retrieval loop, DS-MCM determines both when intervention is warranted and how corrective actions should be informed by prior experience. Experiments across multiple deep search benchmarks and backbone models demonstrate that DS-MCM consistently improves performance and robustness.

While numerous works have assessed the generative performance of language models (LMs) on tasks requiring Theory of Mind reasoning, research into the models' internal representation of mental states remains limited. Recent work has used probing to demonstrate that LMs can represent beliefs of themselves and others. However, these claims are accompanied by limited evaluation, making it difficult to assess how mental state representations are affected by model design and training choices. We report an extensive benchmark with various LM types with different model sizes, fine-tuning approaches, and prompt designs to study the robustness of mental state representations and memorisation issues within the probes. Our results show that the quality of models' internal representations of the beliefs of others increases with model size and, more crucially, with fine-tuning. We are the first to study how prompt variations impact probing performance on theory of mind tasks. We demonstrate that models' representations are sensitive to prompt variations, even when such variations should be beneficial. Finally, we complement previous activation editing experiments on Theory of Mind tasks and show that it is possible to improve models' reasoning performance by steering their activations without the need to train any probe.

We propose and test the LLM Brain Rot Hypothesis: continual exposure to junk web text induces lasting cognitive decline in large language models (LLMs). To causally isolate data quality, we run controlled experiments on real Twitter/X corpora, constructing junk and reversely controlled datasets via two orthogonal operationalizations: M1 (engagement degree) and M2 (semantic quality), with matched token scale and training operations across conditions. Contrary to the control group, continual pre-training of 4 LLMs on the junk dataset causes non-trivial declines (Hedges' g>0.3) on reasoning, long-context understanding, safety, and inflating "dark traits" (e.g., psychopathy, narcissism). The gradual mixtures of junk and control datasets also yield dose-response cognition decay: for example, under M1, ARC-Challenge with Chain Of Thoughts drops 74.9 rightarrow 57.2 and RULER-CWE 84.4 rightarrow 52.3 as junk ratio rises from 0% to 100%. Error forensics reveal several key insights. First, we identify thought-skipping as the primary lesion: models increasingly truncate or skip reasoning chains, explaining most of the error growth. Second, partial but incomplete healing is observed: scaling instruction tuning and clean data pre-training improve the declined cognition yet cannot restore baseline capability, suggesting persistent representational drift rather than format mismatch. Finally, we discover that the popularity, a non-semantic metric, of a tweet is a better indicator of the Brain Rot effect than the length in M1. Together, the results provide significant, multi-perspective evidence that data quality is a causal driver of LLM capability decay, reframing curation for continual pretraining as a training-time safety problem and motivating routine "cognitive health checks" for deployed LLMs.

IQ testing has served as a foundational methodology for evaluating human cognitive capabilities, deliberately decoupling assessment from linguistic background, language proficiency, or domain-specific knowledge to isolate core competencies in abstraction and reasoning. Yet, artificial intelligence research currently lacks systematic benchmarks to quantify these critical cognitive dimensions in multimodal systems. To address this critical gap, we propose MM-IQ, a comprehensive evaluation framework comprising 2,710 meticulously curated test items spanning 8 distinct reasoning paradigms. Through systematic evaluation of leading open-source and proprietary multimodal models, our benchmark reveals striking limitations: even state-of-the-art architectures achieve only marginally superior performance to random chance (27.49% vs. 25% baseline accuracy). This substantial performance chasm highlights the inadequacy of current multimodal systems in approximating fundamental human reasoning capacities, underscoring the need for paradigm-shifting advancements to bridge this cognitive divide.

Do machines and humans process language in similar ways? A recent line of research has hinted in the affirmative, demonstrating that human brain signals can be effectively predicted using the internal representations of language models (LMs). This is thought to reflect shared computational principles between LMs and human language processing. However, there are also clear differences in how LMs and humans acquire and use language, even if the final task they are performing is the same. Despite this, there is little work exploring systematic differences between human and machine language processing using brain data. To address this question, we examine the differences between LM representations and the human brain's responses to language, specifically by examining a dataset of Magnetoencephalography (MEG) responses to a written narrative. In doing so we identify three phenomena that, in prior work, LMs have been found to not capture well: emotional understanding, figurative language processing, and physical commonsense. By fine-tuning LMs on datasets related to these phenomena, we observe that fine-tuned LMs show improved alignment with human brain responses across these tasks. Our study implies that the observed divergences between LMs and human brains may stem from LMs' inadequate representation of these specific types of knowledge.

Large language models are powerful systems that excel at many tasks, ranging from translation to mathematical reasoning. Yet, at the same time, these models often show unhuman-like characteristics. In the present paper, we address this gap and ask whether large language models can be turned into cognitive models. We find that -- after finetuning them on data from psychological experiments -- these models offer accurate representations of human behavior, even outperforming traditional cognitive models in two decision-making domains. In addition, we show that their representations contain the information necessary to model behavior on the level of individual subjects. Finally, we demonstrate that finetuning on multiple tasks enables large language models to predict human behavior in a previously unseen task. Taken together, these results suggest that large, pre-trained models can be adapted to become generalist cognitive models, thereby opening up new research directions that could transform cognitive psychology and the behavioral sciences as a whole.

The impressive performance of recent language models across a wide range of tasks suggests that they possess a degree of abstract reasoning skills. Are these skills general and transferable, or specialized to specific tasks seen during pretraining? To disentangle these effects, we propose an evaluation framework based on "counterfactual" task variants that deviate from the default assumptions underlying standard tasks. Across a suite of 11 tasks, we observe nontrivial performance on the counterfactual variants, but nevertheless find that performance substantially and consistently degrades compared to the default conditions. This suggests that while current LMs may possess abstract task-solving skills to a degree, they often also rely on narrow, non-transferable procedures for task-solving. These results motivate a more careful interpretation of language model performance that teases apart these aspects of behavior.

Accurate estimation of item (question or task) difficulty is critical for educational assessment but suffers from the cold start problem. While Large Language Models demonstrate superhuman problem-solving capabilities, it remains an open question whether they can perceive the cognitive struggles of human learners. In this work, we present a large-scale empirical analysis of Human-AI Difficulty Alignment for over 20 models across diverse domains such as medical knowledge and mathematical reasoning. Our findings reveal a systematic misalignment where scaling up model size is not reliably helpful; instead of aligning with humans, models converge toward a shared machine consensus. We observe that high performance often impedes accurate difficulty estimation, as models struggle to simulate the capability limitations of students even when being explicitly prompted to adopt specific proficiency levels. Furthermore, we identify a critical lack of introspection, as models fail to predict their own limitations. These results suggest that general problem-solving capability does not imply an understanding of human cognitive struggles, highlighting the challenge of using current models for automated difficulty prediction.

As multimodal foundational models start being deployed experimentally in Self-Driving cars, a reasonable question we ask ourselves is how similar to humans do these systems respond in certain driving situations -- especially those that are out-of-distribution? To study this, we create the Robusto-1 dataset that uses dashcam video data from Peru, a country with one of the worst (aggressive) drivers in the world, a high traffic index, and a high ratio of bizarre to non-bizarre street objects likely never seen in training. In particular, to preliminarly test at a cognitive level how well Foundational Visual Language Models (VLMs) compare to Humans in Driving, we move away from bounding boxes, segmentation maps, occupancy maps or trajectory estimation to multi-modal Visual Question Answering (VQA) comparing both humans and machines through a popular method in systems neuroscience known as Representational Similarity Analysis (RSA). Depending on the type of questions we ask and the answers these systems give, we will show in what cases do VLMs and Humans converge or diverge allowing us to probe on their cognitive alignment. We find that the degree of alignment varies significantly depending on the type of questions asked to each type of system (Humans vs VLMs), highlighting a gap in their alignment.

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit cognitive biases -- systematic tendencies of irrational decision-making, similar to those seen in humans. Prior work has found that these biases vary across models and can be amplified by instruction tuning. However, it remains unclear if these differences in biases stem from pretraining, finetuning, or even random noise due to training stochasticity. We propose a two-step causal experimental approach to disentangle these factors. First, we finetune models multiple times using different random seeds to study how training randomness affects over 30 cognitive biases. Second, we introduce cross-tuning -- swapping instruction datasets between models to isolate bias sources. This swap uses datasets that led to different bias patterns, directly testing whether biases are dataset-dependent. Our findings reveal that while training randomness introduces some variability, biases are mainly shaped by pretraining: models with the same pretrained backbone exhibit more similar bias patterns than those sharing only finetuning data. These insights suggest that understanding biases in finetuned models requires considering their pretraining origins beyond finetuning effects. This perspective can guide future efforts to develop principled strategies for evaluating and mitigating bias in LLMs.

Human biases impact the way people analyze data and make decisions. Recent work has shown that some visualization designs can better support cognitive processes and mitigate cognitive biases (i.e., errors that occur due to the use of mental "shortcuts"). In this work, we explore how visualizing a user's interaction history (i.e., which data points and attributes a user has interacted with) can be used to mitigate potential biases that drive decision making by promoting conscious reflection of one's analysis process. Given an interactive scatterplot-based visualization tool, we showed interaction history in real-time while exploring data (by coloring points in the scatterplot that the user has interacted with), and in a summative format after a decision has been made (by comparing the distribution of user interactions to the underlying distribution of the data). We conducted a series of in-lab experiments and a crowd-sourced experiment to evaluate the effectiveness of interaction history interventions toward mitigating bias. We contextualized this work in a political scenario in which participants were instructed to choose a committee of 10 fictitious politicians to review a recent bill passed in the U.S. state of Georgia banning abortion after 6 weeks, where things like gender bias or political party bias may drive one's analysis process. We demonstrate the generalizability of this approach by evaluating a second decision making scenario related to movies. Our results are inconclusive for the effectiveness of interaction history (henceforth referred to as interaction traces) toward mitigating biased decision making. However, we find some mixed support that interaction traces, particularly in a summative format, can increase awareness of potential unconscious biases.

Aligning large language models with human preferences is critical for creating reliable and controllable AI systems. A human preference can be visualized as a high-dimensional vector where different directions represent trade-offs between desired attributes (e.g., helpfulness vs. verbosity). Yet, because the training data often reflects dominant, average preferences, LLMs tend to perform well on common requests but fall short in specific, individual needs. This mismatch creates a preference coverage gap. Existing methods often address this through costly retraining, which may not be generalized to the full spectrum of diverse preferences. This brittleness means that when a user's request reflects a nuanced preference deviating from the training data's central tendency, model performance can degrade unpredictably. To address this challenge, we introduce Robust Preference Selection (RPS), a post-hoc, training-free method by leveraging directional neighborhood consensus. Instead of forcing a model to generate a response from a single, highly specific preference, RPS samples multiple responses from a local neighborhood of related preferences to create a superior candidate pool. It then selects the response that best aligns with the user's original intent. We provide a theoretical framework showing our neighborhood generation strategy is provably superior to a strong baseline that also samples multiple candidates. Comprehensive experiments across three distinct alignment paradigms (DPA, DPO, and SFT) demonstrate that RPS consistently improves robustness against this baseline, achieving win rates of up to 69% on challenging preferences from under-represented regions of the space without any model retraining. Our work presents a practical, theoretically-grounded solution for enhancing the reliability of preference-aligned models.

Knowledge distillation has become a primary mechanism for transferring reasoning and domain expertise from frontier Large Language Models (LLMs) to smaller, deployable students. However, the dominant paradigm remains off-policy: students train on static teacher-generated data and never encounter their own errors during learning. This train--test mismatch, an instance of exposure bias, causes prediction errors to compound autoregressively at inference time. On-Policy Distillation (OPD) addresses this by letting the student generate its own trajectories and receive teacher feedback on these self-generated outputs, grounding distillation in the theory of interactive imitation learning. Despite rapid growth spanning divergence minimization, reward-guided learning, and self-play, the OPD literature remains fragmented with no unified treatment. This survey provides the first comprehensive overview of OPD for LLMs. We introduce a unified f-divergence framework over on-policy samples and organize the landscape along three orthogonal dimensions: feedback signal (logit-based, outcome-based, or self-play), teacher access (white-box, black-box, or teacher-free), and loss granularity (token-level, sequence-level, or hybrid). We systematically analyze representative methods, examine industrial deployments, and identify open problems including distillation scaling laws, uncertainty-aware feedback, and agent-level distillation.

Previous research has shown that LLMs finetuned on malicious or incorrect completions within narrow domains (e.g., insecure code or incorrect medical advice) can become broadly misaligned to exhibit harmful behaviors, which is called emergent misalignment. In this work, we investigate whether this phenomenon can extend beyond safety behaviors to a broader spectrum of dishonesty and deception under high-stakes scenarios (e.g., lying under pressure and deceptive behavior). To explore this, we finetune open-sourced LLMs on misaligned completions across diverse domains. Experimental results demonstrate that LLMs show broadly misaligned behavior in dishonesty. Additionally, we further explore this phenomenon in a downstream combined finetuning setting, and find that introducing as little as 1% of misalignment data into a standard downstream task is sufficient to decrease honest behavior over 20%. Furthermore, we consider a more practical human-AI interaction environment where we simulate both benign and biased users to interact with the assistant LLM. Notably, we find that the assistant can be misaligned unintentionally to exacerbate its dishonesty with only 10% biased user population. In summary, we extend the study of emergent misalignment to the domain of dishonesty and deception under high-stakes scenarios, and demonstrate that this risk arises not only through direct finetuning, but also in downstream mixture tasks and practical human-AI interactions.

Misinformation - false or misleading information - is considered a significant societal concern due to its associated "misinformation effects," such as political polarization, erosion of trust in institutions, problematic behavior, and public health challenges. However, the prevailing concept is misaligned with what is studied. While misinformation focuses on instances of information about factual matters, the broad spectrum of effects often manifests at a societal level and is shaped by a wide range of interdependent factors such as identity, values, opinions, epistemologies, and disagreements. Unsurprisingly, misinformation effects can occur without the prevalence of misinformation, and misinformation does not necessarily increase the effects studied. Here, we propose using disagreement - conflicting attitudes and beliefs between individuals and communities - as a way to study misinformation effects because it addresses the identified conceptual limitations of misinformation. Furthermore, unlike misinformation, disagreement does not require researchers to determine whether a given information is false or misleading. Thus, it can be studied and, more importantly, measured without the need to make a normative judgment about a given information, even when the specific topic is entirely removed, as we show in a longitudinal disagreement measurement. We demonstrate that disagreement, as a holistic concept, provides better explanations for the occurrence of misinformation effects, enhances precision in developing appropriate interventions, and offers a promising approach for evaluating them through quantification. Finally, we show how disagreement addresses current misinformation research questions and conclude with recommendations for research practice.

When do machine learning systems fail to generalize, and what mechanisms could improve their generalization? Here, we draw inspiration from cognitive science to argue that one weakness of machine learning systems is their failure to exhibit latent learning -- learning information that is not relevant to the task at hand, but that might be useful in a future task. We show how this perspective links failures ranging from the reversal curse in language modeling to new findings on agent-based navigation. We then highlight how cognitive science points to episodic memory as a potential part of the solution to these issues. Correspondingly, we show that a system with an oracle retrieval mechanism can use learning experiences more flexibly to generalize better across many of these challenges. We also identify some of the essential components for effectively using retrieval, including the importance of within-example in-context learning for acquiring the ability to use information across retrieved examples. In summary, our results illustrate one possible contributor to the relative data inefficiency of current machine learning systems compared to natural intelligence, and help to understand how retrieval methods can complement parametric learning to improve generalization.

Recent studies show evidence for emergent cognitive abilities in Large Pre-trained Language Models (PLMs). The increasing cognitive alignment of these models has made them candidates for cognitive science theories. Prior research into the emergent cognitive abilities of PLMs has largely been path-independent to model training, i.e., has focused on the final model weights and not the intermediate steps. However, building plausible models of human cognition using PLMs would benefit from considering the developmental alignment of their performance during training to the trajectories of children's thinking. Guided by psychometric tests of human intelligence, we choose four sets of tasks to investigate the alignment of ten popular families of PLMs and evaluate their available intermediate and final training steps. These tasks are Numerical ability, Linguistic abilities, Conceptual understanding, and Fluid reasoning. We find a striking regularity: regardless of model size, the developmental trajectories of PLMs consistently exhibit a window of maximal alignment to human cognitive development. Before that window, training appears to endow "blank slate" models with the requisite structure to be poised to rapidly learn from experience. After that window, training appears to serve the engineering goal of reducing loss but not the scientific goal of increasing alignment with human cognition.

Existing Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are predominantly trained and tested on consistent visual-textual inputs, leaving open the question of whether they can handle inconsistencies in real-world, layout-rich content. To bridge this gap, we propose the Multimodal Inconsistency Reasoning (MMIR) benchmark to assess MLLMs' ability to detect and reason about semantic mismatches in artifacts such as webpages, presentation slides, and posters. MMIR comprises 534 challenging samples, each containing synthetically injected errors across five reasoning-heavy categories: Factual Contradiction, Identity Misattribution, Contextual Mismatch, Quantitative Discrepancy, and Temporal/Spatial Incoherence. We evaluate six state-of-the-art MLLMs, showing that models with dedicated multimodal reasoning capabilities, such as o1, substantially outperform their counterparts while open-source models remain particularly vulnerable to inconsistency errors. Detailed error analyses further show that models excel in detecting inconsistencies confined to a single modality, particularly in text, but struggle with cross-modal conflicts and complex layouts. Probing experiments reveal that single-modality prompting, including Chain-of-Thought (CoT) and Set-of-Mark (SoM) methods, yields marginal gains, revealing a key bottleneck in cross-modal reasoning. Our findings highlight the need for advanced multimodal reasoning and point to future research on multimodal inconsistency.

The structure of causal language model training assumes that each token can be accurately predicted from the previous context. This contrasts with humans' natural writing and reasoning process, where goals are typically known before the exact argument or phrasings. While this mismatch has been well studied in the literature, the working assumption has been that architectural changes are needed to address this mismatch. We argue that rearranging and processing the training data sequences can allow models to more accurately imitate the true data-generating process, and does not require any other changes to the architecture or training infrastructure. We demonstrate that this technique, Trelawney, and the inference algorithms derived from it allow us to improve performance on several key benchmarks that span planning, algorithmic reasoning, and story generation tasks. Finally, our method naturally enables the generation of long-term goals at no additional cost. We investigate how using the model's goal-generation capability can further improve planning and reasoning. Additionally, we believe Trelawney could potentially open doors to new capabilities beyond the current language modeling paradigm.

The deployment of pre-trained perception models in novel environments often leads to performance degradation due to distributional shifts. Although recent artificial intelligence approaches for metacognition use logical rules to characterize and filter model errors, improving precision often comes at the cost of reduced recall. This paper addresses the hypothesis that leveraging multiple pre-trained models can mitigate this recall reduction. We formulate the challenge of identifying and managing conflicting predictions from various models as a consistency-based abduction problem. The input predictions and the learned error detection rules derived from each model are encoded in a logic program. We then seek an abductive explanation--a subset of model predictions--that maximizes prediction coverage while ensuring the rate of logical inconsistencies (derived from domain constraints) remains below a specified threshold. We propose two algorithms for this knowledge representation task: an exact method based on Integer Programming (IP) and an efficient Heuristic Search (HS). Through extensive experiments on a simulated aerial imagery dataset featuring controlled, complex distributional shifts, we demonstrate that our abduction-based framework outperforms individual models and standard ensemble baselines, achieving, for instance, average relative improvements of approximately 13.6% in F1-score and 16.6% in accuracy across 15 diverse test datasets when compared to the best individual model. Our results validate the use of consistency-based abduction as an effective mechanism to robustly integrate knowledge from multiple imperfect reasoners in challenging, novel scenarios.

Recent advancements in Generative Reward Models (GRMs) have demonstrated that scaling the length of Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning considerably enhances the reliability of evaluation. However, current works predominantly rely on unstructured length scaling, ignoring the divergent efficacy of different reasoning mechanisms: Breadth-CoT (B-CoT, i.e., multi-dimensional principle coverage) and Depth-CoT (D-CoT, i.e., substantive judgment soundness). To address this, we introduce Mix-GRM, a framework that reconfigures raw rationales into structured B-CoT and D-CoT through a modular synthesis pipeline, subsequently employing Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) and Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) to internalize and optimize these mechanisms. Comprehensive experiments demonstrate that Mix-GRM establishes a new state-of-the-art across five benchmarks, surpassing leading open-source RMs by an average of 8.2\%. Our results reveal a clear divergence in reasoning: B-CoT benefits subjective preference tasks, whereas D-CoT excels in objective correctness tasks. Consequently, misaligning the reasoning mechanism with the task directly degrades performance. Furthermore, we demonstrate that RLVR acts as a switching amplifier, inducing an emergent polarization where the model spontaneously allocates its reasoning style to match task demands. The synthesized data and models are released at https://huggingface.co/collections/DonJoey/mix-grm{Hugging Face}, and the code is released at https://github.com/Don-Joey/Mix-GRM{Github}.

Analogical reasoning is at the core of human cognition, serving as an important foundation for a variety of intellectual activities. While prior work has shown that LLMs can represent task patterns and surface-level concepts, it remains unclear whether these models can encode high-level relational concepts and apply them to novel situations through structured comparisons. In this work, we explore this fundamental aspect using proportional and story analogies, and identify three key findings. First, LLMs effectively encode the underlying relationships between analogous entities; both attributive and relational information propagate through mid-upper layers in correct cases, whereas reasoning failures reflect missing relational information within these layers. Second, unlike humans, LLMs often struggle not only when relational information is missing, but also when attempting to apply it to new entities. In such cases, strategically patching hidden representations at critical token positions can facilitate information transfer to a certain extent. Lastly, successful analogical reasoning in LLMs is marked by strong structural alignment between analogous situations, whereas failures often reflect degraded or misplaced alignment. Overall, our findings reveal that LLMs exhibit emerging but limited capabilities in encoding and applying high-level relational concepts, highlighting both parallels and gaps with human cognition.

Although synthetic data is widely promoted as a remedy, its prevailing production paradigm -- one optimizing for statistical smoothness -- systematically removes the long-tail, cognitively grounded irregularities that characterize human text. Prolonged training on such statistically optimal but cognitively impoverished data accelerates model collapse. This paper proposes a paradigm shift: instead of imitating the surface properties of data, we simulate the cognitive processes that generate human text. We introduce the Prompt-driven Cognitive Computing Framework (PMCSF), whose core consists of a Cognitive State Decoder (CSD) that reverse-engineers unstructured text into structured cognitive vectors, and a Cognitive Text Encoder (CTE) that re-materializes these states into text enriched with human-typical imperfections via mathematically defined Cognitive Perturbation Operators. The framework is validated through a two-stage objective evaluation pipeline. First, in cognitive codec verification, CTE text yields a Jensen-Shannon divergence of 0.0614 from human text (vs. 0.4431 for standard LLM output), passes double-blind professional media review, and achieves an intraclass correlation coefficient ICC > 0.9 for cognitive profile alignment across heterogeneous models. Second, in functional gain evaluation, isomorphic stress tests in the A-share market show that strategies incorporating CTE-generated data reduce maximum drawdown by 47.4% during the 2015 crash and deliver 8.6% Defensive Alpha, exceeding transaction costs by a factor of 33. Our findings demonstrate that modelling human cognitive limitations -- not copying surface data -- enables synthetic data with genuine functional gain, offering a viable technical pathway toward resolving the AI data-collapse crisis.

Cognitive psychologists have documented that humans use cognitive heuristics, or mental shortcuts, to make quick decisions while expending less effort. While performing annotation work on crowdsourcing platforms, we hypothesize that such heuristic use among annotators cascades on to data quality and model robustness. In this work, we study cognitive heuristic use in the context of annotating multiple-choice reading comprehension datasets. We propose tracking annotator heuristic traces, where we tangibly measure low-effort annotation strategies that could indicate usage of various cognitive heuristics. We find evidence that annotators might be using multiple such heuristics, based on correlations with a battery of psychological tests. Importantly, heuristic use among annotators determines data quality along several dimensions: (1) known biased models, such as partial input models, more easily solve examples authored by annotators that rate highly on heuristic use, (2) models trained on annotators scoring highly on heuristic use don't generalize as well, and (3) heuristic-seeking annotators tend to create qualitatively less challenging examples. Our findings suggest that tracking heuristic usage among annotators can potentially help with collecting challenging datasets and diagnosing model biases.

Large Language Models with transformer architecture have revolutionized the domain of text generation, setting unprecedented benchmarks. Despite their impressive capabilities, LLMs have been criticized for generating outcomes that deviate from factual accuracy or display logical inconsistencies, phenomena commonly referred to as hallucinations. This term, however, has often been misapplied to any results deviating from the instructor's expectations, which this paper defines as attention misdirection rather than true hallucinations. Understanding the distinction between hallucinations and attention misdirection becomes increasingly relevant in business contexts, where the ramifications of such errors can significantly impact the value extraction from these inherently pre-trained models. This paper highlights the best practices of the PGI, Persona, Grouping, and Intelligence, method, a strategic framework that achieved a remarkable error rate of only 3,15 percent across 4,000 responses generated by GPT in response to a real business challenge. It emphasizes that by equipping experimentation with knowledge, businesses can unlock opportunities for innovation through the use of these natively pre-trained models. This reinforces the notion that strategic application grounded in a skilled team can maximize the benefits of emergent technologies such as the LLMs.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) demonstrate remarkable capabilities on complex tasks, exhibiting emergent, human-like thinking patterns. Despite their advances, we identify a fundamental limitation: current LRMs lack a dedicated meta-level cognitive system-an essential faculty in human cognition that enables "thinking about thinking". This absence leaves their emergent abilities uncontrollable (non-adaptive reasoning), unreliable (intermediate error), and inflexible (lack of a clear methodology). To address this gap, we introduce Meta-R1, a systematic and generic framework that endows LRMs with explicit metacognitive capabilities. Drawing on principles from cognitive science, Meta-R1 decomposes the reasoning process into distinct object-level and meta-level components, orchestrating proactive planning, online regulation, and adaptive early stopping within a cascaded framework. Experiments on three challenging benchmarks and against eight competitive baselines demonstrate that Meta-R1 is: (I) high-performing, surpassing state-of-the-art methods by up to 27.3%; (II) token-efficient, reducing token consumption to 15.7% ~ 32.7% and improving efficiency by up to 14.8% when compared to its vanilla counterparts; and (III) transferable, maintaining robust performance across datasets and model backbones.

There is increasing interest in the application large language models (LLMs) to the medical field, in part because of their impressive performance on medical exam questions. While promising, exam questions do not reflect the complexity of real patient-doctor interactions. In reality, physicians' decisions are shaped by many complex factors, such as patient compliance, personal experience, ethical beliefs, and cognitive bias. Taking a step toward understanding this, our hypothesis posits that when LLMs are confronted with clinical questions containing cognitive biases, they will yield significantly less accurate responses compared to the same questions presented without such biases. In this study, we developed BiasMedQA, a benchmark for evaluating cognitive biases in LLMs applied to medical tasks. Using BiasMedQA we evaluated six LLMs, namely GPT-4, Mixtral-8x70B, GPT-3.5, PaLM-2, Llama 2 70B-chat, and the medically specialized PMC Llama 13B. We tested these models on 1,273 questions from the US Medical Licensing Exam (USMLE) Steps 1, 2, and 3, modified to replicate common clinically-relevant cognitive biases. Our analysis revealed varying effects for biases on these LLMs, with GPT-4 standing out for its resilience to bias, in contrast to Llama 2 70B-chat and PMC Llama 13B, which were disproportionately affected by cognitive bias. Our findings highlight the critical need for bias mitigation in the development of medical LLMs, pointing towards safer and more reliable applications in healthcare.

We find that the response length of reasoning LLMs, whether trained by reinforcement learning or supervised learning, drastically increases for ill-posed questions with missing premises (MiP), ending up with redundant and ineffective thinking. This newly introduced scenario exacerbates the general overthinking issue to a large extent, which we name as the MiP-Overthinking. Such failures are against the ``test-time scaling law'' but have been widely observed on multiple datasets we curated with MiP, indicating the harm of cheap overthinking and a lack of critical thinking. Surprisingly, LLMs not specifically trained for reasoning exhibit much better performance on the MiP scenario, producing much shorter responses that quickly identify ill-posed queries. This implies a critical flaw of the current training recipe for reasoning LLMs, which does not encourage efficient thinking adequately, leading to the abuse of thinking patterns. To further investigate the reasons behind such failures, we conduct fine-grained analyses of the reasoning length, overthinking patterns, and location of critical thinking on different types of LLMs. Moreover, our extended ablation study reveals that the overthinking is contagious through the distillation of reasoning models' responses. These results improve the understanding of overthinking and shed novel insights into mitigating the problem.

In order for AI systems to communicate effectively with people, they must understand how we make decisions. However, people's decisions are not always rational, so the implicit internal models of human decision-making in Large Language Models (LLMs) must account for this. Previous empirical evidence seems to suggest that these implicit models are accurate -- LLMs offer believable proxies of human behavior, acting how we expect humans would in everyday interactions. However, by comparing LLM behavior and predictions to a large dataset of human decisions, we find that this is actually not the case: when both simulating and predicting people's choices, a suite of cutting-edge LLMs (GPT-4o & 4-Turbo, Llama-3-8B & 70B, Claude 3 Opus) assume that people are more rational than we really are. Specifically, these models deviate from human behavior and align more closely with a classic model of rational choice -- expected value theory. Interestingly, people also tend to assume that other people are rational when interpreting their behavior. As a consequence, when we compare the inferences that LLMs and people draw from the decisions of others using another psychological dataset, we find that these inferences are highly correlated. Thus, the implicit decision-making models of LLMs appear to be aligned with the human expectation that other people will act rationally, rather than with how people actually act.

Imitation learning from human-provided demonstrations is a strong approach for learning policies for robot manipulation. While the ideal dataset for imitation learning is homogenous and low-variance -- reflecting a single, optimal method for performing a task -- natural human behavior has a great deal of heterogeneity, with several optimal ways to demonstrate a task. This multimodality is inconsequential to human users, with task variations manifesting as subconscious choices; for example, reaching down, then across to grasp an object, versus reaching across, then down. Yet, this mismatch presents a problem for interactive imitation learning, where sequences of users improve on a policy by iteratively collecting new, possibly conflicting demonstrations. To combat this problem of demonstrator incompatibility, this work designs an approach for 1) measuring the compatibility of a new demonstration given a base policy, and 2) actively eliciting more compatible demonstrations from new users. Across two simulation tasks requiring long-horizon, dexterous manipulation and a real-world "food plating" task with a Franka Emika Panda arm, we show that we can both identify incompatible demonstrations via post-hoc filtering, and apply our compatibility measure to actively elicit compatible demonstrations from new users, leading to improved task success rates across simulated and real environments.

As recent multi-modality large language models (MLLMs) have shown formidable proficiency on various complex tasks, there has been increasing attention on debating whether these models could eventually mirror human intelligence. However, existing benchmarks mainly focus on evaluating solely on task performance, such as the accuracy of identifying the attribute of an object. Combining well-developed cognitive science to understand the intelligence of MLLMs beyond superficial achievements remains largely unexplored. To this end, we introduce the first cognitive-driven multi-lingual and multi-modal benchmark to evaluate the general intelligence ability of MLLMs, dubbed M3GIA. Specifically, we identify five key cognitive factors based on the well-recognized Cattell-Horn-Carrol (CHC) model of intelligence and propose a novel evaluation metric. In addition, since most MLLMs are trained to perform in different languages, a natural question arises: is language a key factor influencing the cognitive ability of MLLMs? As such, we go beyond English to encompass other languages based on their popularity, including Chinese, French, Spanish, Portuguese and Korean, to construct our M3GIA. We make sure all the data relevant to the cultural backgrounds are collected from their native context to avoid English-centric bias. We collected a significant corpus of data from human participants, revealing that the most advanced MLLM reaches the lower boundary of human intelligence in English. Yet, there remains a pronounced disparity in the other five languages assessed. We also reveals an interesting winner takes all phenomenon that are aligned with the discovery in cognitive studies. Our benchmark will be open-sourced, with the aspiration of facilitating the enhancement of cognitive capabilities in MLLMs.

Modeling plausible student misconceptions is critical for AI in education. In this work, we examine how large language models (LLMs) reason about misconceptions when generating multiple-choice distractors, a task that requires modeling incorrect yet plausible answers by coordinating solution knowledge, simulating student misconceptions, and evaluating plausibility. We introduce a taxonomy for analyzing the strategies used by state-of-the-art LLMs, examining their reasoning procedures and comparing them to established best practices in the learning sciences. Our structured analysis reveals a surprising alignment between their processes and best practices: the models typically solve the problem correctly first, then articulate and simulate multiple potential misconceptions, and finally select a set of distractors. An analysis of failure modes reveals that errors arise primarily from failures in recovering the correct solution and selecting among response candidates, rather than simulating errors or structuring the process. Consistent with these results, we find that providing the correct solution in the prompt improves alignment with human-authored distractors by 8%, highlighting the critical role of anchoring to the correct solution when generating plausible incorrect student reasoning. Overall, our analysis offers a structured and interpretable lens into LLMs' ability to model incorrect student reasoning and produce high-quality distractors.

Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) are increasingly applied to scientific research, yet it remains unclear whether they can reliably understand and reason over the multimodal complexity of papers. A central challenge lies in detecting and resolving inconsistencies across text, figures, tables, and equations, issues that are often subtle, domain-specific, and ultimately undermine clarity, reproducibility, and trust. Existing benchmarks overlook this issue, either isolating single modalities or relying on synthetic errors that fail to capture real-world complexity. We introduce PRISMM-Bench (Peer-Review-sourced Inconsistency Set for Multimodal Models), the first benchmark grounded in real reviewer-flagged inconsistencies in scientific papers. Through a multi-stage pipeline of review mining, LLM-assisted filtering and human verification, we curate 262 inconsistencies from 242 papers. Based on this set, we design three tasks, namely inconsistency identification, remedy and pair matching, which assess a model's capacity to detect, correct, and reason over inconsistencies across different modalities. Furthermore, to address the notorious problem of choice-only shortcuts in multiple-choice evaluation, where models exploit answer patterns without truly understanding the question, we further introduce structured JSON-based answer representations that minimize linguistic biases by reducing reliance on superficial stylistic cues. We benchmark 21 leading LMMs, including large open-weight models (GLM-4.5V 106B, InternVL3 78B) and proprietary models (Gemini 2.5 Pro, GPT-5 with high reasoning). Results reveal strikingly low performance (26.1-54.2%), underscoring the challenge of multimodal scientific reasoning and motivating progress towards trustworthy scientific assistants.

Current large language models (LLMs) excel in verifiable domains where outputs can be checked before action but prove less reliable for high-stakes strategic decisions with uncertain outcomes. This gap, driven by mutually reinforcing cognitive biases in both humans and artificial intelligence (AI) systems, threatens the defensibility of valuations and sustainability of investments in the sector. This report describes a framework emerging from systematic qualitative assessment across 7 frontier-grade LLMs and 3 market-facing venture vignettes under time pressure. Detailed prompting specifying decision partnership and explicitly instructing avoidance of sycophancy, confabulation, solution drift, and nihilism achieved initial partnership state but failed to maintain it under operational pressure. Sustaining protective partnership state required an emergent 7-stage calibration sequence, built upon a 4-stage initialization process, within a 5-layer protection architecture enabling bias self-monitoring, human-AI adversarial challenge, partnership state verification, performance degradation detection, and stakeholder protection. Three discoveries resulted: partnership state is achievable through ordered calibration but requires emergent maintenance protocols; reliability degrades when architectural drift and context exhaustion align; and dissolution discipline prevents costly pursuit of fundamentally wrong directions. Cross-model validation revealed systematic performance differences across LLM architectures. This approach demonstrates that human-AI teams can achieve cognitive partnership capable of preventing avoidable regret in high-stakes decisions, addressing return-on-investment expectations that depend on AI systems supporting consequential decision-making without introducing preventable cognitive traps when verification arrives too late.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) are widely documented to be sensitive to minor prompt perturbations and prone to sycophantic alignment with user biases, their robustness in consequential, rule-bound decision-making remains under-explored. In this work, we uncover a striking "Paradox of Robustness": despite their known lexical brittleness, instruction-tuned LLMs exhibit a behavioral and near-total invariance to emotional framing effects. Using a novel controlled perturbation framework across three high-stakes domains (healthcare, law, and finance), we quantify a robustness gap where LLMs demonstrate 110-300 times greater resistance to narrative manipulation than human subjects. Specifically, we find a near-zero effect size for models (Cohen's h = 0.003) compared to the substantial biases observed in humans (Cohen's h in [0.3, 0.8]). This result is highly counterintuitive and suggests the mechanisms driving sycophancy and prompt sensitivity do not necessarily translate to a failure in logical constraint satisfaction. We show that this invariance persists across models with diverse training paradigms. Our findings show that while LLMs may be "brittle" to how a query is formatted, they are remarkably "stable" against why a decision should be biased. Our findings establish that instruction-tuned models can decouple logical rule-adherence from persuasive narratives, offering a source of decision stability that complements, and even potentially de-biases, human judgment in institutional contexts. We release the 162-scenario benchmark, code, and data to facilitate the rigorous evaluation of narrative-induced bias and robustness on GitHub.com.

Recent reasoning LLMs (RLMs), especially those trained with verifier-based reinforcement learning, often perform worse with few-shot CoT than with direct answering. We revisit this paradox using high-quality reasoning traces from DeepSeek-R1 as demonstrations and find that adding more exemplars consistently degrades accuracy, even when demonstrations are optimal. A detailed analysis reveals two mechanisms behind this decline: (i) semantic misguidance, where high textual similarity leads the model to treat the target as the same as the exemplar and to copy intermediate steps verbatim; and (ii) strategy transfer failure, where the model struggles to extract useful reasoning strategies and apply them to target questions. Guided by these, we introduce Insight-to-Solve (I2S), a sequential test-time procedure that turns demonstrations into explicit, reusable insights and derives a target-specific reasoning trace; optionally, the reasoning is self-refined for coherence and correctness (I2S+). Extensive experiments on diverse benchmarks show that I2S and I2S+ consistently outperform both direct answering and test-time scaling baselines across open- and closed-source models. Even for GPT models, our method helps: on AIME'25, GPT-4.1 rises by +14.0%, and o1-mini improves by +2.7% on AIME and +1.7% on GPQA, indicating that in-context demonstrations can be harnessed effectively via insight-refine-solve framework.

Large language models (LLMs) can sometimes report the strategies they actually use to solve tasks, but they can also fail to do so. This suggests some degree of metacognition -- the capacity to monitor one's own cognitive processes for subsequent reporting and self-control. Metacognitive abilities enhance AI capabilities but raise safety concerns, as models might obscure their internal processes to evade neural-activation-based oversight mechanisms designed to detect harmful behaviors. Given society's increased reliance on these models, it is critical that we understand the limits of their metacognitive abilities, particularly their ability to monitor their internal activations. To address this, we introduce a neuroscience-inspired neurofeedback paradigm designed to quantify the ability of LLMs to explicitly report and control their activation patterns. By presenting models with sentence-label pairs where labels correspond to sentence-elicited internal activations along specific directions in the neural representation space, we demonstrate that LLMs can learn to report and control these activations. The performance varies with several factors: the number of example pairs provided, the semantic interpretability of the target neural direction, and the variance explained by that direction. These results reveal a "metacognitive space" with dimensionality much lower than the model's neural space, suggesting LLMs can monitor only a subset of their neural mechanisms. Our findings provide empirical evidence quantifying metacognitive capabilities in LLMs, with significant implications for AI safety.

Learning from mistakes is a fundamental feature of human intelligence. Previous work has shown that Large Language Models (LLMs) can also learn from incorrect answers when provided with a comprehensive rationale detailing why an answer is wrong or how to correct it. In this work, we examine whether LLMs can learn from mistakes in mathematical reasoning tasks when these explanations are not provided. We investigate if LLMs are able to implicitly infer such rationales simply from observing both incorrect and correct answers. Surprisingly, we find that LLMs perform better, on average, when rationales are eliminated from the context and incorrect answers are simply shown alongside correct ones. This approach also substantially outperforms chain-of-thought prompting in our evaluations. We show that these results are consistent across LLMs of different sizes and varying reasoning abilities. Further, we carry out an in-depth analysis, and show that prompting with both wrong and correct answers leads to greater performance and better generalisation than introducing additional, more diverse question-answer pairs into the context. Finally, we show that new rationales generated by models that have only observed incorrect and correct answers are scored equally as highly by humans as those produced with the aid of exemplar rationales. Our results demonstrate that LLMs are indeed capable of in-context implicit learning.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly optimized for long reasoning, under the assumption that more reasoning leads to better performance. However, emerging evidence suggests that longer responses can sometimes degrade accuracy rather than improve it. In this paper, we conduct a systematic empirical study of the relationship between reasoning length and answer correctness. We find that LLMs tend to overthink simple problems, generating unnecessarily long outputs, and underthink harder ones, failing to extend their reasoning when it is most needed. This indicates that models might misjudge problem difficulty and fail to calibrate their response length appropriately. Furthermore, we investigate the effects of length reduction with a preference optimization algorithm when simply preferring the shorter responses regardless of answer correctness. Experiments show that the generation length can be significantly reduced while maintaining acceptable accuracy. Our findings highlight generation length as a meaningful signal for reasoning behavior and motivate further exploration into LLMs' self-awareness in reasoning length adaptation.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) promise enhanced reasoning by integrating diverse inputs such as text, vision, and audio. Yet cross-modal reasoning remains underexplored, with conflicting reports on whether added modalities help or harm performance. These inconsistencies stem from a lack of controlled evaluation frameworks and analysis of models' internals to isolate when and why modality interactions support or undermine reasoning. We address this gap through a logic-grounded evaluation framework that categorizes multimodal reasoning into six interaction patterns, varying how facts are distributed across modalities and logically combined. Empirically, additional modalities enhance reasoning only when they provide independent and sufficient reasoning paths, while redundant or chained entailment support often hurts performance. Moreover, reasoning degrades in three systematic ways: weaker modalities drag down overall performance, conflicts bias preference toward certain modalities, and joint signals from different modalities fail to be integrated effectively. Therefore, we identify two core failures: task-composition bottleneck, where recognition and reasoning cannot be jointly executed in one pass, and fusion bottleneck, where early integration introduces bias. For further investigation, we find that attention patterns fail to encode fact usefulness, but a simple two-step prompting (recognize then reason) restores performance, confirming the task-composition bottleneck. Moreover, modality identity remains recoverable in early layers, and softening attention in early fusion improves reasoning, highlighting biased fusion as another failure mode. Overall, our findings show that integration, not perception, is the main barrier to multimodal reasoning, suggesting composition-aware training and early fusion control as promising directions.

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) involves training policy models (PMs) and reward models (RMs) to align language models with human preferences. Instead of focusing solely on PMs and RMs independently, we propose to examine their interactions during fine-tuning, introducing the concept of seamlessness. Our study starts with observing the saturation phenomenon, where continual improvements in RM and PM do not translate into RLHF progress. Our analysis shows that RMs fail to assign proper scores to PM responses, resulting in a 35% mismatch rate with human preferences, highlighting a significant discrepancy between PM and RM. To measure seamlessness between PM and RM without human effort, we propose an automatic metric, SEAM. SEAM quantifies the discrepancies between PM and RM judgments induced by data samples. We validate the effectiveness of SEAM in data selection and model augmentation. Our experiments demonstrate that (1) using SEAM-filtered data for RL training improves RLHF performance by 4.5%, and (2) SEAM-guided model augmentation results in a 4% performance improvement over standard augmentation methods.

Large Language Models (LLMs) trained via Reinforcement Learning (RL) have recently achieved impressive results on reasoning benchmarks. Yet, growing evidence shows that these models often generate longer but ineffective chains of thought (CoTs), calling into question whether benchmark gains reflect real reasoning improvements. We present new evidence of overthinking, where models disregard correct solutions even when explicitly provided, instead continuing to generate unnecessary reasoning steps that often lead to incorrect conclusions. Experiments on three state-of-the-art models using the AIME2024 math benchmark reveal critical limitations in these models ability to integrate corrective information, posing new challenges for achieving robust and interpretable reasoning.

Large language models (LLMs) have witnessed rapid advancements, demonstrating remarkable capabilities. However, a notable vulnerability persists: LLMs often uncritically accept flawed or contradictory premises, leading to inefficient reasoning and unreliable outputs. This emphasizes the significance of possessing the Premise Critique Ability for LLMs, defined as the capacity to proactively identify and articulate errors in input premises. Most existing studies assess LLMs' reasoning ability in ideal settings, largely ignoring their vulnerabilities when faced with flawed premises. Thus, we introduce the Premise Critique Bench (PCBench), designed by incorporating four error types across three difficulty levels, paired with multi-faceted evaluation metrics. We conducted systematic evaluations of 15 representative LLMs. Our findings reveal: (1) Most models rely heavily on explicit prompts to detect errors, with limited autonomous critique; (2) Premise critique ability depends on question difficulty and error type, with direct contradictions being easier to detect than complex or procedural errors; (3) Reasoning ability does not consistently correlate with the premise critique ability; (4) Flawed premises trigger overthinking in reasoning models, markedly lengthening responses due to repeated attempts at resolving conflicts. These insights underscore the urgent need to enhance LLMs' proactive evaluation of input validity, positioning premise critique as a foundational capability for developing reliable, human-centric systems. The code is available at https://github.com/MLGroupJLU/Premise_Critique.

In this position paper, we argue that human evaluation of generative large language models (LLMs) should be a multidisciplinary undertaking that draws upon insights from disciplines such as user experience research and human behavioral psychology to ensure that the experimental design and results are reliable. The conclusions from these evaluations, thus, must consider factors such as usability, aesthetics, and cognitive biases. We highlight how cognitive biases can conflate fluent information and truthfulness, and how cognitive uncertainty affects the reliability of rating scores such as Likert. Furthermore, the evaluation should differentiate the capabilities and weaknesses of increasingly powerful large language models -- which requires effective test sets. The scalability of human evaluation is also crucial to wider adoption. Hence, to design an effective human evaluation system in the age of generative NLP, we propose the ConSiDERS-The-Human evaluation framework consisting of 6 pillars -- Consistency, Scoring Criteria, Differentiating, User Experience, Responsible, and Scalability.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) show strong capabilities in complex reasoning, yet their marginal gains on evidence-dependent factual questions are limited. We find this limitation is partially attributable to a reasoning-answer hit gap, where the model identifies the correct facts during reasoning but fails to incorporate them into the final response, thereby reducing factual fidelity. To address this issue, we propose MR-ALIGN, a Meta-Reasoning informed alignment framework that enhances factuality without relying on external verifiers. MR-ALIGN quantifies state transition probabilities along the model's thinking process and constructs a transition-aware implicit reward that reinforces beneficial reasoning patterns while suppressing defective ones at the atomic thinking segments. This re-weighting reshapes token-level signals into probability-aware segment scores, encouraging coherent reasoning trajectories that are more conducive to factual correctness. Empirical evaluations across four factual QA datasets and one long-form factuality benchmark show that MR-ALIGN consistently improves accuracy and truthfulness while reducing misleading reasoning. These results highlight that aligning the reasoning process itself, rather than merely the outputs, is pivotal for advancing factuality in LRMs.

Preference based alignment objectives implicitly assume that all human preferences are expressed with equal strength. In practice, however, preference strength varies across individuals and contexts -- a phenomenon established in behavioral economics and discrete choice theory. This mismatch limits the ability of existing objectives to faithfully capture heterogeneous human judgments. Inspired by this literature, we introduce Mixed Logit Direct Preference Optimization (MixDPO), a generalization of Direct Preference Optimization that models variation in preference strength. MixDPO enables alignment objectives to capture heterogeneity in how strongly preferences are expressed across training examples. We evaluate MixDPO on three preference datasets using two open-weight language models. Across datasets, MixDPO improves aggregate alignment performance (+11.2 points on Pythia-2.8B) while preserving subgroup level preferences, with the largest gains appearing in settings with higher inferred preference heterogeneity. MixDPO makes preference heterogeneity explicit through learned strength distributions. We release our code for reproducibility.

Multiple choice questions (MCQs) are commonly used to evaluate the capabilities of large language models (LLMs). One common way to evaluate the model response is to rank the candidate answers based on the log probability of the first token prediction. An alternative way is to examine the text output. Prior work has shown that first token probabilities lack robustness to changes in MCQ phrasing, and that first token probabilities do not match text answers for instruction-tuned models. Therefore, in this paper, we investigate the robustness of text answers. We show that the text answers are more robust to question perturbations than the first token probabilities, when the first token answers mismatch the text answers. The difference in robustness increases as the mismatch rate becomes greater. As the mismatch reaches over 50\%, the text answer is more robust to option order changes than the debiased first token probabilities using state-of-the-art debiasing methods such as PriDe. Our findings provide further evidence for the benefits of text answer evaluation over first token probability evaluation.

Cognitive diversity, reflected in variations of language, perspective, and reasoning, is essential to creativity and collective intelligence. This diversity is rich and grounded in culture, history, and individual experience. Yet as large language models (LLMs) become deeply embedded in people's lives, they risk standardizing language and reasoning. This Review synthesizes evidence across linguistics, cognitive, and computer science to show how LLMs reflect and reinforce dominant styles while marginalizing alternative voices and reasoning strategies. We examine how their design and widespread use contribute to this effect by mirroring patterns in their training data and amplifying convergence as all people increasingly rely on the same models across contexts. Unchecked, this homogenization risks flattening the cognitive landscapes that drive collective intelligence and adaptability.

Recent advances in applying reinforcement learning (RL) to large language models (LLMs) have led to substantial progress. In particular, a series of remarkable yet often counterintuitive phenomena have been reported in LLMs, exhibiting patterns not typically observed in traditional RL settings. For example, notable claims include that a single training example can match the performance achieved with an entire dataset, that the reward signal does not need to be very accurate, and that training solely with negative samples can match or even surpass sophisticated reward-based methods. However, the precise conditions under which these observations hold - and, critically, when they fail - remain unclear. In this work, we identify a key factor that differentiates RL observations: whether the pretrained model already exhibits strong Model-Task Alignment, as measured by pass@k accuracy on the evaluated task. Through a systematic and comprehensive examination of a series of counterintuitive claims, supported by rigorous experimental validation across different model architectures and task domains, our findings show that while standard RL training remains consistently robust across settings, many of these counterintuitive results arise only when the model and task already exhibit strong model-task alignment. In contrast, these techniques fail to drive substantial learning in more challenging regimes, where standard RL methods remain effective.

Large language models (LLMs) are becoming deeply embedded in human communication and decision-making, yet they inherit the ambiguity, bias, and lack of direct access to truth inherent in language itself. While their outputs are fluent, emotionally resonant, and coherent, they are generated through statistical prediction rather than grounded reasoning. This creates the risk of hallucination, responses that sound convincing but lack factual validity. Building on Geoffrey Hinton's observation that AI mirrors human intuition rather than reasoning, this paper argues that LLMs operationalize System 1 cognition at scale: fast, associative, and persuasive, but without reflection or falsification. To address this, we introduce the Rose-Frame, a three-dimensional framework for diagnosing cognitive and epistemic drift in human-AI interaction. The three axes are: (i) Map vs. Territory, which distinguishes representations of reality (epistemology) from reality itself (ontology); (ii) Intuition vs. Reason, drawing on dual-process theory to separate fast, emotional judgments from slow, reflective thinking; and (iii) Conflict vs. Confirmation, which examines whether ideas are critically tested through disagreement or simply reinforced through mutual validation. Each dimension captures a distinct failure mode, and their combination amplifies misalignment. Rose-Frame does not attempt to fix LLMs with more data or rules. Instead, it offers a reflective tool that makes both the model's limitations and the user's assumptions visible, enabling more transparent and critically aware AI deployment. It reframes alignment as cognitive governance: intuition, whether human or artificial, must remain governed by human reason. Only by embedding reflective, falsifiable oversight can we align machine fluency with human understanding.

We study whether Large Language Models (LLMs) latently perform multi-hop reasoning with complex prompts such as "The mother of the singer of 'Superstition' is". We look for evidence of a latent reasoning pathway where an LLM (1) latently identifies "the singer of 'Superstition'" as Stevie Wonder, the bridge entity, and (2) uses its knowledge of Stevie Wonder's mother to complete the prompt. We analyze these two hops individually and consider their co-occurrence as indicative of latent multi-hop reasoning. For the first hop, we test if changing the prompt to indirectly mention the bridge entity instead of any other entity increases the LLM's internal recall of the bridge entity. For the second hop, we test if increasing this recall causes the LLM to better utilize what it knows about the bridge entity. We find strong evidence of latent multi-hop reasoning for the prompts of certain relation types, with the reasoning pathway used in more than 80% of the prompts. However, the utilization is highly contextual, varying across different types of prompts. Also, on average, the evidence for the second hop and the full multi-hop traversal is rather moderate and only substantial for the first hop. Moreover, we find a clear scaling trend with increasing model size for the first hop of reasoning but not for the second hop. Our experimental findings suggest potential challenges and opportunities for future development and applications of LLMs.

Automated answer matching, which leverages LLMs to evaluate free-text responses by comparing them to a reference answer, shows substantial promise as a scalable and aligned alternative to human evaluation. However, its reliability requires robustness against strategic attacks such as guesswork or verbosity that may artificially inflate scores without improving actual correctness. In this work, we systematically investigate whether such tactics deceive answer matching models by prompting examinee models to: (1) generate verbose responses, (2) provide multiple answers when unconfident, and (3) embed conflicting answers with the correct answer near the start of their response. Our results show that these manipulations do not increase scores and often reduce them. Additionally, binary scoring (which requires a matcher to answer with a definitive "correct" or "incorrect") is more robust to attacks than continuous scoring (which requires a matcher to determine partial correctness). These findings show that answer matching is generally robust to inexpensive text manipulation and is a viable alternative to traditional LLM-as-a-judge or human evaluation when reference answers are available.

Post-training alignment optimizes language models to match human preference signals, but this objective is not equivalent to modeling observed human behavior. We compare 120 base-aligned model pairs on more than 10,000 real human decisions in multi-round strategic games - bargaining, persuasion, negotiation, and repeated matrix games. In these settings, base models outperform their aligned counterparts in predicting human choices by nearly 10:1, robustly across model families, prompt formulations, and game configurations. This pattern reverses, however, in settings where human behavior is more likely to follow normative predictions: aligned models dominate on one-shot textbook games across all 12 types tested and on non-strategic lottery choices - and even within the multi-round games themselves, at round one, before interaction history develops. This boundary-condition pattern suggests that alignment induces a normative bias: it improves prediction when human behavior is relatively well captured by normative solutions, but hurts prediction in multi-round strategic settings, where behavior is shaped by descriptive dynamics such as reciprocity, retaliation, and history-dependent adaptation. These results reveal a fundamental trade-off between optimizing models for human use and using them as proxies for human behavior.

Deductive reasoning plays a pivotal role in the formulation of sound and cohesive arguments. It allows individuals to draw conclusions that logically follow, given the truth value of the information provided. Recent progress in the domain of large language models (LLMs) has showcased their capability in executing deductive reasoning tasks. Nonetheless, a significant portion of research primarily assesses the accuracy of LLMs in solving such tasks, often overlooking a deeper analysis of their reasoning behavior. In this study, we draw upon principles from cognitive psychology to examine inferential strategies employed by LLMs, through a detailed evaluation of their responses to propositional logic problems. Our findings indicate that LLMs display reasoning patterns akin to those observed in humans, including strategies like supposition following or chain construction. Moreover, our research demonstrates that the architecture and scale of the model significantly affect its preferred method of reasoning, with more advanced models tending to adopt strategies more frequently than less sophisticated ones. Importantly, we assert that a model's accuracy, that is the correctness of its final conclusion, does not necessarily reflect the validity of its reasoning process. This distinction underscores the necessity for more nuanced evaluation procedures in the field.

Large language models (LLMs) often exhibit unexpected errors or unintended behavior, even at scale. While recent work reveals the discrepancy between LLMs and humans in skill compositions, the learning dynamics of skill compositions and the underlying cause of non-human behavior remain elusive. In this study, we investigate the mechanism of learning dynamics by training transformers on synthetic arithmetic tasks. Through extensive ablations and fine-grained diagnostic metrics, we discover that transformers do not reliably build skill compositions according to human-like sequential rules. Instead, they often acquire skills in reverse order or in parallel, which leads to unexpected mixing errors especially under distribution shifts--a phenomenon we refer to as shattered compositionality. To explain these behaviors, we provide evidence that correlational matching to the training data, rather than causal or procedural composition, shapes learning dynamics. We further show that shattered compositionality persists in modern LLMs and is not mitigated by pure model scaling or scratchpad-based reasoning. Our results reveal a fundamental mismatch between a model's learning behavior and desired skill compositions, with implications for reasoning reliability, out-of-distribution robustness, and alignment.

Current Large Language Models have achieved Olympiad-level logic, yet Vision-Language Models paradoxically falter on elementary spatial tasks like block counting. This capability mismatch reveals a critical ``spatial intelligence gap,'' where models fail to construct coherent 3D mental representations from 2D observations. We uncover this gap via diagnostic analyses showing the bottleneck is a missing view-consistent spatial interface rather than insufficient visual features or weak reasoning. To bridge this, we introduce 3ViewSense, a framework that grounds spatial reasoning in Orthographic Views. Drawing on engineering cognition, we propose a ``Simulate-and-Reason'' mechanism that decomposes complex scenes into canonical orthographic projections to resolve geometric ambiguities. By aligning egocentric perceptions with these allocentric references, our method facilitates explicit mental rotation and reconstruction. Empirical results on spatial reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that our method significantly outperforms existing baselines, with consistent gains on occlusion-heavy counting and view-consistent spatial reasoning. The framework also improves the stability and consistency of spatial descriptions, offering a scalable path toward stronger spatial intelligence in multimodal systems.

Modern language models can imitate complex patterns through few-shot learning, enabling them to complete challenging tasks without fine-tuning. However, imitation can also lead models to reproduce inaccuracies or harmful content if present in the context. We study harmful imitation through the lens of a model's internal representations, and identify two related phenomena: "overthinking" and "false induction heads". The first phenomenon, overthinking, appears when we decode predictions from intermediate layers, given correct vs. incorrect few-shot demonstrations. At early layers, both demonstrations induce similar model behavior, but the behavior diverges sharply at some "critical layer", after which the accuracy given incorrect demonstrations progressively decreases. The second phenomenon, false induction heads, are a possible mechanistic cause of overthinking: these are heads in late layers that attend to and copy false information from previous demonstrations, and whose ablation reduces overthinking. Beyond scientific understanding, our results suggest that studying intermediate model computations could be a promising avenue for understanding and guarding against harmful model behaviors.

Large language models (LLMs) are currently at the forefront of intertwining AI systems with human communication and everyday life. Therefore, it is of great importance to evaluate their emerging abilities. In this study, we show that LLMs like GPT-3 exhibit behavior that strikingly resembles human-like intuition - and the cognitive errors that come with it. However, LLMs with higher cognitive capabilities, in particular ChatGPT and GPT-4, learned to avoid succumbing to these errors and perform in a hyperrational manner. For our experiments, we probe LLMs with the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) as well as semantic illusions that were originally designed to investigate intuitive decision-making in humans. Our study demonstrates that investigating LLMs with methods from psychology has the potential to reveal otherwise unknown emergent traits.

Large language models (LLMs) such as OpenAI's o1 have demonstrated remarkable abilities in complex reasoning tasks by scaling test-time compute and exhibiting human-like deep thinking. However, we identify a phenomenon we term underthinking, where o1-like LLMs frequently switch between different reasoning thoughts without sufficiently exploring promising paths to reach a correct solution. This behavior leads to inadequate depth of reasoning and decreased performance, particularly on challenging mathematical problems. To systematically analyze this issue, we conduct experiments on three challenging test sets and two representative open-source o1-like models, revealing that frequent thought switching correlates with incorrect responses. We introduce a novel metric to quantify underthinking by measuring token efficiency in incorrect answers. To address underthinking, we propose a decoding strategy with thought switching penalty TIP that discourages premature transitions between thoughts, encouraging deeper exploration of each reasoning path. Experimental results demonstrate that our approach improves accuracy across challenging datasets without requiring model fine-tuning. Our findings contribute to understanding reasoning inefficiencies in o1-like LLMs and offer a practical solution to enhance their problem-solving capabilities.

With the widespread adoption of large language models (LLMs), hallucinations, which are non-factual fabrications in model outputs, have become serious concerns. Reasoning capabilities have received attention as a self-verification process to improve output reliability. However, the effect of reasoning within a closed system where LLMs cannot rely on external tools or knowledge has yet to be clarified. We therefore conduct experiments under strict constraints (recommending peer-reviewed journal articles in computer science) to examine the effect of reasoning across multiple models (GPT-5.2 and Gemini 3 Flash). Our results reveal a problematic trade-off between constraint compliance and factual accuracy. Non-reasoning models exhibit high constraint violation rates (66-75%) but maintain factual accuracy, while reasoning models reduce violations (13-26%) but systematically distort known facts to satisfy constraints and increase complete fabrication. This trade-off pattern is consistent across both models despite different architectures, indicating a fundamental limitation of reasoning. Furthermore, reasoning does not uniformly improve output authenticity: effects diverge by model, reflecting different allocations of the compliance-truthfulness trade-off. These findings challenge the assumption that reasoning universally improves reliability: reasoning models trade honest constraint violations for detection-resistant distortions.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) reveal a perplexing phenomenon in continual learning: despite extensive training, models experience significant performance declines, raising questions about task alignment and underlying knowledge retention. This study first explores the concept of "spurious forgetting", proposing that such performance drops often reflect a decline in task alignment rather than true knowledge loss. Through controlled experiments with a synthesized dataset, we investigate the dynamics of model performance during the initial training phases of new tasks, discovering that early optimization steps can disrupt previously established task alignments. Our theoretical analysis connects these shifts to orthogonal updates in model weights, providing a robust framework for understanding this behavior. Ultimately, we introduce a Freezing strategy that fix the bottom layers of the model, leading to substantial improvements in four continual learning scenarios. Our findings underscore the critical distinction between task alignment and knowledge retention, paving the way for more effective strategies in continual learning.

The lack of a concrete definition for Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) obscures the gap between today's specialized AI and human-level cognition. This paper introduces a quantifiable framework to address this, defining AGI as matching the cognitive versatility and proficiency of a well-educated adult. To operationalize this, we ground our methodology in Cattell-Horn-Carroll theory, the most empirically validated model of human cognition. The framework dissects general intelligence into ten core cognitive domains-including reasoning, memory, and perception-and adapts established human psychometric batteries to evaluate AI systems. Application of this framework reveals a highly "jagged" cognitive profile in contemporary models. While proficient in knowledge-intensive domains, current AI systems have critical deficits in foundational cognitive machinery, particularly long-term memory storage. The resulting AGI scores (e.g., GPT-4 at 27%, GPT-5 at 58%) concretely quantify both rapid progress and the substantial gap remaining before AGI.

Reasoning language models (RLMs) excel at complex tasks by leveraging a chain-of-thought process to generate structured intermediate steps. However, language mixing, i.e., reasoning steps containing tokens from languages other than the prompt, has been observed in their outputs and shown to affect performance, though its impact remains debated. We present the first systematic study of language mixing in RLMs, examining its patterns, impact, and internal causes across 15 languages, 7 task difficulty levels, and 18 subject areas, and show how all three factors influence language mixing. Moreover, we demonstrate that the choice of reasoning language significantly affects performance: forcing models to reason in Latin or Han scripts via constrained decoding notably improves accuracy. Finally, we show that the script composition of reasoning traces closely aligns with that of the model's internal representations, indicating that language mixing reflects latent processing preferences in RLMs. Our findings provide actionable insights for optimizing multilingual reasoning and open new directions for controlling reasoning languages to build more interpretable and adaptable RLMs.

Large reasoning models exhibit remarkable reasoning capabilities via long, elaborate reasoning trajectories. Supervised fine-tuning on such reasoning traces, also known as distillation, can be a cost-effective way to boost reasoning capabilities of student models. However, empirical observations reveal that these reasoning trajectories are often suboptimal, switching excessively between different lines of thought, resulting in under-thinking, over-thinking, and even degenerate responses. We introduce Retro-Search, an MCTS-inspired search algorithm, for distilling higher quality reasoning paths from large reasoning models. Retro-Search retrospectively revises reasoning paths to discover better, yet shorter traces, which can then lead to student models with enhanced reasoning capabilities with shorter, thus faster inference. Our approach can enable two use cases: self-improvement, where models are fine-tuned on their own Retro-Search-ed thought traces, and weak-to-strong improvement, where a weaker model revises stronger model's thought traces via Retro-Search. For self-improving, R1-distill-7B, fine-tuned on its own Retro-Search-ed traces, reduces the average reasoning length by 31.2% while improving performance by 7.7% across seven math benchmarks. For weak-to-strong improvement, we retrospectively revise R1-671B's traces from the OpenThoughts dataset using R1-distill-32B as the Retro-Search-er, a model 20x smaller. Qwen2.5-32B, fine-tuned on this refined data, achieves performance comparable to R1-distill-32B, yielding an 11.3% reduction in reasoning length and a 2.4% performance improvement compared to fine-tuning on the original OpenThoughts data. Our work counters recently emergent viewpoints that question the relevance of search algorithms in the era of large reasoning models, by demonstrating that there are still opportunities for algorithmic advancements, even for frontier models.

Abstract reasoning is a key ability for an intelligent system. Large language models achieve above-chance performance on abstract reasoning tasks, but exhibit many imperfections. However, human abstract reasoning is also imperfect, and depends on our knowledge and beliefs about the content of the reasoning problem. For example, humans reason much more reliably about logical rules that are grounded in everyday situations than arbitrary rules about abstract attributes. The training experiences of language models similarly endow them with prior expectations that reflect human knowledge and beliefs. We therefore hypothesized that language models would show human-like content effects on abstract reasoning problems. We explored this hypothesis across three logical reasoning tasks: natural language inference, judging the logical validity of syllogisms, and the Wason selection task (Wason, 1968). We find that state of the art large language models (with 7 or 70 billion parameters; Hoffman et al., 2022) reflect many of the same patterns observed in humans across these tasks -- like humans, models reason more effectively about believable situations than unrealistic or abstract ones. Our findings have implications for understanding both these cognitive effects, and the factors that contribute to language model performance.

Many cognitive approaches to well-being, such as recognizing and reframing unhelpful thoughts, have received considerable empirical support over the past decades, yet still lack truly widespread adoption in self-help format. A barrier to that adoption is a lack of adequately specific and diverse dedicated practice material. This work examines whether current language models can be leveraged to both produce a virtually unlimited quantity of practice material illustrating standard unhelpful thought patterns matching specific given contexts, and generate suitable positive reframing proposals. We propose PATTERNREFRAME, a novel dataset of about 10k examples of thoughts containing unhelpful thought patterns conditioned on a given persona, accompanied by about 27k positive reframes. By using this dataset to train and/or evaluate current models, we show that existing models can already be powerful tools to help generate an abundance of tailored practice material and hypotheses, with no or minimal additional model training required.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) are increasingly deployed in open-ended, real-world environments where inputs are messy, underspecified, and not always trustworthy. Unlike curated benchmarks, these settings frequently involve instructions that refer to missing objects or contradictory facts, rely on ambiguous references, or request infeasible actions. In such cases, success hinges not on task execution alone, but on a model's ability to detect when something is silently wrong. This paper presents a systematic analysis of how current MLLMs handle such implicit reasoning scenarios: cases where the flaw is not explicitly stated but must be inferred from context. Using a curated diagnostic suite spanning four categories of real-world failure modes, we evaluate six MLLMs, including o3 and GPT-4o, and find that models frequently fail to surface hidden issues, even when they possess the necessary perceptual and reasoning skills. Explicit prompting reveals that the underlying capabilities exist but are often suppressed in favor of user compliance. We further show that simple inference-time interventions, such as cautious persona prompting and, in particular, requiring a clarifying question, can dramatically recover performance. Our findings highlight a persistent gap between reasoning competence and behavioral compliance in current MLLMs and suggest practical strategies for making these models more trustworthy in underconstrained environments.

Information retrieval in Large Language Models (LLMs) is increasingly recognized as intertwined with generation capabilities rather than mere lookup. While longer contexts are often assumed to improve retrieval, the effects of intra-context interference remain understudied. To address this, we adapt the proactive interference (PI) paradigm from cognitive science, where earlier information disrupts recall of newer updates. In humans, susceptibility to such interference is inversely linked to working memory capacity. We introduce PI-LLM, an evaluation that sequentially streams semantically related key-value updates and queries only the final values. Although these final values are clearly positioned just before the query, LLM retrieval accuracy declines log-linearly toward zero as interference accumulates; errors arise from retrieving previously overwritten values. Attempts to mitigate interference via prompt engineering (e.g., instructing models to ignore earlier input) yield limited success. These findings reveal a fundamental constraint on LLMs' ability to disentangle interference and flexibly manipulate information, suggesting a working memory bottleneck beyond mere context access. This calls for approaches that strengthen models' ability to suppress irrelevant content during retrieval.

Large language models have demonstrated impressive performance on challenging mathematical reasoning tasks, which has triggered the discussion of whether the performance is achieved by true reasoning capability or memorization. To investigate this question, prior work has constructed mathematical benchmarks when questions undergo simple perturbations -- modifications that still preserve the underlying reasoning patterns of the solutions. However, no work has explored hard perturbations, which fundamentally change the nature of the problem so that the original solution steps do not apply. To bridge the gap, we construct MATH-P-Simple and MATH-P-Hard via simple perturbation and hard perturbation, respectively. Each consists of 279 perturbed math problems derived from level-5 (hardest) problems in the MATH dataset (Hendrycksmath et. al., 2021). We observe significant performance drops on MATH-P-Hard across various models, including o1-mini (-16.49%) and gemini-2.0-flash-thinking (-12.9%). We also raise concerns about a novel form of memorization where models blindly apply learned problem-solving skills without assessing their applicability to modified contexts. This issue is amplified when using original problems for in-context learning. We call for research efforts to address this challenge, which is critical for developing more robust and reliable reasoning models.

Incongruence detection in eyewitness narratives is critical for understanding the reliability of testimonies, yet traditional approaches often fail to address the nuanced inconsistencies inherent in such accounts. In this paper, we introduce a novel task of incongruence detection in eyewitness testimonies. Given a pair of testimonies containing of multiple pairs of question and answer by two subjects, we identify contextually related incongruence between the two subjects. We also mark the span of incongruences in the utterances. To achieve this, we developed MIND(MultI-EyewitNess Deception) - a comprehensive dataset consisting of 2927 pairs of contextually related answers designed to capture both explicit and implicit contradictions. INstruction - TunEd iNcongruity Detection framework based on 6W and multi-hop reasoning approach, aka. INTEND. Drawing from investigative techniques, INTEND address the task as a close-style problem, contradicting on the who, what, when, where and why aspect of the content. Our findings shows that prompt tuning, especially when utilizing our framework, enhances the detection of incongruences by a margin of +5.63 percent. We compare our approach with multiple fine-tuning and prompt tuning techniques on MLMs and LLMs. Emperical results demonstrate convincing performance improvement in F1-score over fine-tuned and regular prompt-tuning techniques, highlighting the effectiveness of our approach.

Knowledge-dependent tasks typically use two sources of knowledge: parametric, learned at training time, and contextual, given as a passage at inference time. To understand how models use these sources together, we formalize the problem of knowledge conflicts, where the contextual information contradicts the learned information. Analyzing the behaviour of popular models, we measure their over-reliance on memorized information (the cause of hallucinations), and uncover important factors that exacerbate this behaviour. Lastly, we propose a simple method to mitigate over-reliance on parametric knowledge, which minimizes hallucination, and improves out-of-distribution generalization by 4%-7%. Our findings demonstrate the importance for practitioners to evaluate model tendency to hallucinate rather than read, and show that our mitigation strategy encourages generalization to evolving information (i.e., time-dependent queries). To encourage these practices, we have released our framework for generating knowledge conflicts.

Superalignment, where humans are weak supervisors of superhuman models, has become an important and widely discussed issue in the current era of rapid development of Large Language Models (LLMs). The recent work preliminarily studies this problem by using weak models to supervise strong models. It discovers that weakly supervised strong students can consistently outperform weak teachers towards the alignment target, leading to a weak-to-strong generalization phenomenon. However, we are concerned that behind such a promising phenomenon, whether there exists an issue of weak-to-strong deception, where strong models may deceive weak models by exhibiting well-aligned in areas known to weak models but producing misaligned behaviors in cases weak models do not know. We then take an initial step towards exploring this security issue in a specific but realistic multi-objective alignment case, where there may be some alignment targets conflicting with each other (e.g., helpfulness v.s. harmlessness). Such a conflict is likely to cause strong models to deceive weak models in one alignment dimension to gain high reward in other alignment dimension. Our experiments on both the reward modeling task and the preference optimization scenario indicate: (1) the weak-to-strong deception exists; (2) the deception phenomenon may intensify as the capability gap between weak and strong models increases. We also discuss potential solutions and find bootstrapping with an intermediate model can mitigate the deception to some extent. Our work highlights the urgent need to pay more attention to the true reliability of superalignment.

When multiple large language models interact in a shared conversation, do they develop differentiated social roles or converge toward uniform behavior? We present a controlled experimental platform that orchestrates simultaneous multi-agent discussions among 7 heterogeneous LLMs on a unified inference backend, systematically varying group composition, naming conventions, and prompt structure across 12 experimental series (208 runs, 13,786 coded messages). Each message is independently coded on six behavioral flags by two LLM judges from distinct model families (Gemini 3.1 Pro and Claude Sonnet 4.6), achieving mean Cohen's kappa = 0.78 with conservative intersection-based adjudication. Human validation on 609 randomly stratified messages confirmed coding reliability (mean kappa = 0.73 vs. Gemini). We find that (1) heterogeneous groups exhibit significantly richer behavioral differentiation than homogeneous groups (cosine similarity 0.56 vs. 0.85; p < 10^-5, r = 0.70); (2) groups spontaneously exhibit compensatory response patterns when an agent crashes; (3) revealing real model names significantly increases behavioral convergence (cosine 0.56 to 0.77, p = 0.001); and (4) removing all prompt scaffolding converges profiles to homogeneous-level similarity (p < 0.001). Critically, these behaviors are absent when agents operate in isolation, confirming that behavioral diversity is a structured, reproducible phenomenon driven by the interaction of architectural heterogeneity, group context, and prompt-level scaffolding.