Daily Papers

Developing models that can learn to reason is a notoriously challenging problem. We focus on reasoning in relational domains, where the use of Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) seems like a natural choice. However, previous work has shown that regular GNNs lack the ability to systematically generalize from training examples on test graphs requiring longer inference chains, which fundamentally limits their reasoning abilities. A common solution relies on neuro-symbolic methods that systematically reason by learning rules, but their scalability is often limited and they tend to make unrealistically strong assumptions, e.g.\ that the answer can always be inferred from a single relational path. We propose the Epistemic GNN (EpiGNN), a novel parameter-efficient and scalable GNN architecture with an epistemic inductive bias for systematic reasoning. Node embeddings in EpiGNNs are treated as epistemic states, and message passing is implemented accordingly. We show that EpiGNNs achieve state-of-the-art results on link prediction tasks that require systematic reasoning. Furthermore, for inductive knowledge graph completion, EpiGNNs rival the performance of state-of-the-art specialized approaches. Finally, we introduce two new benchmarks that go beyond standard relational reasoning by requiring the aggregation of information from multiple paths. Here, existing neuro-symbolic approaches fail, yet EpiGNNs learn to reason accurately. Code and datasets are available at https://github.com/erg0dic/gnn-sg.

This position paper argues that AI-assisted software engineering requires explicit mechanisms for tracking the epistemic status and temporal validity of architectural decisions. LLM coding assistants generate decisions faster than teams can validate them, yet no widely-adopted framework distinguishes conjecture from verified knowledge, prevents trust inflation through conservative aggregation, or detects when evidence expires. We propose three requirements for responsible AI-assisted engineering: (1) epistemic layers that separate unverified hypotheses from empirically validated claims, (2) conservative assurance aggregation grounded in the Gödel t-norm that prevents weak evidence from inflating confidence, and (3) automated evidence decay tracking that surfaces stale assumptions before they cause failures. We formalize these requirements as the First Principles Framework (FPF), ground its aggregation semantics in fuzzy logic, and define a quintet of invariants that any valid aggregation operator must satisfy. Our retrospective audit applying FPF criteria to two internal projects found that 20-25% of architectural decisions had stale evidence within two months, validating the need for temporal accountability. We outline research directions including learnable aggregation operators, federated evidence sharing, and SMT-based claim validation.

We explore uncertainty quantification in large language models (LLMs), with the goal to identify when uncertainty in responses given a query is large. We simultaneously consider both epistemic and aleatoric uncertainties, where the former comes from the lack of knowledge about the ground truth (such as about facts or the language), and the latter comes from irreducible randomness (such as multiple possible answers). In particular, we derive an information-theoretic metric that allows to reliably detect when only epistemic uncertainty is large, in which case the output of the model is unreliable. This condition can be computed based solely on the output of the model obtained simply by some special iterative prompting based on the previous responses. Such quantification, for instance, allows to detect hallucinations (cases when epistemic uncertainty is high) in both single- and multi-answer responses. This is in contrast to many standard uncertainty quantification strategies (such as thresholding the log-likelihood of a response) where hallucinations in the multi-answer case cannot be detected. We conduct a series of experiments which demonstrate the advantage of our formulation. Further, our investigations shed some light on how the probabilities assigned to a given output by an LLM can be amplified by iterative prompting, which might be of independent interest.

Epistemic Uncertainty is a measure of the lack of knowledge of a learner which diminishes with more evidence. While existing work focuses on using the variance of the Bayesian posterior due to parameter uncertainty as a measure of epistemic uncertainty, we argue that this does not capture the part of lack of knowledge induced by model misspecification. We discuss how the excess risk, which is the gap between the generalization error of a predictor and the Bayes predictor, is a sound measure of epistemic uncertainty which captures the effect of model misspecification. We thus propose a principled framework for directly estimating the excess risk by learning a secondary predictor for the generalization error and subtracting an estimate of aleatoric uncertainty, i.e., intrinsic unpredictability. We discuss the merits of this novel measure of epistemic uncertainty, and highlight how it differs from variance-based measures of epistemic uncertainty and addresses its major pitfall. Our framework, Direct Epistemic Uncertainty Prediction (DEUP) is particularly interesting in interactive learning environments, where the learner is allowed to acquire novel examples in each round. Through a wide set of experiments, we illustrate how existing methods in sequential model optimization can be improved with epistemic uncertainty estimates from DEUP, and how DEUP can be used to drive exploration in reinforcement learning. We also evaluate the quality of uncertainty estimates from DEUP for probabilistic image classification and predicting synergies of drug combinations.

In this paper, we present a conceptual model game to examine the dynamics of asymmetric interactions in games with imperfect information. The game involves two agents with starkly contrasting capabilities: one agent can take actions but has no information of the state of the game, whereas the other agent has perfect information of the state but cannot act or observe the other agent's actions. This duality manifests an extreme form of asymmetry, and how differing abilities influence the possibility of attaining common knowledge. Using Kripke structures and epistemic logic we demonstrate that, under these conditions, common knowledge of the current game state becomes unattainable. Our findings advance the discussion on the strategic limitations of knowledge in environments where information and action are unevenly distributed.

Artificial intelligence commonly refers to the science and engineering of artificial systems that can carry out tasks generally associated with requiring aspects of human intelligence, such as playing games, translating languages, and driving cars. In recent years, there have been exciting advances in learning-based, data-driven approaches towards AI, and machine learning and deep learning have enabled computer systems to perceive the world in unprecedented ways. Reinforcement learning has enabled breakthroughs in complex games such as Go and challenging robotics tasks such as quadrupedal locomotion. A key aspect of intelligence is to not only make predictions, but reason about the uncertainty in these predictions, and to consider this uncertainty when making decisions. This is what this manuscript on "Probabilistic Artificial Intelligence" is about. The first part covers probabilistic approaches to machine learning. We discuss the differentiation between "epistemic" uncertainty due to lack of data and "aleatoric" uncertainty, which is irreducible and stems, e.g., from noisy observations and outcomes. We discuss concrete approaches towards probabilistic inference and modern approaches to efficient approximate inference. The second part of the manuscript is about taking uncertainty into account in sequential decision tasks. We consider active learning and Bayesian optimization -- approaches that collect data by proposing experiments that are informative for reducing the epistemic uncertainty. We then consider reinforcement learning and modern deep RL approaches that use neural network function approximation. We close by discussing modern approaches in model-based RL, which harness epistemic and aleatoric uncertainty to guide exploration, while also reasoning about safety.

To enable quantitative risk assessment of uncontrollable risk states in complex and coupled IoT systems, a new epistemological equation is designed and tested though comparative and empirical analysis. The comparative analysis is conducted on national digital strategies, followed by an empirical analysis of cyber risk assessment approaches. The new epistemological analysis approach enables the assessment of uncontrollable risk states in complex IoT systems, which begin to resemble artificial intelligence, and can be used for a quantitative self-assessment of IoT cyber risk posture.

Artificial intelligence functions not as an epistemic leveller, but as an accelerant of cognitive stratification, entrenching and formalising informational castes within liberal-democratic societies. Synthesising formal epistemology, political theory, algorithmic architecture, and economic incentive structures, the argument traces how contemporary AI systems selectively amplify the reasoning capacity of individuals equipped with recursive abstraction, symbolic logic, and adversarial interrogation, whilst simultaneously pacifying the cognitively untrained through engagement-optimised interfaces. Fluency replaces rigour, immediacy displaces reflection, and procedural reasoning is eclipsed by reactive suggestion. The result is a technocratic realignment of power: no longer grounded in material capital alone, but in the capacity to navigate, deconstruct, and manipulate systems of epistemic production. Information ceases to be a commons; it becomes the substrate through which consent is manufactured and autonomy subdued. Deliberative democracy collapses not through censorship, but through the erosion of interpretive agency. The proposed response is not technocratic regulation, nor universal access, but the reconstruction of rational autonomy as a civic mandate, codified in education, protected by epistemic rights, and structurally embedded within open cognitive infrastructure.

Despite improvements in performances on different natural language generation tasks, deep neural models are prone to hallucinating facts that are incorrect or nonexistent. Different hypotheses are proposed and examined separately for different tasks, but no systematic explanations are available across these tasks. In this study, we draw connections between hallucinations and predictive uncertainty in conditional language generation. We investigate their relationship in both image captioning and data-to-text generation and propose a simple extension to beam search to reduce hallucination. Our analysis shows that higher predictive uncertainty corresponds to a higher chance of hallucination. Epistemic uncertainty is more indicative of hallucination than aleatoric or total uncertainties. It helps to achieve better results of trading performance in standard metric for less hallucination with the proposed beam search variant.

As Generative AI becomes a key component in physics education, a significant ethical challenge has emerged: the tendency of students to anthropomorphize Large Language Models (LLMs), treating them as authoritative "oracles" that retrieve fixed facts from an internal database. However, LLMs operate fundamentally as probabilistic engines. This paper describes the design and implementation of a didactic activity, a reduced version of the "20 Questions" game, aimed at making this stochastic nature directly observable. Unlike a human player who fixes a target object at the start of the game, students discover that the model generates answers based solely on local coherence with the interaction history. By utilizing functionalities such as re-sampling and history rewinding, students act as experimenters, observing how identical interaction histories can yield diverging narrative paths. We discuss how mapping these behaviors to familiar physics concepts provides the epistemic scaffolding necessary to promote informed skepticism, framing the verification of AI outputs not merely as a compliance rule, but as a technical necessity derived from the system's probabilistic nature.

We propose a formal reconstruction of quantum mechanics grounded not in external mathematical abstractions, but in the structured dynamics of subjective experience. The Qualia Abstraction Language (QAL) models physical systems as evolving streams of introspective units, structured sequences of modality, shape, and functional effect, rather than as state vectors in Hilbert space. This approach reimagines core quantum concepts: superposition becomes a form of structured ambiguity; collapse is reframed as an introspective contraction; and entanglement is modeled as semantic resonance across streams of qualia. Drawing on insights from nominalist philosophy and oversight theoretic limits in AI, we argue that the observer paradox in quantum mechanics reflects not an ontological lacuna, but a linguistic one: the absence of a formal vocabulary for modeling first person structure. QAL introduces such a vocabulary, providing a morphodynamic framework that embeds the observer within the system and replaces abstract projection with endogenous transformation. We analyze the alignment of QAL with endophysical approaches, contrast it with standard interpretations of quantum theory, and explore its implications for a post Platonist, introspectively grounded physics.

We propose a many-sorted modal logic for reasoning about knowledge in multi-agent systems. Our logic introduces a clear distinction between participating agents and the environment. This allows to express local properties of agents and global properties of worlds in a uniform way, as well as to talk about the presence or absence of agents in a world. The logic subsumes the standard epistemic logic and is a conservative extension of it. The semantics is given in chromatic hypergraphs, a generalization of chromatic simplicial complexes, which were recently used to model knowledge in distributed systems. We show that the logic is sound and complete with respect to the intended semantics. We also show a further connection of chromatic hypergraphs with neighborhood frames.

A new prior is proposed for learning representations of high-level concepts of the kind we manipulate with language. This prior can be combined with other priors in order to help disentangling abstract factors from each other. It is inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness, seen as a bottleneck through which just a few elements, after having been selected by attention from a broader pool, are then broadcast and condition further processing, both in perception and decision-making. The set of recently selected elements one becomes aware of is seen as forming a low-dimensional conscious state. This conscious state is combining the few concepts constituting a conscious thought, i.e., what one is immediately conscious of at a particular moment. We claim that this architectural and information-processing constraint corresponds to assumptions about the joint distribution between high-level concepts. To the extent that these assumptions are generally true (and the form of natural language seems consistent with them), they can form a useful prior for representation learning. A low-dimensional thought or conscious state is analogous to a sentence: it involves only a few variables and yet can make a statement with very high probability of being true. This is consistent with a joint distribution (over high-level concepts) which has the form of a sparse factor graph, i.e., where the dependencies captured by each factor of the factor graph involve only very few variables while creating a strong dip in the overall energy function. The consciousness prior also makes it natural to map conscious states to natural language utterances or to express classical AI knowledge in a form similar to facts and rules, albeit capturing uncertainty as well as efficient search mechanisms implemented by attention mechanisms.

Unitary quantum theory, having no Born Rule, is non-probabilistic. Hence the notorious problem of reconciling it with the unpredictability and appearance of stochasticity in quantum measurements. Generalising and improving upon the so-called 'decision-theoretic approach' (Deutsch, 1999; Wallace, 2003, 2007, 2012), I shall recast that problem in the recently proposed constructor theory of information - where quantum theory is represented as one of a class of superinformation theories, which are local, non-probabilistic theories conforming to certain constructor-theoretic conditions. I prove that the unpredictability of measurement outcomes (to which I give an exact meaning via constructor theory), necessarily arises in superinformation theories. Then I explain how the appearance of stochasticity in (finitely many) repeated measurements can arise under superinformation theories. And I establish sufficient conditions for a superinformation theory to inform decisions (made under it) as if it were probabilistic, via a Deutsch-Wallace-type argument - thus defining a class of decision-supporting superinformation theories. This broadens the domain of applicability of that argument to cover constructor-theory compliant theories. In addition, in this version some of the argument's assumptions, previously construed as merely decision-theoretic, follow from physical properties expressed by constructor-theoretic principles.

Identifying how much a model {p}_{theta}(Y|X) knows about the stochastic real-world process p(Y|X) it was trained on is important to ensure it avoids producing incorrect or "hallucinated" answers or taking unsafe actions. But this is difficult for generative models because probabilistic predictions do not distinguish between per-response noise (aleatoric uncertainty) and lack of knowledge about the process (epistemic uncertainty), and existing epistemic uncertainty quantification techniques tend to be overconfident when the model underfits. We propose a general strategy for teaching a model to both approximate p(Y|X) and also estimate the remaining gaps between {p}_{theta}(Y|X) and p(Y|X): train it to predict pairs of independent responses drawn from the true conditional distribution, allow it to "cheat" by observing one response while predicting the other, then measure how much it cheats. Remarkably, we prove that being good at cheating (i.e. cheating whenever it improves your prediction) is equivalent to being second-order calibrated, a principled extension of ordinary calibration that allows us to construct provably-correct frequentist confidence intervals for p(Y|X) and detect incorrect responses with high probability. We demonstrate empirically that our approach accurately estimates how much models don't know across ambiguous image classification, (synthetic) language modeling, and partially-observable navigation tasks, outperforming existing techniques.

We study the problem of nonepisodic reinforcement learning (RL) for nonlinear dynamical systems, where the system dynamics are unknown and the RL agent has to learn from a single trajectory, i.e., without resets. We propose Nonepisodic Optimistic RL (NeoRL), an approach based on the principle of optimism in the face of uncertainty. NeoRL uses well-calibrated probabilistic models and plans optimistically w.r.t. the epistemic uncertainty about the unknown dynamics. Under continuity and bounded energy assumptions on the system, we provide a first-of-its-kind regret bound of O(Gamma_T T) for general nonlinear systems with Gaussian process dynamics. We compare NeoRL to other baselines on several deep RL environments and empirically demonstrate that NeoRL achieves the optimal average cost while incurring the least regret.

Theory of Mind (ToM) is a critical component of intelligence, yet accurately measuring it continues to be a subject of debate. Prior research has attempted to apply human ToM assessments to natural language processing models using either human-created standardized tests or rule-based templates. However, these methods primarily focus on simplistic reasoning and require further validation. In this study, we utilize dynamic epistemic logic, which has established overlaps with ToM, to generate more intricate problems. We also introduce novel verbalization techniques to express these problems using natural language. Our findings indicate that certain language model scaling (from 70M to 6B and 350M to 174B) does not consistently yield results better than random chance. While GPT-4 demonstrates improved epistemic reasoning capabilities, there is still room for enhancement. Our code and datasets are publicly available https://github.com/antoinelrnld/modlog https://huggingface.co/datasets/sileod/mindgames

Large language models (LLMs) are becoming deeply embedded in human communication and decision-making, yet they inherit the ambiguity, bias, and lack of direct access to truth inherent in language itself. While their outputs are fluent, emotionally resonant, and coherent, they are generated through statistical prediction rather than grounded reasoning. This creates the risk of hallucination, responses that sound convincing but lack factual validity. Building on Geoffrey Hinton's observation that AI mirrors human intuition rather than reasoning, this paper argues that LLMs operationalize System 1 cognition at scale: fast, associative, and persuasive, but without reflection or falsification. To address this, we introduce the Rose-Frame, a three-dimensional framework for diagnosing cognitive and epistemic drift in human-AI interaction. The three axes are: (i) Map vs. Territory, which distinguishes representations of reality (epistemology) from reality itself (ontology); (ii) Intuition vs. Reason, drawing on dual-process theory to separate fast, emotional judgments from slow, reflective thinking; and (iii) Conflict vs. Confirmation, which examines whether ideas are critically tested through disagreement or simply reinforced through mutual validation. Each dimension captures a distinct failure mode, and their combination amplifies misalignment. Rose-Frame does not attempt to fix LLMs with more data or rules. Instead, it offers a reflective tool that makes both the model's limitations and the user's assumptions visible, enabling more transparent and critically aware AI deployment. It reframes alignment as cognitive governance: intuition, whether human or artificial, must remain governed by human reason. Only by embedding reflective, falsifiable oversight can we align machine fluency with human understanding.

Uncertainty quantification has received increasing attention in machine learning in the recent past. In particular, a distinction between aleatoric and epistemic uncertainty has been found useful in this regard. The latter refers to the learner's (lack of) knowledge and appears to be especially difficult to measure and quantify. In this paper, we analyse a recent proposal based on the idea of a second-order learner, which yields predictions in the form of distributions over probability distributions. While standard (first-order) learners can be trained to predict accurate probabilities, namely by minimising suitable loss functions on sample data, we show that loss minimisation does not work for second-order predictors: The loss functions proposed for inducing such predictors do not incentivise the learner to represent its epistemic uncertainty in a faithful way.

Rapid advancements in large language models (LLMs) have sparked the question whether these models possess some form of consciousness. To tackle this challenge, Butlin et al. (2023) introduced a list of indicators for consciousness in artificial systems based on neuroscientific theories. In this work, we evaluate a key indicator from this list, called HOT-3, which tests for agency guided by a general belief-formation and action selection system that updates beliefs based on meta-cognitive monitoring. We view beliefs as representations in the model's latent space that emerge in response to a given input, and introduce a metric to quantify their dominance during generation. Analyzing the dynamics between competing beliefs across models and tasks reveals three key findings: (1) external manipulations systematically modulate internal belief formation, (2) belief formation causally drives the model's action selection, and (3) models can monitor and report their own belief states. Together, these results provide empirical support for the existence of belief-guided agency and meta-cognitive monitoring in LLMs. More broadly, our work lays methodological groundwork for investigating the emergence of agency, beliefs, and meta-cognition in LLMs.

This paper introduces a novel type theory and logic for probabilistic reasoning. Its logic is quantitative, with fuzzy predicates. It includes normalisation and conditioning of states. This conditioning uses a key aspect that distinguishes our probabilistic type theory from quantum type theory, namely the bijective correspondence between predicates and side-effect free actions (called instrument, or assert, maps). The paper shows how suitable computation rules can be derived from this predicate-action correspondence, and uses these rules for calculating conditional probabilities in two well-known examples of Bayesian reasoning in (graphical) models. Our type theory may thus form the basis for a mechanisation of Bayesian inference.

Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) is the standard paradigm for domain adaptation, yet it frequently incurs the cost of catastrophic forgetting. In sharp contrast, on-policy Reinforcement Learning (RL) effectively preserves general capabilities. We investigate this discrepancy and identify a fundamental distributional gap: while RL aligns with the model's internal belief, SFT forces the model to fit external supervision. This mismatch often manifests as "Confident Conflicts" tokens characterized by low probability but low entropy. In these instances, the model is highly confident in its own prediction but is forced to learn a divergent ground truth, triggering destructive gradient updates. To address this, we propose Entropy-Adaptive Fine-Tuning (EAFT). Unlike methods relying solely on prediction probability, EAFT utilizes token-level entropy as a gating mechanism to distinguish between epistemic uncertainty and knowledge conflict. This allows the model to learn from uncertain samples while suppressing gradients on conflicting data. Extensive experiments on Qwen and GLM series (ranging from 4B to 32B parameters) across mathematical, medical, and agentic domains confirm our hypothesis. EAFT consistently matches the downstream performance of standard SFT while significantly mitigating the degradation of general capabilities.

As language models (LMs) become integral to fields like healthcare, law, and journalism, their ability to differentiate between fact, belief, and knowledge is essential for reliable decision-making. Failure to grasp these distinctions can lead to significant consequences in areas such as medical diagnosis, legal judgments, and dissemination of fake news. Despite this, current literature has largely focused on more complex issues such as theory of mind, overlooking more fundamental epistemic challenges. This study systematically evaluates the epistemic reasoning capabilities of modern LMs, including GPT-4, Claude-3, and Llama-3, using a new dataset, KaBLE, consisting of 13,000 questions across 13 tasks. Our results reveal key limitations. First, while LMs achieve 86% accuracy on factual scenarios, their performance drops significantly with false scenarios, particularly in belief-related tasks. Second, LMs struggle with recognizing and affirming personal beliefs, especially when those beliefs contradict factual data, which raises concerns for applications in healthcare and counseling, where engaging with a person's beliefs is critical. Third, we identify a salient bias in how LMs process first-person versus third-person beliefs, performing better on third-person tasks (80.7%) compared to first-person tasks (54.4%). Fourth, LMs lack a robust understanding of the factive nature of knowledge, namely, that knowledge inherently requires truth. Fifth, LMs rely on linguistic cues for fact-checking and sometimes bypass the deeper reasoning. These findings highlight significant concerns about current LMs' ability to reason about truth, belief, and knowledge while emphasizing the need for advancements in these areas before broad deployment in critical sectors.

Bayes' rule tells us how to invert a causal process in order to update our beliefs in light of new evidence. If the process is believed to have a complex compositional structure, we may ask whether composing the inversions of the component processes gives the same belief update as the inversion of the whole. We answer this question affirmatively, showing that the relevant compositional structure is precisely that of the lens pattern, and that we can think of Bayesian inversion as a particular instance of a state-dependent morphism in a corresponding fibred category. We define a general notion of (mixed) Bayesian lens, and discuss the (un)lawfulness of these lenses when their contravariant components are exact Bayesian inversions. We prove our main result both abstractly and concretely, for both discrete and continuous states, taking care to illustrate the common structures.

Programming robot behavior in a complex world faces challenges on multiple levels, from dextrous low-level skills to high-level planning and reasoning. Recent pre-trained Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown remarkable reasoning ability in few-shot robotic planning. However, it remains challenging to ground LLMs in multimodal sensory input and continuous action output, while enabling a robot to interact with its environment and acquire novel information as its policies unfold. We develop a robot interaction scenario with a partially observable state, which necessitates a robot to decide on a range of epistemic actions in order to sample sensory information among multiple modalities, before being able to execute the task correctly. An interactive perception framework is therefore proposed with an LLM as its backbone, whose ability is exploited to instruct epistemic actions and to reason over the resulting multimodal sensations (vision, sound, haptics, proprioception), as well as to plan an entire task execution based on the interactively acquired information. Our study demonstrates that LLMs can provide high-level planning and reasoning skills and control interactive robot behavior in a multimodal environment, while multimodal modules with the context of the environmental state help ground the LLMs and extend their processing ability. The project website can be found at https://matcha-model.github.io{blue{https://matcha-model.github.io/}}.

Generative AI agents equate understanding with resolving explicit queries, an assumption that confines interaction to what users can articulate. This assumption breaks down when users themselves lack awareness of what is missing, risky, or worth considering. In such conditions, proactivity is not merely an efficiency enhancement, but an epistemic necessity. We refer to this condition as epistemic incompleteness: where progress depends on engaging with unknown unknowns for effective partnership. Existing approaches to proactivity remain narrowly anticipatory, extrapolating from past behavior and presuming that goals are already well defined, thereby failing to support users meaningfully. However, surfacing possibilities beyond a user's current awareness is not inherently beneficial. Unconstrained proactive interventions can misdirect attention, overwhelm users, or introduce harm. Proactive agents, therefore, require behavioral grounding: principled constraints on when, how, and to what extent an agent should intervene. We advance the position that generative proactivity must be grounded both epistemically and behaviorally. Drawing on the philosophy of ignorance and research on proactive behavior, we argue that these theories offer critical guidance for designing agents that can engage responsibly and foster meaningful partnerships.

We provide an optimization-based framework to perform counterfactual analysis in a dynamic model with hidden states. Our framework is grounded in the ``abduction, action, and prediction'' approach to answer counterfactual queries and handles two key challenges where (1) the states are hidden and (2) the model is dynamic. Recognizing the lack of knowledge on the underlying causal mechanism and the possibility of infinitely many such mechanisms, we optimize over this space and compute upper and lower bounds on the counterfactual quantity of interest. Our work brings together ideas from causality, state-space models, simulation, and optimization, and we apply it on a breast cancer case study. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to compute lower and upper bounds on a counterfactual query in a dynamic latent-state model.

I propose a version of quantum mechanics featuring a discrete and finite number of states that is plausibly a model of the real world. The model is based on standard unitary quantum theory of a closed system with a finite-dimensional Hilbert space. Given certain simple conditions on the spectrum of the Hamiltonian, Schr\"odinger evolution is periodic, and it is straightforward to replace continuous time with a discrete version, with the result that the system only visits a discrete and finite set of state vectors. The biggest challenges to the viability of such a model come from cosmological considerations. The theory may have implications for questions of mathematical realism and finitism.

Recent work has shown that, under certain assumptions, zero-shot reinforcement learning (RL) methods can generalise to any unseen task in an environment after reward-free pre-training. Access to Markov states is one such assumption, yet, in many real-world applications, the Markov state is only partially observable. Here, we explore how the performance of standard zero-shot RL methods degrades when subjected to partially observability, and show that, as in single-task RL, memory-based architectures are an effective remedy. We evaluate our memory-based zero-shot RL methods in domains where the states, rewards and a change in dynamics are partially observed, and show improved performance over memory-free baselines. Our code is open-sourced via: https://enjeeneer.io/projects/bfms-with-memory/.

Can we learn more from data than existed in the generating process itself? Can new and useful information be constructed from merely applying deterministic transformations to existing data? Can the learnable content in data be evaluated without considering a downstream task? On these questions, Shannon information and Kolmogorov complexity come up nearly empty-handed, in part because they assume observers with unlimited computational capacity and fail to target the useful information content. In this work, we identify and exemplify three seeming paradoxes in information theory: (1) information cannot be increased by deterministic transformations; (2) information is independent of the order of data; (3) likelihood modeling is merely distribution matching. To shed light on the tension between these results and modern practice, and to quantify the value of data, we introduce epiplexity, a formalization of information capturing what computationally bounded observers can learn from data. Epiplexity captures the structural content in data while excluding time-bounded entropy, the random unpredictable content exemplified by pseudorandom number generators and chaotic dynamical systems. With these concepts, we demonstrate how information can be created with computation, how it depends on the ordering of the data, and how likelihood modeling can produce more complex programs than present in the data generating process itself. We also present practical procedures to estimate epiplexity which we show capture differences across data sources, track with downstream performance, and highlight dataset interventions that improve out-of-distribution generalization. In contrast to principles of model selection, epiplexity provides a theoretical foundation for data selection, guiding how to select, generate, or transform data for learning systems.

A world model is an AI system that simulates how an environment evolves under actions, enabling planning through imagined futures rather than reactive perception. Current world models, however, suffer from visual conflation: the mistaken assumption that high-fidelity video generation implies an understanding of physical and causal dynamics. We show that while modern models excel at predicting pixels, they frequently violate invariant constraints, fail under intervention, and break down in safety-critical decision-making. This survey argues that visual realism is an unreliable proxy for world understanding. Instead, effective world models must encode causal structure, respect domain-specific constraints, and remain stable over long horizons. We propose a reframing of world models as actionable simulators rather than visual engines, emphasizing structured 4D interfaces, constraint-aware dynamics, and closed-loop evaluation. Using medical decision-making as an epistemic stress test, where trial-and-error is impossible and errors are irreversible, we demonstrate that a world model's value is determined not by how realistic its rollouts appear, but by its ability to support counterfactual reasoning, intervention planning, and robust long-horizon foresight.

We identify five selected open problems in the theory of quantum information, which are rather simple to formulate, were well-studied in the literature, but are technically not easy. As these problems enjoy diverse mathematical connections, they offer a huge breakthrough potential. The first four concern existence of certain objects relevant for quantum information, namely a family of symmetric informationally complete generalized measurements in an infinite sequence of dimensions, mutually unbiased bases in dimension six, absolutely maximally entangled states for four subsystems with six levels each and bound entangled states with negative partial transpose. The fifth problem requires checking whether a certain state of a two-ququart system is 2-copy distillable. An award for solving each of them is announced.

We revisit Zadeh's notion of "evidence of the second kind" and show that it provides the foundation for a general theory of epistemic random fuzzy sets, which generalizes both the Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions and possibility theory. In this perspective, Dempster-Shafer theory deals with belief functions generated by random sets, while possibility theory deals with belief functions induced by fuzzy sets. The more general theory allows us to represent and combine evidence that is both uncertain and fuzzy. We demonstrate the application of this formalism to statistical inference, and show that it makes it possible to reconcile the possibilistic interpretation of likelihood with Bayesian inference.

Despite rapid gains in scale, research evaluation still relies on opaque, lagging proxies. To serve the scientific community, we pursue transparency: reproducible, auditable epistemic classification useful for funding and policy. Here we formalize KGX3 as a scenario-based model for mapping Kuhnian stages from research papers, prove determinism of the classification pipeline, and define the epistemic manifold that yields paradigm maps. We report validation across recent corpora, operational complexity at global scale, and governance that preserves interpretability while protecting core IP. The system delivers early, actionable signals of drift, crisis, and shift unavailable to citation metrics or citations-anchored NLP. KGX3 is the latest iteration of a deterministic epistemic engine developed since 2019, originating as Soph.io (2020), advanced as iKuhn (2024), and field-tested through Preprint Watch in 2025.

Inference-Time-Compute (ITC) methods like Best-of-N and Tree-of-Thoughts are meant to produce output candidates that are both high-quality and diverse, but their use of high-temperature sampling often fails to achieve meaningful output diversity. Moreover, existing ITC methods offer limited control over how to perform reasoning, which in turn limits their explainability. We present STATe-of-Thoughts (STATe), an interpretable ITC method that searches over high-level reasoning patterns. STATe replaces stochastic sampling with discrete and interpretable textual interventions: a controller selects actions encoding high-level reasoning choices, a generator produces reasoning steps conditioned on those choices, and an evaluator scores candidates to guide search. This structured approach yields three main advantages. First, action-guided textual interventions produce greater response diversity than temperature-based sampling. Second, in a case study on argument generation, STATe's explicit action sequences capture interpretable features that are highly predictive of output quality. Third, estimating the association between performance and action choices allows us to identify promising yet unexplored regions of the action space and steer generation directly toward them. Together, these results establish STATe as a practical framework for generating high-quality, diverse, and interpretable text. Our framework is available at https://github.com/zbambergerNLP/state-of-thoughts.

In this paper, we discuss that an observable-based single-system Copenhagen and entanglement-based two-system von Neumann measurement protocols in quantum theory can be made equivalent by considering the second part of the two-system scheme to be a Dirac-type negative sea filling up the first system. Based on this equivalence, and by considering the universe as a computational process, the choice of the apparatus state in the two-system protocol can be identified with the choice of the observable in the single-system scheme as negative sea filling up the observable universe. In particular, the measuring party's state is considered to be evolving backwards in time to the big bang as a nondeterministic computational process, which chooses the acceptable path as a time-reversal process of irreversible computation. The suggested model proposes that the prepared microstate of the universe, or reality, corresponds to the observer's choice, therefore, subjective reality. Thus, this effectively provides a specific description of the subjective universe model previously proposed, which is based on the symmetry breakdown between the Schrodinger and the Heisenberg pictures of quantum theory.

Spatial embodied intelligence requires agents to act to acquire information under partial observability. While multimodal foundation models excel at passive perception, their capacity for active, self-directed exploration remains understudied. We propose Theory of Space, defined as an agent's ability to actively acquire information through self-directed, active exploration and to construct, revise, and exploit a spatial belief from sequential, partial observations. We evaluate this through a benchmark where the goal is curiosity-driven exploration to build an accurate cognitive map. A key innovation is spatial belief probing, which prompts models to reveal their internal spatial representations at each step. Our evaluation of state-of-the-art models reveals several critical bottlenecks. First, we identify an Active-Passive Gap, where performance drops significantly when agents must autonomously gather information. Second, we find high inefficiency, as models explore unsystematically compared to program-based proxies. Through belief probing, we diagnose that while perception is an initial bottleneck, global beliefs suffer from instability that causes spatial knowledge to degrade over time. Finally, using a false belief paradigm, we uncover Belief Inertia, where agents fail to update obsolete priors with new evidence. This issue is present in text-based agents but is particularly severe in vision-based models. Our findings suggest that current foundation models struggle to maintain coherent, revisable spatial beliefs during active exploration.

Uncertainty Quantification (UQ) research has primarily focused on closed-book factual question answering (QA), while contextual QA remains unexplored, despite its importance in real-world applications. In this work, we focus on UQ for the contextual QA task and propose a theoretically grounded approach to quantify epistemic uncertainty. We begin by introducing a task-agnostic, token-level uncertainty measure defined as the cross-entropy between the predictive distribution of the given model and the unknown true distribution. By decomposing this measure, we isolate the epistemic component and approximate the true distribution by a perfectly prompted, idealized model. We then derive an upper bound for epistemic uncertainty and show that it can be interpreted as semantic feature gaps in the given model's hidden representations relative to the ideal model. We further apply this generic framework to the contextual QA task and hypothesize that three features approximate this gap: context-reliance (using the provided context rather than parametric knowledge), context comprehension (extracting relevant information from context), and honesty (avoiding intentional lies). Using a top-down interpretability approach, we extract these features by using only a small number of labeled samples and ensemble them to form a robust uncertainty score. Experiments on multiple QA benchmarks in both in-distribution and out-of-distribution settings show that our method substantially outperforms state-of-the-art unsupervised (sampling-free and sampling-based) and supervised UQ methods, achieving up to a 13-point PRR improvement while incurring a negligible inference overhead.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning enables large language models (LLMs) to break down complex problems into interpretable intermediate steps, significantly enhancing model transparency and performance in reasoning tasks. However, conventional CoT methods rely on heuristic sampling without structured modeling of reasoning transitions, constraining their ability to systematically explore and discover diverse and effective reasoning trajectories. In this work, we introduce CTRLS, a framework that formulates CoT reasoning as a Markov decision process (MDP) with latent state transitions, enabling principled and state-aware exploration via distributional reinforcement learning. By modelling reasoning actions as explicit probability distributions in latent space, our approach explicitly models epistemic uncertainty, facilitating robust exploration of the reasoning space. As part of our framework, we introduce an on-policy reinforcement learning strategy incorporating epsilon-greedy exploration and entropy-based regularization to iteratively refine latent state transitions without requiring additional fine-tuning of the underlying LLM. Theoretical analyses provide evidence lower bounds (ELBO), theoretically grounding our transition-aware modeling of latent reasoning dynamics. Further experiments demonstrate improvements in reasoning accuracy, diversity, and exploration efficiency across benchmark reasoning tasks.

Recent work suggests that large language models (LLMs) encode factuality signals in their internal representations, such as hidden states, attention weights, or token probabilities, implying that LLMs may "know what they don't know". However, LLMs can also produce factual errors by relying on shortcuts or spurious associations. These error are driven by the same training objective that encourage correct predictions, raising the question of whether internal computations can reliably distinguish between factual and hallucinated outputs. In this work, we conduct a mechanistic analysis of how LLMs internally process factual queries by comparing two types of hallucinations based on their reliance on subject information. We find that when hallucinations are associated with subject knowledge, LLMs employ the same internal recall process as for correct responses, leading to overlapping and indistinguishable hidden-state geometries. In contrast, hallucinations detached from subject knowledge produce distinct, clustered representations that make them detectable. These findings reveal a fundamental limitation: LLMs do not encode truthfulness in their internal states but only patterns of knowledge recall, demonstrating that "LLMs don't really know what they don't know".

We present a theory of information expressed solely in terms of which transformations of physical systems are possible and which are impossible - i.e. in constructor-theoretic terms. Although it includes conjectured laws of physics that are directly about information, independently of the details of particular physical instantiations, it does not regard information as an a priori mathematical or logical concept, but as something whose nature and properties are determined by the laws of physics alone. It does not suffer from the circularity at the foundations of existing information theory (namely that information and distinguishability are each defined in terms of the other). It explains the relationship between classical and quantum information, and reveals the single, constructor-theoretic property underlying the most distinctive phenomena associated with the latter, including the lack of in-principle distinguishability of some states, the impossibility of cloning, the existence of pairs of variables that cannot simultaneously have sharp values, the fact that measurement processes can be both deterministic and unpredictable, the irreducible perturbation caused by measurement, and entanglement (locally inaccessible information).

The ability to acknowledge the inevitable uncertainty in their knowledge and reasoning is a prerequisite for AI systems to be truly truthful and reliable. In this paper, we present a taxonomy of uncertainty specific to vision-language AI systems, distinguishing between epistemic uncertainty (arising from a lack of information) and aleatoric uncertainty (due to inherent unpredictability), and further explore finer categories within. Based on this taxonomy, we synthesize a benchmark dataset, CertainlyUncertain, featuring 178K visual question answering (VQA) samples as contrastive pairs. This is achieved by 1) inpainting images to make previously answerable questions into unanswerable ones; and 2) using image captions to prompt large language models for both answerable and unanswerable questions. Additionally, we introduce a new metric confidence-weighted accuracy, that is well correlated with both accuracy and calibration error, to address the shortcomings of existing metrics.

Multiple types of inference are available for probabilistic graphical models, e.g., marginal, maximum-a-posteriori, and even marginal maximum-a-posteriori. Which one do researchers mean when they talk about ``planning as inference''? There is no consistency in the literature, different types are used, and their ability to do planning is further entangled with specific approximations or additional constraints. In this work we use the variational framework to show that, just like all commonly used types of inference correspond to different weightings of the entropy terms in the variational problem, planning corresponds exactly to a different set of weights. This means that all the tricks of variational inference are readily applicable to planning. We develop an analogue of loopy belief propagation that allows us to perform approximate planning in factored-state Markov decisions processes without incurring intractability due to the exponentially large state space. The variational perspective shows that the previous types of inference for planning are only adequate in environments with low stochasticity, and allows us to characterize each type by its own merits, disentangling the type of inference from the additional approximations that its practical use requires. We validate these results empirically on synthetic MDPs and tasks posed in the International Planning Competition.

Given a stationary state-space model that relates a sequence of hidden states and corresponding measurements or observations, Bayesian filtering provides a principled statistical framework for inferring the posterior distribution of the current state given all measurements up to the present time. For example, the Apollo lunar module implemented a Kalman filter to infer its location from a sequence of earth-based radar measurements and land safely on the moon. To perform Bayesian filtering, we require a measurement model that describes the conditional distribution of each observation given state. The Kalman filter takes this measurement model to be linear, Gaussian. Here we show how a nonlinear, Gaussian approximation to the distribution of state given observation can be used in conjunction with Bayes' rule to build a nonlinear, non-Gaussian measurement model. The resulting approach, called the Discriminative Kalman Filter (DKF), retains fast closed-form updates for the posterior. We argue there are many cases where the distribution of state given measurement is better-approximated as Gaussian, especially when the dimensionality of measurements far exceeds that of states and the Bernstein-von Mises theorem applies. Online neural decoding for brain-computer interfaces provides a motivating example, where filtering incorporates increasingly detailed measurements of neural activity to provide users control over external devices. Within the BrainGate2 clinical trial, the DKF successfully enabled three volunteers with quadriplegia to control an on-screen cursor in real-time using mental imagery alone. Participant "T9" used the DKF to type out messages on a tablet PC.

Symbolic world modeling requires inferring and representing an environment's transitional dynamics as an executable program. Prior work has focused on largely deterministic environments with abundant interaction data, simple mechanics, and human guidance. We address a more realistic and challenging setting, learning in a complex, stochastic environment where the agent has only "one life" to explore a hostile environment without human guidance. We introduce OneLife, a framework that models world dynamics through conditionally-activated programmatic laws within a probabilistic programming framework. Each law operates through a precondition-effect structure, activating in relevant world states. This creates a dynamic computation graph that routes inference and optimization only through relevant laws, avoiding scaling challenges when all laws contribute to predictions about a complex, hierarchical state, and enabling the learning of stochastic dynamics even with sparse rule activation. To evaluate our approach under these demanding constraints, we introduce a new evaluation protocol that measures (a) state ranking, the ability to distinguish plausible future states from implausible ones, and (b) state fidelity, the ability to generate future states that closely resemble reality. We develop and evaluate our framework on Crafter-OO, our reimplementation of the Crafter environment that exposes a structured, object-oriented symbolic state and a pure transition function that operates on that state alone. OneLife can successfully learn key environment dynamics from minimal, unguided interaction, outperforming a strong baseline on 16 out of 23 scenarios tested. We also test OneLife's planning ability, with simulated rollouts successfully identifying superior strategies. Our work establishes a foundation for autonomously constructing programmatic world models of unknown, complex environments.

It is commonly thought that observers in distinct branches of an Everettian multiverse cannot communicate without violating the linearity of quantum theory. Here we show a counterexample, demonstrating that inter-branch communication is in fact possible, entirely within standard quantum theory. We do this by considering a Wigner's-friend scenario, where an observer (Wigner) can have quantum control over another observer (the friend). We present a thought experiment where the friend in superposition can receive a message written by a distinct copy of themselves in the multiverse, with the aid of Wigner. To maintain the unitarity of quantum theory, the observers must have no memory of the message that they sent. Our thought experiment challenges conventional wisdom regarding the ultimate limits of what is possible in an Everettian multiverse. It has a surprising potential application which involves using knowledge-creation paradoxes for testing Everettian quantum theory against single-world theories.

Whether AI models can introspect is an increasingly important practical question. But there is no consensus on how introspection is to be defined. Beginning from a recently proposed ''lightweight'' definition, we argue instead for a thicker one. According to our proposal, introspection in AI is any process which yields information about internal states through a process more reliable than one with equal or lower computational cost available to a third party. Using experiments where LLMs reason about their internal temperature parameters, we show they can appear to have lightweight introspection while failing to meaningfully introspect per our proposed definition.

Past analyses of reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) assume that the human fully observes the environment. What happens when human feedback is based only on partial observations? We formally define two failure cases: deception and overjustification. Modeling the human as Boltzmann-rational w.r.t. a belief over trajectories, we prove conditions under which RLHF is guaranteed to result in policies that deceptively inflate their performance, overjustify their behavior to make an impression, or both. To help address these issues, we mathematically characterize how partial observability of the environment translates into (lack of) ambiguity in the learned return function. In some cases, accounting for partial observability makes it theoretically possible to recover the return function and thus the optimal policy, while in other cases, there is irreducible ambiguity. We caution against blindly applying RLHF in partially observable settings and propose research directions to help tackle these challenges.

We introduce the category of information structures, whose objects are suitable diagrams of measurable sets that encode the possible outputs of a given family of observables and their mutual relationships of refinement; they serve as mathematical models of contextuality in classical and quantum settings. Each information structure can be regarded as a ringed site with trivial topology; the structure ring is generated by the observables themselves and its multiplication corresponds to joint measurement. We extend Baudot and Bennequin's definition of information cohomology to this setting, as a derived functor in the category of modules over the structure ring, and show explicitly that the bar construction gives a projective resolution in that category, recovering in this way the cochain complexes previously considered in the literature. Finally, we study the particular case of a one-parameter family of coefficients made of functions of probability distributions. The only 1-cocycles are Shannon entropy or Tsallis alpha-entropy, depending on the value of the parameter.

This work presents a framework for assessing whether large language models (LLMs) encode more factual knowledge in their parameters than what they express in their outputs. While a few studies hint at this possibility, none has clearly defined or demonstrated this phenomenon. We first propose a formal definition of knowledge, quantifying it for a given question as the fraction of correct-incorrect answer pairs where the correct one is ranked higher. This gives rise to external and internal knowledge, depending on the information used to score individual answer candidates: either the model's observable token-level probabilities or its intermediate computations. Hidden knowledge arises when internal knowledge exceeds external knowledge. We then present a case study, applying this framework to three popular open-weights LLMs in a closed-book QA setup. Our results indicate that: (1) LLMs consistently encode more factual knowledge internally than what they express externally, with an average gap of 40%. (2) Surprisingly, some knowledge is so deeply hidden that a model can internally know an answer perfectly, yet fail to generate it even once, despite large-scale repeated sampling of 1,000 answers. This reveals fundamental limitations in the generation capabilities of LLMs, which (3) puts a practical constraint on scaling test-time compute via repeated answer sampling in closed-book QA: significant performance improvements remain inaccessible because some answers are practically never sampled, yet if they were, we would be guaranteed to rank them first.

Although AI agents have demonstrated impressive capabilities in long-horizon reasoning, their reliability is severely hampered by the ``Spiral of Hallucination,'' where early epistemic errors propagate irreversibly. Existing methods face a dilemma: uncertainty quantification (UQ) methods typically act as passive sensors, only diagnosing risks without addressing them, while self-reflection mechanisms suffer from continuous or aimless corrections. To bridge this gap, we propose a unified Dual-Process Agentic UQ (AUQ) framework that transforms verbalized uncertainty into active, bi-directional control signals. Our architecture comprises two complementary mechanisms: System 1 (Uncertainty-Aware Memory, UAM), which implicitly propagates verbalized confidence and semantic explanations to prevent blind decision-making; and System 2 (Uncertainty-Aware Reflection, UAR), which utilizes these explanations as rational cues to trigger targeted inference-time resolution only when necessary. This enables the agent to balance efficient execution and deep deliberation dynamically. Extensive experiments on closed-loop benchmarks and open-ended deep research tasks demonstrate that our training-free approach achieves superior performance and trajectory-level calibration. We believe this principled framework AUQ represents a significant step towards reliable agents.

We develop a discipline-agnostic emergence calculus that treats theories as fixed points of idempotent operators acting on descriptions. We show that, once processes are composable but access to the underlying system is mediated by a bounded observational interface, a canonical toolkit of six closure-changing primitives (P1--P6) is unavoidable. The framework unifies order-theoretic closure operators with dynamics-induced endomaps E_{τ,f} built from a Markov kernel, a coarse-graining lens, and a time scale τ. We introduce a computable total-variation idempotence defect for E_{τ,f}; small retention error implies approximate idempotence and yields stable "objects" packaged at the chosen τ within a fixed lens. For directionality, we define an arrow-of-time functional as the path-space KL divergence between forward and time-reversed trajectories and prove it is monotone under coarse-graining (data processing); we also formalize a protocol-trap audit showing that protocol holonomy alone cannot sustain asymmetry without a genuine affinity in the lifted dynamics. Finally, we prove a finite forcing-style counting lemma: relative to a partition-based theory, definable predicate extensions are exponentially rare, giving a clean anti-saturation mechanism for strict ladder climbing.

In the flavour of categorical quantum mechanics, we extend nonlocal games to allow quantum questions and answers, using quantum sets (special symmetric dagger Frobenius algebras) and the quantum functions of Musto, Reutter, and Verdon [arXiv:1711.07945]. Equations are presented using a diagrammatic calculus for tensor categories. To this quantum question and answer setting, we extend the standard definitions, including strategies, correlations, and synchronicity, and we use these definitions to extend results about synchronicity. We extend the graph homomorphism (isomorphism) game to quantum graphs, and show it is synchronous (bisynchronous) and connect its perfect (bi)strategies to quantum graph homomorphisms (isomorphisms). Our extended definitions agree with the existing quantum games literature, except in the case of synchronicity.

Deterministic inference is a comforting ideal in classical software: the same program on the same input should always produce the same output. As large language models move into real-world deployment, this ideal has been imported wholesale into inference stacks. Recent work from the Thinking Machines Lab has presented a detailed analysis of nondeterminism in LLM inference, showing how batch-invariant kernels and deterministic attention can enforce bitwise-identical outputs, positioning deterministic inference as a prerequisite for reproducibility and enterprise reliability. In this paper, we take the opposite stance. We argue that, for LLMs, deterministic inference kills. It kills the ability to model uncertainty, suppresses emergent abilities, collapses reasoning into a single brittle path, and weakens safety alignment by hiding tail risks. LLMs implement conditional distributions over outputs, not fixed functions. Collapsing these distributions to a single canonical completion may appear reassuring, but it systematically conceals properties central to artificial cognition. We instead advocate Stochastic CHAOS, treating distributional variability as a signal to be measured and controlled. Empirically, we show that deterministic inference is systematically misleading. Single-sample deterministic evaluation underestimates both capability and fragility, masking failure probability under paraphrases and noise. Phase-like transitions associated with emergent abilities disappear under greedy decoding. Multi-path reasoning degrades when forced onto deterministic backbones, reducing accuracy and diagnostic insight. Finally, deterministic evaluation underestimates safety risk by hiding rare but dangerous behaviors that appear only under multi-sample evaluation.

The notions of disintegration and Bayesian inversion are fundamental in conditional probability theory. They produce channels, as conditional probabilities, from a joint state, or from an already given channel (in opposite direction). These notions exist in the literature, in concrete situations, but are presented here in abstract graphical formulations. The resulting abstract descriptions are used for proving basic results in conditional probability theory. The existence of disintegration and Bayesian inversion is discussed for discrete probability, and also for measure-theoretic probability --- via standard Borel spaces and via likelihoods. Finally, the usefulness of disintegration and Bayesian inversion is illustrated in several examples.

Large-scale video generation models have demonstrated emergent physical coherence, positioning them as potential world models. However, a gap remains between contemporary "stateless" video architectures and classic state-centric world model theories. This work bridges this gap by proposing a novel taxonomy centered on two pillars: State Construction and Dynamics Modeling. We categorize state construction into implicit paradigms (context management) and explicit paradigms (latent compression), while dynamics modeling is analyzed through knowledge integration and architectural reformulation. Furthermore, we advocate for a transition in evaluation from visual fidelity to functional benchmarks, testing physical persistence and causal reasoning. We conclude by identifying two critical frontiers: enhancing persistence via data-driven memory and compressed fidelity, and advancing causality through latent factor decoupling and reasoning-prior integration. By addressing these challenges, the field can evolve from generating visually plausible videos to building robust, general-purpose world simulators.

As Large Language Models become more ubiquitous across domains, it becomes important to examine their inherent limitations critically. This work argues that hallucinations in language models are not just occasional errors but an inevitable feature of these systems. We demonstrate that hallucinations stem from the fundamental mathematical and logical structure of LLMs. It is, therefore, impossible to eliminate them through architectural improvements, dataset enhancements, or fact-checking mechanisms. Our analysis draws on computational theory and Godel's First Incompleteness Theorem, which references the undecidability of problems like the Halting, Emptiness, and Acceptance Problems. We demonstrate that every stage of the LLM process-from training data compilation to fact retrieval, intent classification, and text generation-will have a non-zero probability of producing hallucinations. This work introduces the concept of Structural Hallucination as an intrinsic nature of these systems. By establishing the mathematical certainty of hallucinations, we challenge the prevailing notion that they can be fully mitigated.

Physics is based on probabilities as fundamental entities of a mathematical description. Expectation values of observables are computed according to the classical statistical rule. The overall probability distribution for one world covers all times. The quantum formalism arises once one focuses on the evolution of the time-local probabilistic information. Wave functions or the density matrix allow the formulation of a general linear evolution law for classical statistics. The quantum formalism for classical statistics is a powerful tool which allows us to implement for generalized Ising models the momentum observable with the associated Fourier representation. The association of operators to observables permits the computation of expectation values in terms of the density matrix by the usual quantum rule. We show that probabilistic cellular automata are quantum systems in a formulation with discrete time steps and real wave functions. With a complex structure the evolution operator for automata can be expressed in terms of a Hamiltonian involving fermionic creation and annihilation operators. The time-local probabilistic information amounts to a subsystem of the overall probabilistic system which is correlated with its environment consisting of the past and future. Such subsystems typically involve probabilistic observables for which only a probability distribution for their possible measurement values is available. Incomplete statistics does not permit to compute classical correlation functions for arbitrary subsystem-observables. Bell's inequalities are not generally applicable.

Fully automated self-driving laboratories are promising to enable high-throughput and large-scale scientific discovery by reducing repetitive labour. However, effective automation requires deep integration of laboratory knowledge, which is often unstructured, multimodal, and difficult to incorporate into current AI systems. This paper introduces the k-agents framework, designed to support experimentalists in organizing laboratory knowledge and automating experiments with agents. Our framework employs large language model-based agents to encapsulate laboratory knowledge including available laboratory operations and methods for analyzing experiment results. To automate experiments, we introduce execution agents that break multi-step experimental procedures into state machines, interact with other agents to execute each step and analyze the experiment results. The analyzed results are then utilized to drive state transitions, enabling closed-loop feedback control. To demonstrate its capabilities, we applied the agents to calibrate and operate a superconducting quantum processor, where they autonomously planned and executed experiments for hours, successfully producing and characterizing entangled quantum states at the level achieved by human scientists. Our knowledge-based agent system opens up new possibilities for managing laboratory knowledge and accelerating scientific discovery.

Recent advances in artificial intelligence reveal the limits of purely predictive systems and call for a shift toward causal and collaborative reasoning. Drawing inspiration from the revolution of Grothendieck in mathematics, we introduce the relativity of causal knowledge, which posits structural causal models (SCMs) are inherently imperfect, subjective representations embedded within networks of relationships. By leveraging category theory, we arrange SCMs into a functor category and show that their observational and interventional probability measures naturally form convex structures. This result allows us to encode non-intervened SCMs with convex spaces of probability measures. Next, using sheaf theory, we construct the network sheaf and cosheaf of causal knowledge. These structures enable the transfer of causal knowledge across the network while incorporating interventional consistency and the perspective of the subjects, ultimately leading to the formal, mathematical definition of relative causal knowledge.

Quantifying uncertainty is important for actionable predictions in real-world applications. A crucial part of predictive uncertainty quantification is the estimation of epistemic uncertainty, which is defined as an integral of the product between a divergence function and the posterior. Current methods such as Deep Ensembles or MC dropout underperform at estimating the epistemic uncertainty, since they primarily consider the posterior when sampling models. We suggest Quantification of Uncertainty with Adversarial Models (QUAM) to better estimate the epistemic uncertainty. QUAM identifies regions where the whole product under the integral is large, not just the posterior. Consequently, QUAM has lower approximation error of the epistemic uncertainty compared to previous methods. Models for which the product is large correspond to adversarial models (not adversarial examples!). Adversarial models have both a high posterior as well as a high divergence between their predictions and that of a reference model. Our experiments show that QUAM excels in capturing epistemic uncertainty for deep learning models and outperforms previous methods on challenging tasks in the vision domain.

We explain how the so-called Einstein locality is to be understood in the Schr\"odinger picture of quantum mechanics. This notion is perfectly compatible with the Bell non-locality exhibited by entangled states. Contrary to some beliefs that quantum mechanics is incomplete, it is, in fact, its overcompleteness as exemplified by different pictures of quantum physics, that points to the same underlying reality.

This topical review article gives an overview of the interplay between quantum information theory and thermodynamics of quantum systems. We focus on several trending topics including the foundations of statistical mechanics, resource theories, entanglement in thermodynamic settings, fluctuation theorems and thermal machines. This is not a comprehensive review of the diverse field of quantum thermodynamics; rather, it is a convenient entry point for the thermo-curious information theorist. Furthermore this review should facilitate the unification and understanding of different interdisciplinary approaches emerging in research groups around the world.

Planning with partial observation is a central challenge in embodied AI. A majority of prior works have tackled this challenge by developing agents that physically explore their environment to update their beliefs about the world state.In contrast, humans can imagine unseen parts of the world through a mental exploration and revise their beliefs with imagined observations. Such updated beliefs can allow them to make more informed decisions, without necessitating the physical exploration of the world at all times. To achieve this human-like ability, we introduce the Generative World Explorer (Genex), an egocentric world exploration framework that allows an agent to mentally explore a large-scale 3D world (e.g., urban scenes) and acquire imagined observations to update its belief. This updated belief will then help the agent to make a more informed decision at the current step. To train Genex, we create a synthetic urban scene dataset, Genex-DB. Our experimental results demonstrate that (1) Genex can generate high-quality and consistent observations during long-horizon exploration of a large virtual physical world and (2) the beliefs updated with the generated observations can inform an existing decision-making model (e.g., an LLM agent) to make better plans.

We introduce Minary, a computational framework designed as a candidate for the first formally provable autopoietic primitive. Minary represents interacting probabilistic events as multi-dimensional vectors and combines them via linear superposition rather than multiplicative scalar operations, thereby preserving uncertainty and enabling constructive and destructive interference in the range [-1,1]. A fixed set of ``perspectives'' evaluates ``semantic dimensions'' according to hidden competencies, and their interactions drive two discrete-time stochastic processes. We model this system as an iterated random affine map and use the theory of iterated random functions to prove that it converges in distribution to a unique stationary law; we moreover obtain an explicit closed form for the limiting expectation in terms of row, column, and global averages of the competency matrix. We then derive exact formulas for the mean and variance of the normalized consensus conditioned on the activation of a given semantic dimension, revealing how consensus depends on competency structure rather than raw input signals. Finally, we argue that Minary is organizationally closed yet operationally open in the sense of Maturana and Varela, and we discuss implications for building self-maintaining, distributed, and parallelizable computational systems that house a uniquely subjective notion of identity.

Do Large Language Models (LLMs) possess a Theory of Mind (ToM)? Research into this question has focused on evaluating LLMs against benchmarks and found success across a range of social tasks. However, these evaluations do not test for the actual representations posited by ToM: namely, a causal model of mental states and behavior. Here, we use a cognitively-grounded definition of ToM to develop and test a new evaluation framework. Specifically, our approach probes whether LLMs have a coherent, domain-general, and consistent model of how mental states cause behavior -- regardless of whether that model matches a human-like ToM. We find that even though LLMs succeed in approximating human judgments in a simple ToM paradigm, they fail at a logically equivalent task and exhibit low consistency between their action predictions and corresponding mental state inferences. As such, these findings suggest that the social proficiency exhibited by LLMs is not the result of an domain-general or consistent ToM.

True self-evolution requires agents to act as lifelong learners that internalize novel experiences to solve future problems. However, rigorously measuring this foundational capability is hindered by two obstacles: the entanglement of prior knowledge, where ``new'' knowledge may appear in pre-training data, and the entanglement of reasoning complexity, where failures may stem from problem difficulty rather than an inability to recall learned knowledge. We introduce SE-Bench, a diagnostic environment that obfuscates the NumPy library and its API doc into a pseudo-novel package with randomized identifiers. Agents are trained to internalize this package and evaluated on simple coding tasks without access to documentation, yielding a clean setting where tasks are trivial with the new API doc but impossible for base models without it. Our investigation reveals three insights: (1) the Open-Book Paradox, where training with reference documentation inhibits retention, requiring "Closed-Book Training" to force knowledge compression into weights; (2) the RL Gap, where standard RL fails to internalize new knowledge completely due to PPO clipping and negative gradients; and (3) the viability of Self-Play for internalization, proving models can learn from self-generated, noisy tasks when coupled with SFT, but not RL. Overall, SE-Bench establishes a rigorous diagnostic platform for self-evolution with knowledge internalization. Our code and dataset can be found at https://github.com/thunlp/SE-Bench.

Large language models (LLMs) tend to generate lexically, semantically, and stylistically homogenous texts. This poses a risk of knowledge collapse, where homogenous LLMs mediate a shrinking in the range of accessible information over time. Existing works on homogenization are limited by a focus on closed-ended multiple-choice setups or fuzzy semantic features, and do not look at trends across time and cultural contexts. To overcome this, we present a new methodology to measure epistemic diversity, i.e., variation in real-world claims in LLM outputs, which we use to perform a broad empirical study of LLM knowledge collapse. We test 27 LLMs, 155 topics covering 12 countries, and 200 prompt variations sourced from real user chats. For the topics in our study, we show that while newer models tend to generate more diverse claims, nearly all models are less epistemically diverse than a basic web search. We find that model size has a negative impact on epistemic diversity, while retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) has a positive impact, though the improvement from RAG varies by the cultural context. Finally, compared to a traditional knowledge source (Wikipedia), we find that country-specific claims reflect the English language more than the local one, highlighting a gap in epistemic representation

Automated evaluation of free-form outputs from large language models (LLMs) is challenging because many distinct answers can be equally valid. A common practice is to use LLMs themselves as judges, but the theoretical properties of this approach are not yet well understood. We show that a geometric framework that represents both judges and candidates as points on a probability simplex can provide helpful insight on what is or is not identifiable using LLM judges. Our theoretical analysis uncovers a "phase transition" in ranking identifiability: for binary scoring systems, true rankings are identifiable even with weak judges under mild assumptions, while rankings become non-identifiable for three or more scoring levels even with infinite data, absent additional prior knowledge. This non-identifiability highlights how uncertainty in rankings stems from not only aleatoric uncertainty (i.e., inherent stochasticity in the data) but also epistemic uncertainty regarding which assumptions hold, an aspect that has received limited attention until now. To integrate both types of uncertainty, we use Bayesian inference to encode assumptions as priors and conduct sensitivity analysis of ranking estimates and credible intervals. Empirical evaluations across multiple benchmarks demonstrate that Bayesian inference yields more accurate rankings and substantially improves coverage rates. These results underscore the importance of taking a more holistic approach to uncertainty quantification when using LLMs as judges.

To enable Large Language Models (LLMs) to function as conscious agents with generalizable reasoning capabilities, it is crucial that they possess the reasoning ability to comprehend situational changes (transitions) in distribution triggered by environmental factors or actions from other agents. Despite its fundamental significance, this ability remains underexplored due to the complexity of modeling infinite possible changes in an event and their associated distributions, coupled with the lack of benchmark data with situational transitions. Addressing these gaps, we propose a novel formulation of reasoning with distributional changes as a three-step discriminative process, termed as MetAphysical ReaSoning. We then introduce the first-ever benchmark, MARS, comprising three tasks corresponding to each step. These tasks systematically assess LLMs' capabilities in reasoning the plausibility of (i) changes in actions, (ii) states caused by changed actions, and (iii) situational transitions driven by changes in action. Extensive evaluations with 20 (L)LMs of varying sizes and methods indicate that all three tasks in this process pose significant challenges, even for state-of-the-art LLMs and LMs after fine-tuning. Further analyses reveal potential causes for the underperformance of LLMs and demonstrate that pre-training them on large-scale conceptualization taxonomies can potentially enhance their metaphysical reasoning capabilities. Our data and models are publicly accessible at https://github.com/HKUST-KnowComp/MARS.

Bayes' rule tells us how to invert a causal process in order to update our beliefs in light of new evidence. If the process is believed to have a complex compositional structure, we may observe that the inversion of the whole can be computed piecewise in terms of the component processes. We study the structure of this compositional rule, noting that it relates to the lens pattern in functional programming. Working in a suitably general axiomatic presentation of a category of Markov kernels, we see how we can think of Bayesian inversion as a particular instance of a state-dependent morphism in a fibred category. We discuss the compositional nature of this, formulated as a functor on the underlying category and explore how this can used for a more type-driven approach to statistical inference.

Living systems face both environmental complexity and limited access to free-energy resources. Survival under these conditions requires a control system that can activate, or deploy, available perception and action resources in a context specific way. We show here that when systems are described as executing active inference driven by the free-energy principle (and hence can be considered Bayesian prediction-error minimizers), their control flow systems can always be represented as tensor networks (TNs). We show how TNs as control systems can be implmented within the general framework of quantum topological neural networks, and discuss the implications of these results for modeling biological systems at multiple scales.

In this paper, we propose feedback designs for manipulating a quantum state to a target state by performing sequential measurements. In light of Belavkin's quantum feedback control theory, for a given set of (projective or non-projective) measurements and a given time horizon, we show that finding the measurement selection policy that maximizes the probability of successful state manipulation is an optimal control problem for a controlled Markovian process. The optimal policy is Markovian and can be solved by dynamical programming. Numerical examples indicate that making use of feedback information significantly improves the success probability compared to classical scheme without taking feedback. We also consider other objective functionals including maximizing the expected fidelity to the target state as well as minimizing the expected arrival time. The connections and differences among these objectives are also discussed.

With the great success in simulating many intelligent behaviors using computing devices, there has been an ongoing debate whether all conscious activities are computational processes. In this paper, the answer to this question is shown to be no. A certain phenomenon of consciousness is demonstrated to be fully represented as a computational process using a quantum computer. Based on the computability criterion discussed with Turing machines, the model constructed is shown to necessarily involve a non-computable element. The concept that this is solely a quantum effect and does not work for a classical case is also discussed.

Due to the self-referencing aspect, consciousness is placed in a unique non-computable position among natural phenomena. Non-computable consciousness was previously analyzed on the basis of self-referential cyclical time. This paper extends the cyclical model of vacuum observation and posits that choice, or the experience of reality, may be expressed as the initial part of the self-referencing loop, while the conscious awareness of the experience is the other part of the loop. In particular, the inseparability of the two sides of the loop is established through the cyclical time process, which bears a resemblance to Heidegger's analysis of existence. The cyclical looping model is also discussed in terms of Wittgenstein's analysis of language as attaching semantic meaning, or continuous or infinite conscious awareness, to physical reality. We also discuss the proposed model of subjectivity and cyclical time - as opposed to objectivity and linear time - which may be considered similar to Hebrew thought.

A probabilistic classifier with reliable predictive uncertainties i) fits successfully to the target domain data, ii) provides calibrated class probabilities in difficult regions of the target domain (e.g.\ class overlap), and iii) accurately identifies queries coming out of the target domain and rejects them. We introduce an original combination of Evidential Deep Learning, Neural Processes, and Neural Turing Machines capable of providing all three essential properties mentioned above for total uncertainty quantification. We observe our method on five classification tasks to be the only one that can excel all three aspects of total calibration with a single standalone predictor. Our unified solution delivers an implementation-friendly and compute efficient recipe for safety clearance and provides intellectual economy to an investigation of algorithmic roots of epistemic awareness in deep neural nets.

Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes (POMDPs) are used to model environments where the full state cannot be perceived by an agent. As such the agent needs to reason taking into account the past observations and actions. However, simply remembering the full history is generally intractable due to the exponential growth in the history space. Maintaining a probability distribution that models the belief over what the true state is can be used as a sufficient statistic of the history, but its computation requires access to the model of the environment and is often intractable. While SOTA algorithms use Recurrent Neural Networks to compress the observation-action history aiming to learn a sufficient statistic, they lack guarantees of success and can lead to sub-optimal policies. To overcome this, we propose the Wasserstein Belief Updater, an RL algorithm that learns a latent model of the POMDP and an approximation of the belief update. Our approach comes with theoretical guarantees on the quality of our approximation ensuring that our outputted beliefs allow for learning the optimal value function.

With the development in cognitive science and Large Language Models (LLMs), increasing connections have come to light between these two distinct fields. Building upon these connections, we propose a conjecture suggesting the existence of a duality between LLMs and Tulving's theory of memory. We identify a potential correspondence between Tulving's synergistic ecphory model (SEM) of retrieval and the emergent abilities observed in LLMs, serving as supporting evidence for our conjecture. Furthermore, we speculate that consciousness may be considered a form of emergent ability based on this duality. We also discuss how other theories of consciousness intersect with our research.

Theory of mind (ToM; Premack & Woodruff, 1978) broadly refers to humans' ability to represent the mental states of others, including their desires, beliefs, and intentions. We propose to train a machine to build such models too. We design a Theory of Mind neural network -- a ToMnet -- which uses meta-learning to build models of the agents it encounters, from observations of their behaviour alone. Through this process, it acquires a strong prior model for agents' behaviour, as well as the ability to bootstrap to richer predictions about agents' characteristics and mental states using only a small number of behavioural observations. We apply the ToMnet to agents behaving in simple gridworld environments, showing that it learns to model random, algorithmic, and deep reinforcement learning agents from varied populations, and that it passes classic ToM tasks such as the "Sally-Anne" test (Wimmer & Perner, 1983; Baron-Cohen et al., 1985) of recognising that others can hold false beliefs about the world. We argue that this system -- which autonomously learns how to model other agents in its world -- is an important step forward for developing multi-agent AI systems, for building intermediating technology for machine-human interaction, and for advancing the progress on interpretable AI.

This review examines how AI technologies are transforming democratic representation, focusing on citizen participation and algorithmic decision-making. The analysis reveals that AI technologies are reshaping democratic processes in fundamental ways: enabling mass-scale deliberation, changing how citizens access and engage with political information, and transforming how representatives make and implement decisions. While AI offers unprecedented opportunities for enhancing democratic participation and governance efficiency, it also presents significant challenges to democratic legitimacy and accountability. Social media platforms' AI-driven algorithms currently mediate much political discourse, creating concerns about information manipulation and privacy. Large Language Models introduce both epistemic challenges and potential tools for improving democratic dialogue. The emergence of Mass Online Deliberation platforms suggests possibilities for scaling up meaningful citizen participation, while Algorithmic Decision-Making systems promise more efficient policy implementation but face limitations in handling complex political trade-offs. As these systems become prevalent, representatives may assume the role of architects of automated decision frameworks, responsible for guiding the translation of politically contested concepts into technical parameters and metrics. Advanced deliberation platforms offering real-time insights into citizen preferences will challenge traditional representative independence and discretion to interpret public will. The institutional integration of these participation mechanisms requires frameworks that balance the benefits with democratic stability through hybrid systems weighting different forms of democratic expression.

Reliable probability estimation is of crucial importance in many real-world applications where there is inherent (aleatoric) uncertainty. Probability-estimation models are trained on observed outcomes (e.g. whether it has rained or not, or whether a patient has died or not), because the ground-truth probabilities of the events of interest are typically unknown. The problem is therefore analogous to binary classification, with the difference that the objective is to estimate probabilities rather than predicting the specific outcome. This work investigates probability estimation from high-dimensional data using deep neural networks. There exist several methods to improve the probabilities generated by these models but they mostly focus on model (epistemic) uncertainty. For problems with inherent uncertainty, it is challenging to evaluate performance without access to ground-truth probabilities. To address this, we build a synthetic dataset to study and compare different computable metrics. We evaluate existing methods on the synthetic data as well as on three real-world probability estimation tasks, all of which involve inherent uncertainty: precipitation forecasting from radar images, predicting cancer patient survival from histopathology images, and predicting car crashes from dashcam videos. We also give a theoretical analysis of a model for high-dimensional probability estimation which reproduces several of the phenomena evinced in our experiments. Finally, we propose a new method for probability estimation using neural networks, which modifies the training process to promote output probabilities that are consistent with empirical probabilities computed from the data. The method outperforms existing approaches on most metrics on the simulated as well as real-world data.

The pursuit of artificial agents that can learn to master complex environments has led to remarkable successes, yet prevailing deep reinforcement learning methods often rely on immense experience, encoding their knowledge opaquely within neural network weights. We propose a different paradigm, one in which an agent learns to play by reasoning and planning. We introduce Cogito, ergo ludo (CEL), a novel agent architecture that leverages a Large Language Model (LLM) to build an explicit, language-based understanding of its environment's mechanics and its own strategy. Starting from a tabula rasa state with no prior knowledge (except action set), CEL operates on a cycle of interaction and reflection. After each episode, the agent analyzes its complete trajectory to perform two concurrent learning processes: Rule Induction, where it refines its explicit model of the environment's dynamics, and Strategy and Playbook Summarization, where it distills experiences into an actionable strategic playbook. We evaluate CEL on diverse grid-world tasks (i.e., Minesweeper, Frozen Lake, and Sokoban), and show that the CEL agent successfully learns to master these games by autonomously discovering their rules and developing effective policies from sparse rewards. Ablation studies confirm that the iterative process is critical for sustained learning. Our work demonstrates a path toward more general and interpretable agents that not only act effectively but also build a transparent and improving model of their world through explicit reasoning on raw experience.

Large Language Models (LLMs) encapsulate vast amounts of knowledge but still remain vulnerable to external misinformation. Existing research mainly studied this susceptibility behavior in a single-turn setting. However, belief can change during a multi-turn conversation, especially a persuasive one. Therefore, in this study, we delve into LLMs' susceptibility to persuasive conversations, particularly on factual questions that they can answer correctly. We first curate the Farm (i.e., Fact to Misinform) dataset, which contains factual questions paired with systematically generated persuasive misinformation. Then, we develop a testing framework to track LLMs' belief changes in a persuasive dialogue. Through extensive experiments, we find that LLMs' correct beliefs on factual knowledge can be easily manipulated by various persuasive strategies.

This work stems from prior complementary observations on the dynamics of Chain-of-Thought (CoT): Large Language Models (LLMs) is shown latent planning of subsequent reasoning prior to CoT emergence, thereby diminishing the significance of explicit CoT; whereas CoT remains critical for tasks requiring multi-step reasoning. To deepen the understanding between LLM's internal states and its verbalized reasoning trajectories, we investigate the latent planning strength of LLMs, through our probing method, Tele-Lens, applying to hidden states across diverse task domains. Our empirical results indicate that LLMs exhibit a myopic horizon, primarily conducting incremental transitions without precise global planning. Leveraging this characteristic, we propose a hypothesis on enhancing uncertainty estimation of CoT, which we validate that a small subset of CoT positions can effectively represent the uncertainty of the entire path. We further underscore the significance of exploiting CoT dynamics, and demonstrate that automatic recognition of CoT bypass can be achieved without performance degradation. Our code, data and models are released at https://github.com/lxucs/tele-lens.

Recent progress in using machine learning models for reasoning tasks has been driven by novel model architectures, large-scale pre-training protocols, and dedicated reasoning datasets for fine-tuning. In this work, to further pursue these advances, we introduce a new data generator for machine reasoning that integrates with an embodied agent. The generated data consists of templated text queries and answers, matched with world-states encoded into a database. The world-states are a result of both world dynamics and the actions of the agent. We show the results of several baseline models on instantiations of train sets. These include pre-trained language models fine-tuned on a text-formatted representation of the database, and graph-structured Transformers operating on a knowledge-graph representation of the database. We find that these models can answer some questions about the world-state, but struggle with others. These results hint at new research directions in designing neural reasoning models and database representations. Code to generate the data will be released at github.com/facebookresearch/neuralmemory

Language models show a surprising range of capabilities, but the source of their apparent competence is unclear. Do these networks just memorize a collection of surface statistics, or do they rely on internal representations of the process that generates the sequences they see? We investigate this question by applying a variant of the GPT model to the task of predicting legal moves in a simple board game, Othello. Although the network has no a priori knowledge of the game or its rules, we uncover evidence of an emergent nonlinear internal representation of the board state. Interventional experiments indicate this representation can be used to control the output of the network and create "latent saliency maps" that can help explain predictions in human terms.

Autonomous agents, especially delegated systems with memory, persistent context, and multi-step planning, pose a measurement problem not present in stateless models: an agent that preserves continued operation as a terminal objective and one that does so merely instrumentally can produce observationally similar trajectories. External behavioral monitoring cannot reliably distinguish between them. We introduce the Unified Continuation-Interest Protocol (UCIP), a multi-criterion detection framework that moves this distinction from behavior to the latent structure of agent trajectories. UCIP encodes trajectories with a Quantum Boltzmann Machine (QBM), a classical algorithm based on the density-matrix formalism of quantum statistical mechanics, and measures the von Neumann entropy of the reduced density matrix induced by a bipartition of hidden units. We test whether agents with terminal continuation objectives (Type A) produce latent states with higher entanglement entropy than agents whose continuation is merely instrumental (Type B). Higher entanglement reflects stronger cross-partition statistical coupling. On gridworld agents with known ground-truth objectives, UCIP achieves 100% detection accuracy and 1.0 AUC-ROC on held-out non-adversarial evaluation under the frozen Phase I gate. The entanglement gap between Type A and Type B agents is Delta = 0.381 (p < 0.001, permutation test). Pearson r = 0.934 across an 11-point interpolation sweep indicates that, within this synthetic family, UCIP tracks graded changes in continuation weighting rather than merely a binary label. Among the tested models, only the QBM achieves positive Delta. All computations are classical; "quantum" refers only to the mathematical formalism. UCIP does not detect consciousness or subjective experience; it detects statistical structure in latent representations that correlates with known objectives.

Large language models (LLMs) are widely used for factual tasks such as "What treats asthma?" or "What is the capital of Latvia?". However, it remains unclear how stably LLMs encode distinctions between true, false, and neither-true-nor-false content in their internal probabilistic representations. We introduce representational stability as the robustness of an LLM's veracity representations to perturbations in the operational definition of truth. We assess representational stability by (i) training a linear probe on an LLM's activations to separate true from not-true statements and (ii) measuring how its learned decision boundary shifts under controlled label changes. Using activations from sixteen open-source models and three factual domains, we compare two types of neither statements. The first are fact-like assertions about entities we believe to be absent from any training data. We call these unfamiliar neither statements. The second are nonfactual claims drawn from well-known fictional contexts. We call these familiar neither statements. The unfamiliar statements induce the largest boundary shifts, producing up to 40% flipped truth judgements in fragile domains (such as word definitions), while familiar fictional statements remain more coherently clustered and yield smaller changes (leq 8.2%). These results suggest that representational stability stems more from epistemic familiarity than from linguistic form. More broadly, our approach provides a diagnostic for auditing and training LLMs to preserve coherent truth assignments under semantic uncertainty, rather than optimizing for output accuracy alone.

Communicating state machines provide a formal foundation for distributed computation. Unfortunately, they are Turing-complete and, thus, challenging to analyse. In this paper, we classify restrictions on channels which have been proposed to work around the undecidability of verification questions. We compare half-duplex communication, existential B-boundedness, and k-synchronisability. These restrictions do not prevent the communication channels from growing arbitrarily large but still restrict the power of the model. Each restriction gives rise to a set of languages so, for every pair of restrictions, we check whether one subsumes the other or if they are incomparable. We investigate their relationship in two different contexts: first, the one of communicating state machines, and, second, the one of communication protocol specifications using high-level message sequence charts. Surprisingly, these two contexts yield different conclusions. In addition, we integrate multiparty session types, another approach to specify communication protocols, into our classification. We show that multiparty session type languages are half-duplex, existentially 1-bounded, and 1-synchronisable. To~show this result, we provide the first formal embedding of multiparty session types into high-level message sequence charts.

Recent breakthroughs in large language models (LLMs) have brought remarkable success in the field of LLM-as-Agent. Nevertheless, a prevalent assumption is that the information processed by LLMs is consistently honest, neglecting the pervasive deceptive or misleading information in human society and AI-generated content. This oversight makes LLMs susceptible to malicious manipulations, potentially resulting in detrimental outcomes. This study utilizes the intricate Avalon game as a testbed to explore LLMs' potential in deceptive environments. Avalon, full of misinformation and requiring sophisticated logic, manifests as a "Game-of-Thoughts". Inspired by the efficacy of humans' recursive thinking and perspective-taking in the Avalon game, we introduce a novel framework, Recursive Contemplation (ReCon), to enhance LLMs' ability to identify and counteract deceptive information. ReCon combines formulation and refinement contemplation processes; formulation contemplation produces initial thoughts and speech, while refinement contemplation further polishes them. Additionally, we incorporate first-order and second-order perspective transitions into these processes respectively. Specifically, the first-order allows an LLM agent to infer others' mental states, and the second-order involves understanding how others perceive the agent's mental state. After integrating ReCon with different LLMs, extensive experiment results from the Avalon game indicate its efficacy in aiding LLMs to discern and maneuver around deceptive information without extra fine-tuning and data. Finally, we offer a possible explanation for the efficacy of ReCon and explore the current limitations of LLMs in terms of safety, reasoning, speaking style, and format, potentially furnishing insights for subsequent research.

We present a modular semantic account of Bayesian inference algorithms for probabilistic programming languages, as used in data science and machine learning. Sophisticated inference algorithms are often explained in terms of composition of smaller parts. However, neither their theoretical justification nor their implementation reflects this modularity. We show how to conceptualise and analyse such inference algorithms as manipulating intermediate representations of probabilistic programs using higher-order functions and inductive types, and their denotational semantics. Semantic accounts of continuous distributions use measurable spaces. However, our use of higher-order functions presents a substantial technical difficulty: it is impossible to define a measurable space structure over the collection of measurable functions between arbitrary measurable spaces that is compatible with standard operations on those functions, such as function application. We overcome this difficulty using quasi-Borel spaces, a recently proposed mathematical structure that supports both function spaces and continuous distributions. We define a class of semantic structures for representing probabilistic programs, and semantic validity criteria for transformations of these representations in terms of distribution preservation. We develop a collection of building blocks for composing representations. We use these building blocks to validate common inference algorithms such as Sequential Monte Carlo and Markov Chain Monte Carlo. To emphasize the connection between the semantic manipulation and its traditional measure theoretic origins, we use Kock's synthetic measure theory. We demonstrate its usefulness by proving a quasi-Borel counterpart to the Metropolis-Hastings-Green theorem.

Computational complexity has often been ignored in philosophy of mind, in philosophical artificial intelligence studies. The purpose of this paper is threefold. First and foremost, to show the importance of complexity rather than computability in philosophical and AI problems. Second, to rephrase the notion of computability in terms of solvability, i.e. treating computability as non-sufficient for establishing intelligence. The Church-Turing thesis is therefore revisited and rephrased in order to capture the ontological background of spatial and temporal complexity. Third, to emphasize ontological differences between different time complexities, which seem to provide a solid base towards better understanding of artificial intelligence in general.

We show that a GPT-3 model can learn to express uncertainty about its own answers in natural language -- without use of model logits. When given a question, the model generates both an answer and a level of confidence (e.g. "90% confidence" or "high confidence"). These levels map to probabilities that are well calibrated. The model also remains moderately calibrated under distribution shift, and is sensitive to uncertainty in its own answers, rather than imitating human examples. To our knowledge, this is the first time a model has been shown to express calibrated uncertainty about its own answers in natural language. For testing calibration, we introduce the CalibratedMath suite of tasks. We compare the calibration of uncertainty expressed in words ("verbalized probability") to uncertainty extracted from model logits. Both kinds of uncertainty are capable of generalizing calibration under distribution shift. We also provide evidence that GPT-3's ability to generalize calibration depends on pre-trained latent representations that correlate with epistemic uncertainty over its answers.

Large language model (LLM)-based multi-agent systems enable expressive agent reasoning but are expensive to scale and poorly calibrated for timestep-aligned state-transition simulation, while classical agent-based models (ABMs) offer interpretability but struggle to integrate rich individual-level signals and non-stationary behaviors. We propose PhysicsAgentABM, which shifts inference to behaviorally coherent agent clusters: state-specialized symbolic agents encode mechanistic transition priors, a multimodal neural transition model captures temporal and interaction dynamics, and uncertainty-aware epistemic fusion yields calibrated cluster-level transition distributions. Individual agents then stochastically realize transitions under local constraints, decoupling population inference from entity-level variability. We further introduce ANCHOR, an LLM agent-driven clustering strategy based on cross-contextual behavioral responses and a novel contrastive loss, reducing LLM calls by up to 6-8 times. Experiments across public health, finance, and social sciences show consistent gains in event-time accuracy and calibration over mechanistic, neural, and LLM baselines. By re-architecting generative ABM around population-level inference with uncertainty-aware neuro-symbolic fusion, PhysicsAgentABM establishes a new paradigm for scalable and calibrated simulation with LLMs.

While numerous works have assessed the generative performance of language models (LMs) on tasks requiring Theory of Mind reasoning, research into the models' internal representation of mental states remains limited. Recent work has used probing to demonstrate that LMs can represent beliefs of themselves and others. However, these claims are accompanied by limited evaluation, making it difficult to assess how mental state representations are affected by model design and training choices. We report an extensive benchmark with various LM types with different model sizes, fine-tuning approaches, and prompt designs to study the robustness of mental state representations and memorisation issues within the probes. Our results show that the quality of models' internal representations of the beliefs of others increases with model size and, more crucially, with fine-tuning. We are the first to study how prompt variations impact probing performance on theory of mind tasks. We demonstrate that models' representations are sensitive to prompt variations, even when such variations should be beneficial. Finally, we complement previous activation editing experiments on Theory of Mind tasks and show that it is possible to improve models' reasoning performance by steering their activations without the need to train any probe.

Solving complex tasks usually requires LLMs to generate long multi-step reasoning chains. Previous work has shown that verifying the correctness of individual reasoning steps can further improve the performance and efficiency of LLMs on such tasks and enhance solution interpretability. However, existing verification approaches, such as Process Reward Models (PRMs), are either computationally expensive, limited to specific domains, or require large-scale human or model-generated annotations. Thus, we propose a lightweight alternative for step-level reasoning verification based on data-driven uncertainty scores. We train transformer-based uncertainty quantification heads (UHeads) that use the internal states of a frozen LLM to estimate the uncertainty of its reasoning steps during generation. The approach is fully automatic: target labels are generated either by another larger LLM (e.g., DeepSeek R1) or in a self-supervised manner by the original model itself. UHeads are both effective and lightweight, containing less than 10M parameters. Across multiple domains, including mathematics, planning, and general knowledge question answering, they match or even surpass the performance of PRMs that are up to 810x larger. Our findings suggest that the internal states of LLMs encode their uncertainty and can serve as reliable signals for reasoning verification, offering a promising direction toward scalable and generalizable introspective LLMs.

We study the quantum coherence and its distribution of N-partite GHZ and W states of bosonic fields in the noninertial frames with arbitrary number of acceleration observers. We find that the coherence of both GHZ and W state reduces with accelerations and freezes in the limit of infinite accelerations. The freezing value of coherence depends on the number of accelerated observers. The coherence of N-partite GHZ state is genuinely global and no coherence exists in any subsystems. For the N-partite W state, however, the coherence is essentially bipartite types, and the total coherence is equal to the sum of coherence of all the bipartite subsystems.

We investigate whether large language models can introspect on their internal states. It is difficult to answer this question through conversation alone, as genuine introspection cannot be distinguished from confabulations. Here, we address this challenge by injecting representations of known concepts into a model's activations, and measuring the influence of these manipulations on the model's self-reported states. We find that models can, in certain scenarios, notice the presence of injected concepts and accurately identify them. Models demonstrate some ability to recall prior internal representations and distinguish them from raw text inputs. Strikingly, we find that some models can use their ability to recall prior intentions in order to distinguish their own outputs from artificial prefills. In all these experiments, Claude Opus 4 and 4.1, the most capable models we tested, generally demonstrate the greatest introspective awareness; however, trends across models are complex and sensitive to post-training strategies. Finally, we explore whether models can explicitly control their internal representations, finding that models can modulate their activations when instructed or incentivized to "think about" a concept. Overall, our results indicate that current language models possess some functional introspective awareness of their own internal states. We stress that in today's models, this capacity is highly unreliable and context-dependent; however, it may continue to develop with further improvements to model capabilities.

We study the prepare-and-measure scenario in which Alice transmits a quantum system to Bob, who then performs a quantum measurement. The quantum state of the system is unknown to Bob, and the measurement is unknown to Alice. It has recently been shown that shared randomness and two bits of classical communication are necessary and sufficient to simulate the transmission of a qubit. We show that the communication cost can be reduced to an average of 1.89 bits. We then study restricted sets of state preparations: First, for a restriction to real-valued qubit states, if the communication of a classical trit is sufficient, we show that the corresponding protocol must have a convoluted form. We then reduce the smallest qubit scenario requiring two bits of classical communication to only 6 state preparations and 5 measurements. For a qutrit, it is not known whether the communication cost is finite; we identify a scenario that requires at least 5 classical messages, already for the simulation of the real qutrit. Finally, we develop a method for restricted sets of states, that allows us to lower bound the classical communication cost based solely on the set of quantum states.

While prior work has explored whether large language models (LLMs) possess a "theory of mind" (ToM) - the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others - there has been little work testing whether LLMs can implicitly apply such knowledge to predict behavior, or to judge whether an observed behavior is rational. Such skills are critical for appropriate interaction in social environments. We create a new dataset, SimpleTom, containing concise, diverse stories (e.g., "The can of Pringles has moldy chips in it. Mary picks up the can in the supermarket and walks to the cashier."), each with three questions that test different degrees of ToM reasoning, asking models to predict (a) mental state ("Is Mary aware of the mold?"), (b) behavior ("Will Mary pay for the chips or report the mold?"), and (c) judgment ("Mary paid for the chips. Was that reasonable?"). To our knowledge, SimpleToM is the first dataset to systematically explore downstream reasoning requiring knowledge of mental states in realistic scenarios. Our experimental results are intriguing: While most models can reliably predict mental state on our dataset (a), they often fail to correctly predict the behavior (b), and fare even worse at judging whether given behaviors are reasonable (c), despite being correctly aware of the protagonist's mental state should make such secondary predictions obvious. We further show that we can help models do better at (b) and (c) via interventions such as reminding the model of its earlier mental state answer and mental-state-specific chain-of-thought prompting, raising the action prediction accuracies (e.g., from 49.5% to 93.5% for GPT-4o) and judgment accuracies (e.g., from 15.3% to 94.7% in GPT-4o). While this shows that models can be coaxed to perform well, it requires task-specific interventions, and the natural model performances remain low, a cautionary tale for LLM deployment.

Neural NLP models are often miscalibrated, assigning high confidence to incorrect predictions, which undermines selective prediction and high-stakes deployment. Post-hoc calibration methods adjust output probabilities but leave internal computation unchanged, while ensemble and Bayesian approaches improve uncertainty at substantial training or storage cost. We propose UAT-LITE, an inference-time framework that makes self-attention uncertainty-aware using approximate Bayesian inference via Monte Carlo dropout in pretrained transformer classifiers. Token-level epistemic uncertainty is estimated from stochastic forward passes and used to modulate self-attention during contextualization, without modifying pretrained weights or training objectives. We additionally introduce a layerwise variance decomposition to diagnose how predictive uncertainty accumulates across transformer depth. Across the SQuAD 2.0 answerability, MNLI, and SST-2, UAT-LITE reduces Expected Calibration Error by approximately 20% on average relative to a fine-tuned BERT-base baseline while preserving task accuracy, and improves selective prediction and robustness under distribution shift.

Quantum theory departs from classical physics in its treatment of correlations, most prominently through the phenomena of contextuality and nonlocality. Once regarded primarily as foundational curiosities, these effects are now understood as key operational resources for quantum computation, communication, and simulation. Although traditionally investigated in distinct settings, recent theoretical and experimental advances have revealed deep conceptual, mathematical, and operational connections between them. This review presents a unified perspective on these developments based on sheaf-theoretic and graph-theoretic frameworks, which provide theory-independent characterizations of statistical correlations. These approaches clarify the structural relationship between contextuality and nonlocality, facilitate the formulation of experimentally testable inequalities, and guide implementations in realistic physical platforms, with particular emphasis on photonic systems. By bridging abstract theoretical structures and concrete experimental realizations, this review sheds light on the nonclassical foundations of quantum correlations and their emerging role in quantum technologies.

Beliefs serve as the foundation for human cognition and decision-making. They guide individuals in deriving meaning from their lives, shaping their behaviors, and forming social connections. Therefore, a model that encapsulates beliefs and their interrelationships is crucial for quantitatively studying the influence of beliefs on our actions. Despite its importance, research on the interplay between human beliefs has often been limited to a small set of beliefs pertaining to specific issues, with a heavy reliance on surveys or experiments. Here, we propose a method for extracting nuanced relations between thousands of beliefs by leveraging large-scale user participation data from an online debate platform and mapping these beliefs to an embedding space using a fine-tuned large language model (LLM). This belief embedding space effectively encapsulates the interconnectedness of diverse beliefs as well as polarization across various social issues. We discover that the positions within this belief space predict new beliefs of individuals. Furthermore, we find that the relative distance between one's existing beliefs and new beliefs can serve as a quantitative estimate of cognitive dissonance, allowing us to predict new beliefs. Our study highlights how modern LLMs, when combined with collective online records of human beliefs, can offer insights into the fundamental principles that govern human belief formation and decision-making processes.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive accomplishments in both reasoning and planning, their abilities in multi-agent collaborations remains largely unexplored. This study evaluates LLM-based agents in a multi-agent cooperative text game with Theory of Mind (ToM) inference tasks, comparing their performance with Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) and planning-based baselines. We observed evidence of emergent collaborative behaviors and high-order Theory of Mind capabilities among LLM-based agents. Our results reveal limitations in LLM-based agents' planning optimization due to systematic failures in managing long-horizon contexts and hallucination about the task state. We explore the use of explicit belief state representations to mitigate these issues, finding that it enhances task performance and the accuracy of ToM inferences for LLM-based agents.

Natural language has long enabled human cooperation, but its lossy, ambiguous, and indirect nature limits the potential of collective intelligence. While machines are not subject to these constraints, most LLM-based multi-agent systems still rely solely on natural language, exchanging tokens or their embeddings. To go beyond language, we introduce a new paradigm, thought communication, which enables agents to interact directly mind-to-mind, akin to telepathy. To uncover these latent thoughts in a principled way, we formalize the process as a general latent variable model, where agent states are generated by an unknown function of underlying thoughts. We prove that, in a nonparametric setting without auxiliary information, both shared and private latent thoughts between any pair of agents can be identified. Moreover, the global structure of thought sharing, including which agents share which thoughts and how these relationships are structured, can also be recovered with theoretical guarantees. Guided by the established theory, we develop a framework that extracts latent thoughts from all agents prior to communication and assigns each agent the relevant thoughts, along with their sharing patterns. This paradigm naturally extends beyond LLMs to all modalities, as most observational data arise from hidden generative processes. Experiments on both synthetic and real-world benchmarks validate the theory and demonstrate the collaborative advantages of thought communication. We hope this work illuminates the potential of leveraging the hidden world, as many challenges remain unsolvable through surface-level observation alone, regardless of compute or data scale.

The Monty Hall problem is a classic probability puzzle known for its counterintuitive solution, revealing fundamental discrepancies between mathematical reasoning and human intuition. To bridge this gap, we introduce a novel explanatory framework inspired by quantum measurement theory. Specifically, we conceptualize the hosts' actions-opening doors to reveal non-prizes-as analogous to quantum measurements that cause asymmetric collapses of the probability distribution. This quantum-inspired interpretation not only clarifies why the intuitive misunderstanding arises but also provides generalized formulas consistent with standard Bayesian results. We further validate our analytical approach using Monte Carlo simulations across various problem settings, demonstrating precise agreement between theoretical predictions and empirical outcomes. Our quantum analogy thus offers a powerful pedagogical tool, enhancing intuitive understanding of conditional probability phenomena through the lens of probability redistribution and quantum-like measurement operations.

While 3D body reconstruction methods have made remarkable progress recently, it remains difficult to acquire the sufficiently accurate and numerous 3D supervisions required for training. In this paper, we propose KNOWN, a framework that effectively utilizes body KNOWledge and uNcertainty modeling to compensate for insufficient 3D supervisions. KNOWN exploits a comprehensive set of generic body constraints derived from well-established body knowledge. These generic constraints precisely and explicitly characterize the reconstruction plausibility and enable 3D reconstruction models to be trained without any 3D data. Moreover, existing methods typically use images from multiple datasets during training, which can result in data noise (e.g., inconsistent joint annotation) and data imbalance (e.g., minority images representing unusual poses or captured from challenging camera views). KNOWN solves these problems through a novel probabilistic framework that models both aleatoric and epistemic uncertainty. Aleatoric uncertainty is encoded in a robust Negative Log-Likelihood (NLL) training loss, while epistemic uncertainty is used to guide model refinement. Experiments demonstrate that KNOWN's body reconstruction outperforms prior weakly-supervised approaches, particularly on the challenging minority images.

We discuss the notion of coherent states from three different perspectives: the seminal approach of Schroedinger, the experimental take of quantum optics, and the theoretical developments in quantum gravity. This comparative study tries to emphasise the connections between the approaches, and to offer a coherent short story of the field, so to speak. It may be useful for pedagogical purposes, as well as for specialists of quantum optics and quantum gravity willing to embed their perspective within a wider landscape.

We define a probabilistic programming language for Gaussian random variables with a first-class exact conditioning construct. We give operational, denotational and equational semantics for this language, establishing convenient properties like exchangeability of conditions. Conditioning on equality of continuous random variables is nontrivial, as the exact observation may have probability zero; this is Borel's paradox. Using categorical formulations of conditional probability, we show that the good properties of our language are not particular to Gaussians, but can be derived from universal properties, thus generalizing to wider settings. We define the Cond construction, which internalizes conditioning as a morphism, providing general compositional semantics for probabilistic programming with exact conditioning.

One might think that, once we know something is computable, how efficiently it can be computed is a practical question with little further philosophical importance. In this essay, I offer a detailed case that one would be wrong. In particular, I argue that computational complexity theory -- the field that studies the resources (such as time, space, and randomness) needed to solve computational problems -- leads to new perspectives on the nature of mathematical knowledge, the strong AI debate, computationalism, the problem of logical omniscience, Hume's problem of induction, Goodman's grue riddle, the foundations of quantum mechanics, economic rationality, closed timelike curves, and several other topics of philosophical interest. I end by discussing aspects of complexity theory itself that could benefit from philosophical analysis.

A new information theoretic condition is presented for reconstructing a discrete random variable X based on the knowledge of a set of discrete functions of X. The reconstruction condition is derived from Shannon's 1953 lattice theory with two entropic metrics of Shannon and Rajski. Because such a theoretical material is relatively unknown and appears quite dispersed in different references, we first provide a synthetic description (with complete proofs) of its concepts, such as total, common and complementary informations. Definitions and properties of the two entropic metrics are also fully detailed and shown compatible with the lattice structure. A new geometric interpretation of such a lattice structure is then investigated that leads to a necessary (and sometimes sufficient) condition for reconstructing the discrete random variable X given a set { X_1,ldots,X_{n} } of elements in the lattice generated by X. Finally, this condition is illustrated in five specific examples of perfect reconstruction problems: reconstruction of a symmetric random variable from the knowledge of its sign and absolute value, reconstruction of a word from a set of linear combinations, reconstruction of an integer from its prime signature (fundamental theorem of arithmetic) and from its remainders modulo a set of coprime integers (Chinese remainder theorem), and reconstruction of the sorting permutation of a list from a minimal set of pairwise comparisons.

Recent work suggests that large language models may implicitly learn world models. How should we assess this possibility? We formalize this question for the case where the underlying reality is governed by a deterministic finite automaton. This includes problems as diverse as simple logical reasoning, geographic navigation, game-playing, and chemistry. We propose new evaluation metrics for world model recovery inspired by the classic Myhill-Nerode theorem from language theory. We illustrate their utility in three domains: game playing, logic puzzles, and navigation. In all domains, the generative models we consider do well on existing diagnostics for assessing world models, but our evaluation metrics reveal their world models to be far less coherent than they appear. Such incoherence creates fragility: using a generative model to solve related but subtly different tasks can lead to failures. Building generative models that meaningfully capture the underlying logic of the domains they model would be immensely valuable; our results suggest new ways to assess how close a given model is to that goal.

Active inference is a first principles approach for understanding the brain in particular, and sentient agents in general, with the single imperative of minimizing free energy. As such, it provides a computational account for modelling artificial intelligent agents, by defining the agent's generative model and inferring the model parameters, actions and hidden state beliefs. However, the exact specification of the generative model and the hidden state space structure is left to the experimenter, whose design choices influence the resulting behaviour of the agent. Recently, deep learning methods have been proposed to learn a hidden state space structure purely from data, alleviating the experimenter from this tedious design task, but resulting in an entangled, non-interpreteable state space. In this paper, we hypothesize that such a learnt, entangled state space does not necessarily yield the best model in terms of free energy, and that enforcing different factors in the state space can yield a lower model complexity. In particular, we consider the problem of 3D object representation, and focus on different instances of the ShapeNet dataset. We propose a model that factorizes object shape, pose and category, while still learning a representation for each factor using a deep neural network. We show that models, with best disentanglement properties, perform best when adopted by an active agent in reaching preferred observations.

We propose a quantum version of a generative diffusion model. In this algorithm, artificial neural networks are replaced with parameterized quantum circuits, in order to directly generate quantum states. We present both a full quantum and a latent quantum version of the algorithm; we also present a conditioned version of these models. The models' performances have been evaluated using quantitative metrics complemented by qualitative assessments. An implementation of a simplified version of the algorithm has been executed on real NISQ quantum hardware.

In this paper I apply newly-proposed information-theoretic principles to thermodynamic work extraction. I show that if it is possible to extract work deterministically from a physical system prepared in any one of a set of states, then those states must be distinguishable from one another. This result is formulated independently of scale and of particular dynamical laws; it also provides a novel connection between thermodynamics and information theory, established via the law of conservation of energy (rather than the second law of thermodynamics). Albeit compatible with these conclusions, existing thermodynamics approaches cannot provide a result of such generality, because they are scale-dependent (relying on ensembles or coarse-graining) or tied to particular dynamical laws. This paper thus provides a broader foundation for thermodynamics, with implications for the theory of von Neumann's universal constructor

The accessibility of spatially distributed data, enabled by affordable sensors, field, and numerical experiments, has facilitated the development of data-driven solutions for scientific problems, including climate change, weather prediction, and urban planning. Neural Partial Differential Equations (Neural PDEs), which combine deep learning (DL) techniques with domain expertise (e.g., governing equations) for parameterization, have proven to be effective in capturing valuable correlations within spatiotemporal datasets. However, sparse and noisy measurements coupled with modeling approximation introduce aleatoric and epistemic uncertainties. Therefore, quantifying uncertainties propagated from model inputs to outputs remains a challenge and an essential goal for establishing the trustworthiness of Neural PDEs. This work evaluates various Uncertainty Quantification (UQ) approaches for both Forward and Inverse Problems in scientific applications. Specifically, we investigate the effectiveness of Bayesian methods, such as Hamiltonian Monte Carlo (HMC) and Monte-Carlo Dropout (MCD), and a more conventional approach, Deep Ensembles (DE). To illustrate their performance, we take two canonical PDEs: Burger's equation and the Navier-Stokes equation. Our results indicate that Neural PDEs can effectively reconstruct flow systems and predict the associated unknown parameters. However, it is noteworthy that the results derived from Bayesian methods, based on our observations, tend to display a higher degree of certainty in their predictions as compared to those obtained using the DE. This elevated certainty in predictions suggests that Bayesian techniques might underestimate the true underlying uncertainty, thereby appearing more confident in their predictions than the DE approach.

Current Large Language Models (LLMs) are unparalleled in their ability to generate grammatically correct, fluent text. LLMs are appearing rapidly, and debates on LLM capacities have taken off, but reflection is lagging behind. Thus, in this position paper, we first zoom in on the debate and critically assess three points recurring in critiques of LLM capacities: i) that LLMs only parrot statistical patterns in the training data; ii) that LLMs master formal but not functional language competence; and iii) that language learning in LLMs cannot inform human language learning. Drawing on empirical and theoretical arguments, we show that these points need more nuance. Second, we outline a pragmatic perspective on the issue of `real' understanding and intentionality in LLMs. Understanding and intentionality pertain to unobservable mental states we attribute to other humans because they have pragmatic value: they allow us to abstract away from complex underlying mechanics and predict behaviour effectively. We reflect on the circumstances under which it would make sense for humans to similarly attribute mental states to LLMs, thereby outlining a pragmatic philosophical context for LLMs as an increasingly prominent technology in society.

Wigner's Friend-type paradoxes challenge the assumption that events are absolute -- that when we measure a system, we obtain a single result, which is not relative to anything or anyone else. These paradoxes highlight the tension between quantum theory and our intuitions about reality being observer-independent. Building on a recent result that developed these paradoxes into a no-go theorem, namely the Local Friendliness Theorem, we introduce the Causal Friendliness Paradox, a time-ordered analogue of it. In this framework, we replace the usual locality assumption with Axiological Time Symmetry (ATS), and show that, when combined with the assumptions of Absoluteness of Observed Events (AOE), No Retrocausality (NRC), and Screening via Pseudo Events (SPE), we obtain a causal inequality. We then show that quantum mechanics violates this inequality and is therefore incompatible with at least one of these assumptions. To probe which assumption might be incompatible, we then examine whether AOE in its entirety is essential for this no-go result. We propose a weaker, operational form of AOE that still leads to inequalities that quantum mechanics violates. This result shows that even under relaxed assumptions, quantum theory resists reconciliation with classical notions of absolute events, reinforcing the foundational significance of Wigner's Friend-type paradoxes in timelike scenarios.

Uncertainty quantification (UQ) is vital for trustworthy deep learning, yet existing methods are either computationally intensive, such as Bayesian or ensemble methods, or provide only partial, task-specific estimates, such as single-forward-pass techniques. In this paper, we propose a post-hoc single-forward-pass framework that jointly captures aleatoric and epistemic uncertainty without modifying or retraining pretrained models. Our method applies Split-Point Analysis (SPA) to decompose predictive residuals into upper and lower subsets, computing Mean Absolute Residuals (MARs) on each side. We prove that, under ideal conditions, the total MAR equals the harmonic mean of subset MARs; deviations define a novel Self-consistency Discrepancy Score (SDS) for fine-grained epistemic estimation across regression and classification. For regression, side-specific quantile regression yields prediction intervals with improved empirical coverage, which are further calibrated via SDS. For classification, when calibration data are available, we apply SPA-based calibration identities to adjust the softmax outputs and then compute predictive entropy on these calibrated probabilities. Extensive experiments on diverse regression and classification benchmarks demonstrate that our framework matches or exceeds several state-of-the-art UQ methods while incurring minimal overhead. Our source code is available at https://github.com/zzz0527/SPC-UQ.

It is well known that accurate probabilistic predictors can be trained through empirical risk minimisation with proper scoring rules as loss functions. While such learners capture so-called aleatoric uncertainty of predictions, various machine learning methods have recently been developed with the goal to let the learner also represent its epistemic uncertainty, i.e., the uncertainty caused by a lack of knowledge and data. An emerging branch of the literature proposes the use of a second-order learner that provides predictions in terms of distributions on probability distributions. However, recent work has revealed serious theoretical shortcomings for second-order predictors based on loss minimisation. In this paper, we generalise these findings and prove a more fundamental result: There seems to be no loss function that provides an incentive for a second-order learner to faithfully represent its epistemic uncertainty in the same manner as proper scoring rules do for standard (first-order) learners. As a main mathematical tool to prove this result, we introduce the generalised notion of second-order scoring rules.