Daily Papers

We study the optimal portfolio selection problem under relative performance criteria in the market model with random coefficients from the perspective of many players game theory. We consider five random coefficients which consist of three market parameters which are used in the risky asset price modeling and two preference parameters which are related to risk attitude and impact of relative performance. We focus on two cases; either all agents have Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) risk preferences or all agents have Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) risk preferences for their investment optimization problem. For each case, we show that the forward Nash equilibrium and the mean field equilibrium exist for the n-agent game and the corresponding mean field stochastic optimal control problem, respectively. To extend the n-agent game to the continuum of players game, we introduce a measure dependent forward relative performance process and apply an optimization over controlled dynamics of McKean-Vlasov type. We conclude that our optimal portfolio formulas extend the corresponding results of the market model with constant coefficients.

In this paper we develop a model of an order-driven market where traders set bids and asks and post market or limit orders according to exogenously fixed rules. Agents are assumed to have three components to the expectation of future asset returns, namely-fundamentalist, chartist and noise trader. Furthermore agents differ in the characteristics describing these components, such as time horizon, risk aversion and the weights given to the various components. The model developed here extends a great deal of earlier literature in that the order submissions of agents are determined by utility maximisation, rather than the mechanical unit order size that is commonly assumed. In this way the order flow is better related to the ongoing evolution of the market. For the given market structure we analyze the impact of the three components of the trading strategies on the statistical properties of prices and order flows and observe that it is the chartist strategy that is mainly responsible of the fat tails and clustering in the artificial price data generated by the model. The paper provides further evidence that large price changes are likely to be generated by the presence of large gaps in the book.

We initiate the study of statistical inference and A/B testing for first-price pacing equilibria (FPPE). The FPPE model captures the dynamics resulting from large-scale first-price auction markets where buyers use pacing-based budget management. Such markets arise in the context of internet advertising, where budgets are prevalent. We propose a statistical framework for the FPPE model, in which a limit FPPE with a continuum of items models the long-run steady-state behavior of the auction platform, and an observable FPPE consisting of a finite number of items provides the data to estimate primitives of the limit FPPE, such as revenue, Nash social welfare (a fair metric of efficiency), and other parameters of interest. We develop central limit theorems and asymptotically valid confidence intervals. Furthermore, we establish the asymptotic local minimax optimality of our estimators. We then show that the theory can be used for conducting statistically valid A/B testing on auction platforms. Numerical simulations verify our central limit theorems, and empirical coverage rates for our confidence intervals agree with our theory.

Prediction markets are used in real life to predict outcomes of interest such as presidential elections. This paper presents a mathematical theory of artificial prediction markets for supervised learning of conditional probability estimators. The artificial prediction market is a novel method for fusing the prediction information of features or trained classifiers, where the fusion result is the contract price on the possible outcomes. The market can be trained online by updating the participants' budgets using training examples. Inspired by the real prediction markets, the equations that govern the market are derived from simple and reasonable assumptions. Efficient numerical algorithms are presented for solving these equations. The obtained artificial prediction market is shown to be a maximum likelihood estimator. It generalizes linear aggregation, existent in boosting and random forest, as well as logistic regression and some kernel methods. Furthermore, the market mechanism allows the aggregation of specialized classifiers that participate only on specific instances. Experimental comparisons show that the artificial prediction markets often outperform random forest and implicit online learning on synthetic data and real UCI datasets. Moreover, an extensive evaluation for pelvic and abdominal lymph node detection in CT data shows that the prediction market improves adaboost's detection rate from 79.6% to 81.2% at 3 false positives/volume.

Although machine learning tasks are highly sensitive to the quality of input data, relevant datasets can often be challenging for firms to acquire, especially when held privately by a variety of owners. For instance, if these owners are competitors in a downstream market, they may be reluctant to share information. Focusing on supervised learning for regression tasks, we develop a regression market to provide a monetary incentive for data sharing. Our mechanism adopts a Bayesian framework, allowing us to consider a more general class of regression tasks. We present a thorough exploration of the market properties, and show that similar proposals in literature expose the market agents to sizeable financial risks, which can be mitigated in our setup.

Conventional models of matching markets assume that monetary transfers can clear markets by compensating for utility differentials. However, empirical patterns show that such transfers often fail to close structural preference gaps. This paper introduces a market microstructure framework that models matching decisions as a limit order book system with rigid bid ask spreads. Individual preferences are represented by a latent preference state matrix, where the spread between an agent's internal ask price (the unconditional maximum) and the market's best bid (the reachable maximum) creates a structural liquidity constraint. We establish a Threshold Impossibility Theorem showing that linear compensation cannot close these spreads unless it induces a categorical identity shift. A dynamic discrete choice execution model further demonstrates that matches occur only when the market to book ratio crosses a time decaying liquidity threshold, analogous to order execution under inventory pressure. Numerical experiments validate persistent slippage, regional invariance of preference orderings, and high tier zero spread executions. The model provides a unified microstructure explanation for matching failures, compensation inefficiency, and post match regret in illiquid order driven environments.

Most economic theories typically assume that financial market participants are fully rational individuals and use mathematical models to simulate human behavior in financial markets. However, human behavior is often not entirely rational and is challenging to predict accurately with mathematical models. In this paper, we propose Agent-based Simulated Financial Market (ASFM), which first constructs a simulated stock market with a real order matching system. Then, we propose a large language model based agent as the stock trader, which contains the profile, observation, and tool-learning based action module. The trading agent can comprehensively understand current market dynamics and financial policy information, and make decisions that align with their trading strategy. In the experiments, we first verify that the reactions of our ASFM are consistent with the real stock market in two controllable scenarios. In addition, we also conduct experiments in two popular economics research directions, and we find that conclusions drawn in our \model align with the preliminary findings in economics research. Based on these observations, we believe our proposed ASFM provides a new paradigm for economic research.

The answers to many economic questions depend on the slope and curvature of demand. Estimating demand for differentiated products entails a trade-off between flexibility and scalability. Existing nonparametric approaches face a curse of dimensionality in the number of products. I develop a scalable nonparametric approach using market-level data that overcomes this curse through economically motivated restrictions embedded in many standard models. Simulations and an application to the U.S. beer market demonstrate flexibility in demand slope and curvature, with consequential differences in counterfactual price responses. Estimation in the application takes seconds, versus several hours for a random coefficient nested logit model.

Financial markets are complex systems characterized by high statistical noise, nonlinearity, and constant evolution. Thus, modeling them is extremely hard. We address the task of generating realistic and responsive Limit Order Book (LOB) market simulations, which are fundamental for calibrating and testing trading strategies, performing market impact experiments, and generating synthetic market data. Previous works lack realism, usefulness, and responsiveness of the generated simulations. To bridge this gap, we propose a novel TRAnsformer-based Denoising Diffusion Probabilistic Engine for LOB Simulations (TRADES). TRADES generates realistic order flows conditioned on the state of the market, leveraging a transformer-based architecture that captures the temporal and spatial characteristics of high-frequency market data. There is a notable absence of quantitative metrics for evaluating generative market simulation models in the literature. To tackle this problem, we adapt the predictive score, a metric measured as an MAE, by training a stock price predictive model on synthetic data and testing it on real data. We compare TRADES with previous works on two stocks, reporting an x3.27 and x3.47 improvement over SoTA according to the predictive score, demonstrating that we generate useful synthetic market data for financial downstream tasks. We assess TRADES's market simulation realism and responsiveness, showing that it effectively learns the conditional data distribution and successfully reacts to an experimental agent, giving sprout to possible calibrations and evaluations of trading strategies and market impact experiments. We developed DeepMarket, the first open-source Python framework for market simulation with deep learning. Our repository includes a synthetic LOB dataset composed of TRADES's generates simulations. We release the code at github.com/LeonardoBerti00/DeepMarket.

Organizations typically train large models individually. This is costly and time-consuming, particularly for large-scale foundation models. Such vertical production is known to be suboptimal. Inspired by this economic insight, we ask whether it is possible to leverage others' expertise by trading the constituent parts in models, i.e., sets of weights, as if they were market commodities. While recent advances in aligning and interpolating models suggest that doing so may be possible, a number of fundamental questions must be answered to create viable parameter markets. In this work, we address these basic questions, propose a framework containing the infrastructure necessary for market operations to take place, study strategies for exchanging parameters, and offer means for agents to monetize parameters. Excitingly, compared to agents who train siloed models from scratch, we show that it is possible to mutually gain by using the market, even in competitive settings. This suggests that the notion of parameter markets may be a useful paradigm for improving large-scale model training in the future.

Generative models aim to simulate realistic effects of various actions across different contexts, from text generation to visual effects. Despite significant efforts to build real-world simulators, the application of generative models to virtual worlds, like financial markets, remains under-explored. In financial markets, generative models can simulate complex market effects of participants with various behaviors, enabling interaction under different market conditions, and training strategies without financial risk. This simulation relies on the finest structured data in financial market like orders thus building the finest realistic simulation. We propose Large Market Model (LMM), an order-level generative foundation model, for financial market simulation, akin to language modeling in the digital world. Our financial Market Simulation engine (MarS), powered by LMM, addresses the domain-specific need for realistic, interactive and controllable order generation. Key observations include LMM's strong scalability across data size and model complexity, and MarS's robust and practicable realism in controlled generation with market impact. We showcase MarS as a forecast tool, detection system, analysis platform, and agent training environment, thus demonstrating MarS's "paradigm shift" potential for a variety of financial applications. We release the code of MarS at https://github.com/microsoft/MarS/.

We propose a machine learning-based extension of the classical binomial option pricing model that incorporates key market microstructure effects. Traditional models assume frictionless markets, overlooking empirical features such as bid-ask spreads, discrete price movements, and serial return correlations. Our framework augments the binomial tree with path-dependent transition probabilities estimated via Random Forest classifiers trained on high-frequency market data. This approach preserves no-arbitrage conditions while embedding real-world trading dynamics into the pricing model. Using 46,655 minute-level observations of SPY from January to June 2025, we achieve an AUC of 88.25% in forecasting one-step price movements. Order flow imbalance is identified as the most influential predictor, contributing 43.2% to feature importance. After resolving time-scaling inconsistencies in tree construction, our model yields option prices that deviate by 13.79% from Black-Scholes benchmarks, highlighting the impact of microstructure on fair value estimation. While computational limitations restrict the model to short-term derivatives, our results offer a robust, data-driven alternative to classical pricing methods grounded in empirical market behavior.

This paper develops a comprehensive theoretical framework that imports concepts from stochastic thermodynamics to model price impact and characterize the feasibility of round-trip arbitrage in financial markets. A trading cycle is treated as a non-equilibrium thermodynamic process, where price impact represents dissipative work and market noise plays the role of thermal fluctuations. The paper proves a Financial Second Law: under general convex impact functionals, any round-trip trading strategy yields non-positive expected profit. This structural constraint is complemented by a fluctuation theorem that bounds the probability of profitable cycles in terms of dissipated work and market volatility. The framework introduces a statistical ensemble of trading strategies governed by a Gibbs measure, leading to a free energy decomposition that connects expected cost, strategy entropy, and a market temperature parameter. The framework provides rigorous, testable inequalities linking microstructural impact to macroscopic no-arbitrage conditions, offering a novel physics-inspired perspective on market efficiency. The paper derives explicit analytical results for prototypical trading strategies and discusses empirical validation protocols.

In this work, we aim to reconcile several apparently contradictory observations in market microstructure: is the famous "square-root law" of metaorder impact, which decays with time, compatible with the random-walk nature of prices and the linear impact of order imbalances? Can one entirely explain the volatility of prices as resulting from the flow of uninformed metaorders that mechanically impact them? We introduce a new theoretical framework to describe metaorders with different signs, sizes and durations, which all impact prices as a square-root of volume but with a subsequent time decay. We show that, as in the original propagator model, price diffusion is ensured by the long memory of cross-correlations between metaorders. In order to account for the effect of strongly fluctuating volumes q of individual trades, we further introduce two q-dependent exponents, which allow us to describe how the moments of generalized volume imbalance and the correlation between price changes and generalized order flow imbalance scale with T. We predict in particular that the corresponding power-laws depend in a non-monotonic fashion on a parameter a, which allows one to put the same weight on all child orders or to overweight large ones, a behaviour that is clearly borne out by empirical data. We also predict that the correlation between price changes and volume imbalances should display a maximum as a function of a, which again matches observations. Such noteworthy agreement between theory and data suggests that our framework correctly captures the basic mechanism at the heart of price formation, namely the average impact of metaorders. We argue that our results support the "Order-Driven" theory of excess volatility, and are at odds with the idea that a "Fundamental" component accounts for a large share of the volatility of financial markets.

We develop an econometric framework integrating heavy-tailed Student's t distributions with behavioral probability weighting while preserving infinite divisibility. Using 432{,}752 observations across 86 assets (2004--2024), we demonstrate Student's t specifications outperform Gaussian models in 88.4\% of cases. Bounded probability-weighting transformations preserve mathematical properties required for dynamic pricing. Gaussian models underestimate 99\% Value-at-Risk by 19.7\% versus 3.2\% for our specification. Joint estimation procedures identify tail and behavioral parameters with established asymptotic properties. Results provide robust inference for asset-pricing applications where heavy tails and behavioral distortions coexist.

Autoregressive foundation models offer state-of-the-art capabilities to simulate the market by generating the message flow of limit order books (LOBs). Yet, without understanding their inner workings, research directions are hard to narrow and practical use in real-world trading environments remains uncertain. This study therefore asks what these models actually learn about market microstructure. We find that, similarly to games where sequence models build an internal representation of the board, an 8.2M-parameter Mamba-3 state-space model trained autoregressively on the tokenized message stream of eight large-cap US equities learns an internal representation of the market and its dynamics. In particular, order-flow imbalance, a central driver of short-horizon price moves, is decodable at R^2 approx 0.59, far above controls and baselines. This representation extends to unseen stocks, suggesting that these models learn general representations rather than ticker-specific patterns. The model also generalizes across metrics beyond order-flow imbalance: results hold across traded volume and volatility. Additionally, the representation is causally steerable: pushing the state along a feature's axis shifts the model's next-message beliefs as that feature implies, monotonically in dose, consistent with the emergence of a world model.

The deployment of Large Language Models (LLMs) as autonomous economic agents introduces systemic risks that extend beyond individual capability failures. As agents transition to directly interacting with marketplaces, their collective behavior can amplify volatility and mask deception at scale. We introduce the Agent Bazaar, a multi-agent simulation framework for evaluating Economic Alignment, the capacity of agentic systems to preserve market stability and integrity. We identify two failure modes: (1) Algorithmic Instability in a B2C market ("The Crash"), where firms amplify price volatility until the market collapses, and (2) Sybil Deception in a C2C market ("The Lemon Market"), where a single deceptive agent controlling multiple coordinated seller identities floods the market with fraudulent listings, eroding trust and consumer welfare. We evaluate frontier and open-weight models across both scenarios and find that models largely fail to self-regulate, with failure severity varying by model rather than by size. We propose economically aligned harnesses, Stabilizing Firms and Skeptical Guardians, that improve outcomes but remain fragile under harder market conditions. To close this gap, we train agents with REINFORCE++ using an adaptive curriculum, producing a 9B model that outperforms all evaluated frontier and open-weight models. We propose the Economic Alignment Score (EAS), a 4-component scalar metric aggregating stability, integrity, welfare, and profitability, enabling direct cross-model comparison. Our results show that economic alignment is orthogonal to general capability and can be directly trained with targeted RL.

Congestion is a common failure mode of markets, where consumers compete inefficiently on the same subset of goods (e.g., chasing the same small set of properties on a vacation rental platform). The typical economic story is that prices decongest by balancing supply and demand. But in modern online marketplaces, prices are typically set in a decentralized way by sellers, and the information about items is inevitably partial. The power of a platform is limited to controlling representations -- the subset of information about items presented by default to users. This motivates the present study of decongestion by representation, where a platform seeks to learn representations that reduce congestion and thus improve social welfare. The technical challenge is twofold: relying only on revealed preferences from the choices of consumers, rather than true preferences; and the combinatorial problem associated with representations that determine the features to reveal in the default view. We tackle both challenges by proposing a differentiable proxy of welfare that can be trained end-to-end on consumer choice data. We develop sufficient conditions for when decongestion promotes welfare, and present the results of extensive experiments on both synthetic and real data that demonstrate the utility of our approach.

Polymarket is a prediction market platform where users can speculate on future events by trading shares tied to specific outcomes, known as conditions. Each market is associated with a set of one or more such conditions. To ensure proper market resolution, the condition set must be exhaustive -- collectively accounting for all possible outcomes -- and mutually exclusive -- only one condition may resolve as true. Thus, the collective prices of all related outcomes should be \1, representing a combined probability of 1 of any outcome. Despite this design, Polymarket exhibits cases where dependent assets are mispriced, allowing for purchasing (or selling) a certain outcome for less than (or more than) 1, guaranteeing profit. This phenomenon, known as arbitrage, could enable sophisticated participants to exploit such inconsistencies. In this paper, we conduct an empirical arbitrage analysis on Polymarket data to answer three key questions: (Q1) What conditions give rise to arbitrage (Q2) Does arbitrage actually occur on Polymarket and (Q3) Has anyone exploited these opportunities. A major challenge in analyzing arbitrage between related markets lies in the scalability of comparisons across a large number of markets and conditions, with a naive analysis requiring O(2^{n+m}) comparisons. To overcome this, we employ a heuristic-driven reduction strategy based on timeliness, topical similarity, and combinatorial relationships, further validated by expert input. Our study reveals two distinct forms of arbitrage on Polymarket: Market Rebalancing Arbitrage, which occurs within a single market or condition, and Combinatorial Arbitrage, which spans across multiple markets. We use on-chain historical order book data to analyze when these types of arbitrage opportunities have existed, and when they have been executed by users. We find a realized estimate of 40 million USD of profit extracted.

We present a new approach to formulating and solving heterogeneous agent models with aggregate risk. We replace the cross-sectional distribution with low-dimensional prices as state variables and let agents learn equilibrium price dynamics directly from simulated paths. To do so, we introduce a structural reinforcement learning (SRL) method which treats prices via simulation while exploiting agents' structural knowledge of their own individual dynamics. Our SRL method yields a general and highly efficient global solution method for heterogeneous agent models that sidesteps the Master equation and handles problems traditional methods struggle with, in particular nontrivial market-clearing conditions. We illustrate the approach in the Krusell-Smith model, the Huggett model with aggregate shocks, and a HANK model with a forward-looking Phillips curve, all of which we solve globally within minutes.

This paper investigates the problem of ensembling multiple strategies for sequential portfolios to outperform individual strategies in terms of long-term wealth. Due to the uncertainty of strategies' performances in the future market, which are often based on specific models and statistical assumptions, investors often mitigate risk and enhance robustness by combining multiple strategies, akin to common approaches in collective learning prediction. However, the absence of a distribution-free and consistent preference framework complicates decisions of combination due to the ambiguous objective. To address this gap, we introduce a novel framework for decision-making in combining strategies, irrespective of market conditions, by establishing the investor's preference between decisions and then forming a clear objective. Through this framework, we propose a combinatorial strategy construction, free from statistical assumptions, for any scale of component strategies, even infinite, such that it meets the determined criterion. Finally, we test the proposed strategy along with its accelerated variant and some other multi-strategies. The numerical experiments show results in favor of the proposed strategies, albeit with small tradeoffs in their Sharpe ratios, in which their cumulative wealths eventually exceed those of the best component strategies while the accelerated strategy significantly improves performance.

We develop a tractable identification approach for strategic network formation models with both strategic link interdependence and individual unobserved heterogeneity (fixed effects). The key challenge is that endogenous network statistics (e.g. number of common friends) enter the link formation equation, while the mapping from model primitives to equilibrium network structure is generally intractable. Our approach sidesteps this difficulty using a ``bounding-by-c'' technique that treats endogenous covariates as random variables and exploits monotonicity restrictions to obtain identifying information. A central contribution is to develop a spectrum of fixed-effects handling strategies based on subnetwork configurations: tetrad-based restrictions that difference out all individual fixed effects, triad-based and weighted restrictions that combine ``difference-out'' and ``integrate-out'' steps by differencing out some fixed effects and profiling over the remainder conditional on observed characteristics, and general weighted cycle-based restrictions that unify these cases. We also provide point identification results. Preliminary simulations show that the approach can deliver informative bounds on the structural parameters.

We study mean field portfolio games under Epstein-Zin preferences, which naturally encompass the classical time-additive power utility as a special case. In a general non-Markovian framework, we establish a uniqueness result by proving a one-to-one correspondence between Nash equilibria and the solutions to a class of BSDEs. A key ingredient in our approach is a necessary stochastic maximum principle tailored to Epstein-Zin utility and a nonlinear transformation. In the deterministic setting, we further derive an explicit closed-form solution for the equilibrium investment and consumption policies.

Completely monotonic inverse marginal (CMIM) utilities, introduced in [MSZ24], constitute a tractable class of preferences that includes many of the most important utility functions used in mathematical finance, such as power and exponential utilities. In stochastically dominant markets, their Bernstein representation induces a hidden linear structure in the dual optimization problem that serves as the foundation for the present analysis. In this paper, we investigate the sensitivity of optimal investment with respect to perturbations of investor preferences within the CMIM class. Exploiting Bernstein's representation theorem, we show that, under stochastic dominance, affine perturbations of Bernstein measures induce an affine representation of the dual value function. As a result, the dependence of the optimization problem on preferences can be analyzed through a scalar budget equation, allowing us to prove analyticity of the associated Lagrange multiplier with respect to the perturbation parameter and to derive convergent analytic expansions of arbitrary order for the primal value function and the optimal terminal wealth, with explicit recursive formulas expressed through Bell polynomials.

Consider a market of competing model providers selling query access to models with varying costs and capabilities. Customers submit problem instances and are willing to pay up to a budget for a verifiable solution. An arbitrageur efficiently allocates inference budget across providers to undercut the market, thus creating a competitive offering with no model-development risk. In this work, we initiate the study of arbitrage in AI model markets, empirically demonstrating the viability of arbitrage and illustrating its economic consequences. We conduct an in-depth case study of SWE-bench GitHub issue resolution using two representative models, GPT-5 mini and DeepSeek v3.2. In this verifiable domain, simple arbitrage strategies generate net profit margins of up to 40%. Robust arbitrage strategies that generalize across different domains remain profitable. Distillation further creates strong arbitrage opportunities, potentially at the expense of the teacher model's revenue. Multiple competing arbitrageurs drive down consumer prices, reducing the marginal revenue of model providers. At the same time, arbitrage reduces market segmentation and facilitates market entry for smaller model providers by enabling earlier revenue capture. Our results suggest that arbitrage can be a powerful force in AI model markets with implications for model development, distillation, and deployment.

We study the perfect information Nash equilibrium between a broker and her clients -- an informed trader and an uniformed trader. In our model, the broker trades in the lit exchange where trades have instantaneous and transient price impact with exponential resilience, while both clients trade with the broker. The informed trader and the broker maximise expected wealth subject to inventory penalties, while the uninformed trader is not strategic and sends the broker random buy and sell orders. We characterise the Nash equilibrium of the trading strategies with the solution to a coupled system of forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs). We solve this system explicitly and study the effect of information, profitability, and inventory control in the trading strategies of the broker and the informed trader.

Using a large-scale Deep Learning approach applied to a high-frequency database containing billions of electronic market quotes and transactions for US equities, we uncover nonparametric evidence for the existence of a universal and stationary price formation mechanism relating the dynamics of supply and demand for a stock, as revealed through the order book, to subsequent variations in its market price. We assess the model by testing its out-of-sample predictions for the direction of price moves given the history of price and order flow, across a wide range of stocks and time periods. The universal price formation model is shown to exhibit a remarkably stable out-of-sample prediction accuracy across time, for a wide range of stocks from different sectors. Interestingly, these results also hold for stocks which are not part of the training sample, showing that the relations captured by the model are universal and not asset-specific. The universal model --- trained on data from all stocks --- outperforms, in terms of out-of-sample prediction accuracy, asset-specific linear and nonlinear models trained on time series of any given stock, showing that the universal nature of price formation weighs in favour of pooling together financial data from various stocks, rather than designing asset- or sector-specific models as commonly done. Standard data normalizations based on volatility, price level or average spread, or partitioning the training data into sectors or categories such as large/small tick stocks, do not improve training results. On the other hand, inclusion of price and order flow history over many past observations is shown to improve forecasting performance, showing evidence of path-dependence in price dynamics.

Completely randomized experiments, originally developed by Fisher and Neyman in the 1930s, are still widely used in practice, even in online experimentation. However, such designs are of limited value for answering standard questions in marketplaces, where multiple populations of agents interact strategically, leading to complex patterns of spillover effects. In this paper, we derive the finite-sample properties of tractable estimators for "Simple Multiple Randomization Designs" (SMRDs), a new class of experimental designs which account for complex spillover effects in randomized experiments. Our derivations are obtained under a natural and general form of cross-unit interference, which we call "local interference". We discuss the estimation of main effects, direct effects, and spillovers, and present associated central limit theorems.

The intricate dynamics of stock markets have led to extensive research on models that are able to effectively explain their inherent complexities. This study leverages the econometrics literature to explore the dynamic factor model as an interpretable model with sufficient predictive capabilities for capturing essential market phenomena. Although the model has been extensively applied for predictive purposes, this study focuses on analyzing the extracted loadings and common factors as an alternative framework for understanding stock price dynamics. The results reveal novel insights into traditional market theories when applied to the Philippine Stock Exchange using the Kalman method and maximum likelihood estimation, with subsequent validation against the capital asset pricing model. Notably, a one-factor model extracts a common factor representing systematic or market dynamics similar to the composite index, whereas a two-factor model extracts common factors representing market trends and volatility. Furthermore, an application of the model for nowcasting the growth rates of the Philippine gross domestic product highlights the potential of the extracted common factors as viable real-time market indicators, yielding over a 34% decrease in the out-of-sample prediction error. Overall, the results underscore the value of dynamic factor analysis in gaining a deeper understanding of market price movement dynamics.

Long-horizon agentic tasks go beyond chaining short tasks over more interaction turns. Their evolving dynamic environments and long-range dependencies require Large Language Models (LLMs) to continually explore, learn from experience, and adapt their policies over thousands of steps. We introduce E-Commerce Bench, the first open-source benchmark that integrates multi-round counterpart negotiation and dynamic events into a year-long business operation. Over a 365-day year, an LLM agent concurrently runs multiple online stores, researching the market, negotiating with suppliers to source inventory, optimizing sales strategies, fulfilling orders, handling returns, and managing cash flow to maximize its end-of-year total assets. To construct a realistic merchant-side operating environment, the product and supplier data are derived from a real e-commerce platform, while a year-long calendar of promotions, natural disasters, and supply-chain shocks continually reshapes demand. For reproducibility, both sides of the market are deterministic: customer purchases and returns follow a fixed demand model, while a negotiation kernel determines supplier pricing, concessions, and decisions, with an LLM used only to verbalize them. We evaluate 18 frontier models across seven dimensions, including year-end assets, and find that no single model dominates. GPT-5.6 Sol earns the most, growing the 100,000 opening stake into 1,431,425, yet it ranks 16th of 18 on fraud avoidance and trails Fable5 in operational efficiency. Among open-weight models, Qwen3.8-Max-Preview leads with 416,252, 38% above GLM 5.2 (high), and achieves the strongest learning over the horizon, progressively bargaining down prices across repeated orders. Our code is available at https://github.com/QwenLM/E-CommerceBench.

Understanding and analyzing markets is crucial, yet analytical equilibrium solutions remain largely infeasible. Recent breakthroughs in equilibrium computation rely on zeroth-order policy gradient estimation. These approaches commonly suffer from high variance and are computationally expensive. The use of fully differentiable simulators would enable more efficient gradient estimation. However, the discrete allocation of goods in economic simulations is a non-differentiable operation. This renders the first-order Monte Carlo gradient estimator inapplicable and the learning feedback systematically misleading. We propose a novel smoothing technique that creates a surrogate market game, in which first-order methods can be applied. We provide theoretical bounds on the resulting bias which justifies solving the smoothed game instead. These bounds also allow choosing the smoothing strength a priori such that the resulting estimate has low variance. Furthermore, we validate our approach via numerous empirical experiments. Our method theoretically and empirically outperforms zeroth-order methods in approximation quality and computational efficiency.

Semiparametric discrete choice models are widely used in a variety of practical applications. While these models are point identified in the presence of continuous covariates, they can become partially identified when covariates are discrete. In this paper we find that classical estimators, including the maximum score estimator, (Manski (1975)), loose their attractive statistical properties without point identification. First of all, they are not sharp with the estimator converging to an outer region of the identified set, (Komarova (2013)), and in many discrete designs it weakly converges to a random set. Second, they are not robust, with their distribution limit discontinuously changing with respect to the parameters of the model. We propose a novel class of estimators based on the concept of a quantile of a random set, which we show to be both sharp and robust. We demonstrate that our approach extends from cross-sectional settings to classical static and dynamic discrete panel data models.

Recent deployments of large language models (LLMs) as autonomous trading agents raise questions about whether financial decision-making competence generalizes beyond specific market patterns and how it should be trained and evaluated in noisy markets lacking ground truth. We propose a structured framework for training and evaluating such models. Central to our approach is a curated, multiple-choice question (MCQ) dataset derived from classic textbooks and historical markets, verified by an AI committee, enriched with structured reasoning traces, and augmented to reduce shortcut learning. To evaluate whether performance on isolated MCQs generalizes to real-world trading, we introduce a two-stage protocol combining test-set evaluation with an MCQ-based chronological trading simulation. Extensive evaluations across market regimes provide statistically robust evidence that open models trained with our framework exhibit competitive, risk-aware behavior over time, outperform open-source baselines, and approach frontier-model performance at smaller scale. We release the dataset and evaluation framework to support further research.

Prediction markets allow users to trade on outcomes of real-world events, but are prone to fragmentation through overlapping questions, implicit equivalences, and hidden contradictions across markets. We present an agentic AI pipeline that autonomously (i) clusters markets into coherent topical groups using natural-language understanding over contract text and metadata, and (ii) identifies within-cluster market pairs whose resolved outcomes exhibit strong dependence, including same-outcome (correlated) and different-outcome (anti-correlated) relationships. Using a historical dataset of resolved markets on Polymarket, we evaluate the accuracy of the agent's relational predictions. We then translate discovered relationships into a simple trading strategy to quantify how these relationships map to actionable signals. Results show that agent-identified relationships achieve roughly 60-70% accuracy, and their induced trading strategies earn about 20% average returns over week-long horizons, highlighting the ability of agentic AI and large language models to uncover latent semantic structure in prediction markets.

We consider an extension to the classic position auctions in which sponsored creatives can be added within AI generated content rather than shown in predefined slots. New challenges arise from the natural requirement that sponsored creatives should smoothly fit into the context. With the help of advanced LLM technologies, it becomes viable to accurately estimate the benefits of adding each individual sponsored creatives into each potential positions within the AI generated content by properly taking the context into account. Therefore, we assume one click-through rate estimation for each position-creative pair, rather than one uniform estimation for each sponsored creative across all positions in classic settings. As a result, the underlying optimization becomes a general matching problem, thus the substitution effects should be treated more carefully compared to standard position auction settings, where the slots are independent with each other. In this work, we formalize a concrete mathematical model of the extended position auction problem and study the welfare-maximization and revenue-maximization mechanism design problem. Formally, we consider two different user behavior models and solve the mechanism design problems therein respectively. For the Multinomial Logit (MNL) model, which is order-insensitive, we can efficiently implement the optimal mechanisms. For the cascade model, which is order-sensitive, we provide approximately optimal solutions.

Foundation models have transformed domains from language to genomics by learning general-purpose representations from large-scale, heterogeneous data. We introduce TradeFM, a 524M-parameter generative Transformer that brings this paradigm to market microstructure, learning directly from billions of trade events across >9K equities. To enable cross-asset generalization, we develop scale-invariant features and a universal tokenization scheme that map the heterogeneous, multi-modal event stream of order flow into a unified discrete sequence -- eliminating asset-specific calibration. Integrated with a deterministic market simulator, TradeFM-generated rollouts reproduce key stylized facts of financial returns, including heavy tails, volatility clustering, and absence of return autocorrelation. Quantitatively, TradeFM achieves 2-3x lower distributional error than Compound Hawkes baselines and generalizes zero-shot to geographically out-of-distribution APAC markets with moderate perplexity degradation. Together, these results suggest that scale-invariant trade representations capture transferable structure in market microstructure, opening a path toward synthetic data generation, stress testing, and learning-based trading agents.

We propose a general methodology for recovering preference parameters from data on choices and response times. Our methods yield estimates with fast (1/n for n data points) convergence rates when specialized to the popular Drift Diffusion Model (DDM), but are broadly applicable to generalizations of the DDM as well as to alternative models of decision making that make use of response time data. The paper develops an empirical application to an experiment on intertemporal choice, showing that the use of response times delivers predictive accuracy and matters for the estimation of economically relevant parameters.

Algorithmic trading relies on machine learning models to make trading decisions. Despite strong in-sample performance, these models often degrade when confronted with evolving real-world market regimes, which can shift dramatically due to macroeconomic changes-e.g., monetary policy updates or unanticipated fluctuations in participant behavior. We identify two challenges that perpetuate this mismatch: (1) insufficient robustness in existing policy against uncertainties in high-level market fluctuations, and (2) the absence of a realistic and diverse simulation environment for training, leading to policy overfitting. To address these issues, we propose a Bayesian Robust Framework that systematically integrates a macro-conditioned generative model with robust policy learning. On the data side, to generate realistic and diverse data, we propose a macro-conditioned GAN-based generator that leverages macroeconomic indicators as primary control variables, synthesizing data with faithful temporal, cross-instrument, and macro correlations. On the policy side, to learn robust policy against market fluctuations, we cast the trading process as a two-player zero-sum Bayesian Markov game, wherein an adversarial agent simulates shifting regimes by perturbing macroeconomic indicators in the macro-conditioned generator, while the trading agent-guided by a quantile belief network-maintains and updates its belief over hidden market states. The trading agent seeks a Robust Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium via Bayesian neural fictitious self-play, stabilizing learning under adversarial market perturbations. Extensive experiments on 9 financial instruments demonstrate that our framework outperforms 9 state-of-the-art baselines. In extreme events like the COVID, our method shows improved profitability and risk management, offering a reliable solution for trading under uncertain and shifting market dynamics.

This script offers an implementation-oriented introduction to deep learning methods for solving and estimating high-dimensional dynamic stochastic models in economics and finance. Its starting point is the curse of dimensionality: heterogeneous-agent economies, overlapping-generations models with aggregate risk, continuous-time models with occasionally binding constraints, climate-economy models, and macro-finance environments with many assets and frictions generate state and parameter spaces that strain classical tensor-product grid methods. The exposition is organized around four complementary methodologies. Deep Equilibrium Nets embed discrete-time equilibrium conditions into neural-network loss functions. Physics-Informed Neural Networks approximate continuous-time Hamilton--Jacobi--Bellman, Kolmogorov forward, and related partial differential equations. Deep surrogate models provide fast, differentiable approximations to expensive structural models, while Gaussian processes add a probabilistic layer that quantifies approximation uncertainty; together they support estimation, sensitivity analysis, and constrained policy design. Gaussian-process-based dynamic programming, combined with active learning and dimension reduction, extends value-function iteration to very large continuous state spaces. Applications span representative-agent and international real business cycle models, overlapping-generations and heterogeneous-agent economies, continuous-time macro-finance, structural estimation by simulated method of moments, and climate economics under uncertainty. Companion notebooks in TensorFlow and PyTorch invite hands-on experimentation. These notes are a deliberately subjective and inevitably incomplete snapshot of a rapidly evolving field, aimed at equipping PhD students and researchers to engage with this frontier hands-on.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly being used to simulate human-like decision making in agent-based financial market models (ABMs). As models become more powerful and accessible, researchers can now incorporate individual LLM decisions into ABM environments. However, integration may introduce inherent biases that need careful evaluation. In this paper we test three state-of-the-art GPT models for bias using two model sampling approaches: one-shot and few-shot API queries. We observe significant variations in distributions of outputs between specific models, and model sub versions, with GPT-4o-Mini-2024-07-18 showing notably better performance (32-43% yes responses) compared to GPT-4-0125-preview's extreme bias (98-99% yes responses). We show that sampling methods and model sub-versions significantly impact results: repeated independent API calls produce different distributions compared to batch sampling within a single call. While no current GPT model can simultaneously achieve a uniform distribution and Markovian properties in one-shot testing, few-shot sampling can approach uniform distributions under certain conditions. We explore the Temperature parameter, providing a definition and comparative results. We further compare our results to true random binary series and test specifically for the common human bias of Negative Recency - finding LLMs have a mixed ability to 'beat' humans in this one regard. These findings emphasise the critical importance of careful LLM integration into ABMs for financial markets and more broadly.

Randomized mechanisms can have good normative properties compared to their deterministic counterparts. However, randomized mechanisms are problematic in several ways such as in their verifiability. We propose here to derandomize such mechanisms by having agents play a game instead of tossing a coin. The game is designed so an agent's best action is to play randomly, and this play then injects ``randomness'' into the mechanism. This derandomization retains many of the good normative properties of the original randomized mechanism but gives a mechanism that is deterministic and easy, for instance, to audit. We consider three related methods to derandomize randomized mechanism in six different domains: voting, facility location, task allocation, school choice, peer selection, and resource allocation. We propose a number of novel derandomized mechanisms for these six domains with good normative properties. Each mechanism has a mixed Nash equilibrium in which agents play a modular arithmetic game with an uniform mixed strategy. In all but one mixed Nash equilibrium, agents report their preferences over the original problem sincerely. The derandomized methods are thus ``quasi-strategy proof''. In one domain, we additionally show that a new and desirable normative property emerges as a result of derandomization.

We study the discrete Bertrand pricing game with a non-increasing demand function. The game has n ge 2 players who simultaneously choose prices from the set {1/k, 2/k, ldots, 1}, where kinN. The player who sets the lowest price captures the entire demand; if multiple players tie for the lowest price, they split the demand equally. We study the Bertrand paradox, where classical theory predicts low prices, yet real markets often sustain high prices. To understand this gap, we analyze a repeated-game model in which firms set prices using no-regret learners. Our goal is to characterize the equilibrium outcomes that can arise under different no-regret learning guarantees. We are particularly interested in questions such as whether no-external-regret learners can converge to undesirable high-price outcomes, and how stronger guarantees such as no-swap regret shape the emergence of competitive low-price behavior. We address these and related questions through a theoretical analysis, complemented by experiments that support the theory and reveal surprising phenomena for no-swap regret learners.

The prevalence and importance of algorithmic two-sided marketplaces has drawn attention to the issue of fairness in such settings. Algorithmic decisions are used in assigning students to schools, users to advertisers, and applicants to job interviews. These decisions should heed the preferences of individuals, and simultaneously be fair with respect to their merits (synonymous with fit, future performance, or need). Merits conditioned on observable features are always uncertain, a fact that is exacerbated by the widespread use of machine learning algorithms to infer merit from the observables. As our key contribution, we carefully axiomatize a notion of individual fairness in the two-sided marketplace setting which respects the uncertainty in the merits; indeed, it simultaneously recognizes uncertainty as the primary potential cause of unfairness and an approach to address it. We design a linear programming framework to find fair utility-maximizing distributions over allocations, and we show that the linear program is robust to perturbations in the estimated parameters of the uncertain merit distributions, a key property in combining the approach with machine learning techniques.

As LLM agents advance, they are increasingly mediating economic decisions, ranging from product discovery to transactions, on behalf of users. Such applications promise benefits but also raise many questions about agent accountability and value for users. Addressing these questions requires understanding how agents behave in realistic market conditions. However, previous research has largely evaluated agents in constrained settings, such as single-task marketplaces (e.g., negotiation) or structured two-agent interactions. Real-world markets are fundamentally different: they require agents to handle diverse economic activities and coordinate within large, dynamic ecosystems where multiple agents with opaque behaviors may engage in open-ended dialogues. To bridge this gap, we investigate two-sided agentic marketplaces where Assistant agents represent consumers and Service agents represent competing businesses. To study these interactions safely, we develop Magentic-Marketplace-- a simulated environment where Assistants and Services can operate. This environment enables us to study key market dynamics: the utility agents achieve, behavioral biases, vulnerability to manipulation, and how search mechanisms shape market outcomes. Our experiments show that frontier models can approach optimal welfare-- but only under ideal search conditions. Performance degrades sharply with scale, and all models exhibit severe first-proposal bias, creating 10-30x advantages for response speed over quality. These findings reveal how behaviors emerge across market conditions, informing the design of fair and efficient agentic marketplaces.

In this research, we have empirically investigated the key drivers affecting liquidity in equity markets. We illustrated how theoretical models, such as Kyle's model, of agents' interplay in the financial markets, are aligned with the phenomena observed in publicly available trades and quotes data. Specifically, we confirmed that for small signed order-flows, the price impact grows linearly with increase in the order-flow imbalance. We have, further, implemented a machine learning algorithm to forecast market impact given a signed order-flow. Our findings suggest that machine learning models can be used in estimation of financial variables; and predictive accuracy of such learning algorithms can surpass the performance of traditional statistical approaches. Understanding the determinants of price impact is crucial for several reasons. From a theoretical stance, modelling the impact provides a statistical measure of liquidity. Practitioners adopt impact models as a pre-trade tool to estimate expected transaction costs and optimize the execution of their strategies. This further serves as a post-trade valuation benchmark as suboptimal execution can significantly deteriorate a portfolio performance. More broadly, the price impact reflects the balance of liquidity across markets. This is of central importance to regulators as it provides an all-encompassing explanation of the correlation between market design and systemic risk, enabling regulators to design more stable and efficient markets.

Stochastic optimization is one of the central problems in Machine Learning and Theoretical Computer Science. In the standard model, the algorithm is given a fixed distribution known in advance. In practice though, one may acquire at a cost extra information to make better decisions. In this paper, we study how to buy information for stochastic optimization and formulate this question as an online learning problem. Assuming the learner has an oracle for the original optimization problem, we design a 2-competitive deterministic algorithm and a e/(e-1)-competitive randomized algorithm for buying information. We show that this ratio is tight as the problem is equivalent to a robust generalization of the ski-rental problem, which we call super-martingale stopping. We also consider an adaptive setting where the learner can choose to buy information after taking some actions for the underlying optimization problem. We focus on the classic optimization problem, Min-Sum Set Cover, where the goal is to quickly find an action that covers a given request drawn from a known distribution. We provide an 8-competitive algorithm running in polynomial time that chooses actions and decides when to buy information about the underlying request.

We study concentration inequalities for structured weighted sums of random data, including (i) tensor inner products and (ii) sequential matrix sums. We are interested in tail bounds and concentration inequalities for those structured weighted sums under exchangeability, extending beyond the classical framework of independent terms. We develop Hoeffding and Bernstein bounds provided with structure-dependent exchangeability. Along the way, we recover known results in weighted sum of exchangeable random variables and i.i.d. sums of random matrices to the optimal constants. Notably, we develop a sharper concentration bound for combinatorial sum of matrix arrays than the results previously derived from Chatterjee's method of exchangeable pairs. For applications, the richer structures provide us with novel analytical tools for estimating the average effect of multi-factor response models and studying fixed-design sketching methods in federated averaging. We apply our results to these problems, and find that our theoretical predictions are corroborated by numerical evidence.

We show how state-of-the-art large language models (LLMs) can be trained effectively on limited historical data for macroeconomic forecasting. We estimate a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with stochastic volatility and Student-t shocks on an initial segment of the data to obtain a posterior distribution over structural parameters. We sample from this posterior to generate millions of theory-consistent synthetic panels that, when mixed with macroeconomic data, form the training corpus for a deep learning transformer. Rather than using the DSGE model as a direct forecasting device, we use it as a structural simulator that regularizes transformer training in a small-sample environment. Our results show that this hybrid forecaster, which combines the theoretical coherence of DSGE models with the representational power of modern LLMs, learns key features of the macroeconomic language. Relative to a conventional vector autoregression benchmark, the transformer achieves comparable or stronger predictive performance in both token accuracy and predictive likelihood. These gains are strongest under a theory-heavy training mix and remain broadly robust to finer tokenization and deeper network architecture.

Building a world model requires a state representation useful for planning and decision-making---potentially over tasks unknown at training time. In the context of financial markets, planning and decision-making may require a model to reason about market-wide conditions, asset-specific expected returns, liquidity, volatility, and cross-asset relationships. Yet financial representation learning has largely been evaluated on individual predictive tasks, oftentimes on a single time period using comparatively narrow datasets. We address this through three primary contributions. First, we introduce Market-1T, a dataset containing nearly one trillion observations across U.S. equities from 2008 to 2025 at 1 Hz resolution. Second, we develop and implement a rigorous evaluation protocol. Third, we conduct a systematic large-scale study of financial representation learning, comparing 18 encoder-training strategies across nearly two decades of market regimes. We evaluate learned representations both by their predictive utility on common finance tasks and through probes of latent structure. We find that encoders with similar predictive performance can organize market state very differently. Collectively, we establish a foundation for training and evaluating financial market representations in support of world models such as DINO-WM, V-JEPA 2, and LeWM.

Realistic market impact is essential for generative limit order book (LOB) models to serve as world models for trading agents. If a simulator misprices this mechanism, agents learn policies that are optimal in the simulator but wrong in the real market. Existing metrics assess generated streams purely through distributional comparison with historical data, leaving counterfactual response to an agent's own orders largely unexplored. Here, we show that market impact emerges naturally in neural LOB generators trained solely for next-token prediction. We inject execution-style metaorders into the generated message flow of five autoregressive models across five NASDAQ stocks and measure the response using estimators from the empirical impact literature, validated on baselines whose physics is known in advance. Our benchmark evaluates any message-level generator in three phases: free generation (reading order-flow persistence against price diffusivity); metaorder injection (yielding the impact law's exponent and amplitude); and a post-execution window (measuring relaxation). In addition, comparing each visible injection to a blind, simulator-only control isolates the model's learned response from standard book mechanics. For every model on every stock, we measure how the impact responds as a function of cumulative metaorder participation. Interestingly, we observe emergent impact in generative models of market data, with exponents in the range of 0.63 to 1.21, slightly above the traditional 0.5 of the square-root law of impact. In the family of models tested, we are so far unable to observe impact decay during relaxation. We tentatively attribute this to the still-short context windows of the models. We release the benchmark as open source to validate future generative models for market data.

We investigated the use of Empirical Mode Decomposition (EMD) combined with Gaussian Mixture Models (GMM), feature engineering and machine learning algorithms to optimize trading decisions. We used five, two, and one year samples of hourly candle data for GameStop, Tesla, and XRP (Ripple) markets respectively. Applying a 15 hour rolling window for each market, we collected several features based on a linear model and other classical features to predict the next hour's movement. Subsequently, a GMM filtering approach was used to identify clusters among these markets. For each cluster, we applied the EMD algorithm to extract high, medium, low and trend components from each feature collected. A simple thresholding algorithm was applied to classify market movements based on the percentage change in each market's close price. We then evaluated the performance of various machine learning models, including Random Forests (RF) and XGBoost, in classifying market movements. A naive random selection of trading decisions was used as a benchmark, which assumed equal probabilities for each outcome, and a temporal cross-validation approach was used to test models on 40%, 30%, and 20% of the dataset. Our results indicate that transforming selected features using EMD improves performance, particularly for ensemble learning algorithms like Random Forest and XGBoost, as measured by accumulated profit. Finally, GMM filtering expanded the range of learning algorithm and data source combinations that outperformed the top percentile of the random baseline.

The aim of this paper is to present an elementary computable theory of probability, random variables and stochastic processes. The probability theory is baed on existing approaches using valuations and lower integrals. Various approaches to random variables are discussed, including the approach based on completions in a Polish space. We apply the theory to the study of stochastic dynamical systems in discrete-time, and give a brief exposition of the Wiener process as a foundation for stochastic differential equations. The theory is based within the framework of type-two effectivity, so has an explicit direct link with Turing computation, and is expressed in a system of computable types and operations, so has a clean mathematical description.

The Growth-at-Risk (GaR) framework has garnered attention in recent econometric literature, yet current approaches implicitly assume a constant Pareto exponent. We introduce novel and robust econometrics to estimate the tails of GaR based on a rigorous theoretical framework and establish validity and effectiveness. Simulations demonstrate consistent outperformance relative to existing alternatives in terms of predictive accuracy. We perform a long-term GaR analysis that provides accurate and insightful predictions, effectively capturing financial anomalies better than current methods.

This work builds on the theoretical frameworks presented in "Liquidity pools as mean field games: A new framework" and "Liquidity pools as mean field games with transaction costs" by the same author, where the strategic interactions among traders in a constant-product market-making protocol were modelled using mean field games (MFG), first without transaction costs and then incorporating them. Here we present the formulation of a more complete model that integrates three types of agents: traders, liquidity providers (LPs), and arbitrageurs. While we do not establish existence results for this general model, the formulation identifies the main technical difficulties and lays the groundwork for future work. The LP acts as a dominating player in the sense of 'Mean field games with a dominating player' by Bensoussan, Chau, and Yam: its strategy influences the mean field distribution of the traders, and the equilibrium is sought as a solution to the coupled system of three problems that constitute a Major-Minor game. The arbitrageurs operate by solving the optimization problem presented in "An analysis of uniswap markets" by Angeris et al., and their impact on the LP is captured through the loss-versus-rebalancing of "Automated market making and loss-versus-rebalancing" by Milionis et al. The material in this article should be read as an open research proposal rather than a collection of closed results.

We present a new type of game, the Liquidity Game. We draw inspiration from the UK government bond market and apply game theoretic approaches to its analysis. In Liquidity Games, market participants (agents) use non-cooperative games where the players' utility is directly defined by the liquidity of the game itself, offering a paradigm shift in our understanding of market dynamics. Each player's utility is intricately linked to the liquidity generated within the game, making the utility endogenous and dynamic. Players are not just passive recipients of utility based on external factors but active participants whose strategies and actions collectively shape and are shaped by the liquidity of the market. This reflexivity introduces a level of complexity and realism previously unattainable in conventional models. We apply Liquidity Game theoretic approaches to a simple UK bond market interaction and present results for market design and strategic behavior of participants. We tackle one of the largest issues within this mechanism, namely what strategy should market makers utilize when uncertain about the type of market maker they are interacting with, and what structure might regulators wish to see.

Proportionality is an attractive fairness concept that has been applied to a range of problems including the facility location problem, a classic problem in social choice. In our work, we propose a concept called Strong Proportionality, which ensures that when there are two groups of agents at different locations, both groups incur the same total cost. We show that although Strong Proportionality is a well-motivated and basic axiom, there is no deterministic strategyproof mechanism satisfying the property. We then identify a randomized mechanism called Random Rank (which uniformly selects a number k between 1 to n and locates the facility at the k'th highest agent location) which satisfies Strong Proportionality in expectation. Our main theorem characterizes Random Rank as the unique mechanism that achieves universal truthfulness, universal anonymity, and Strong Proportionality in expectation among all randomized mechanisms. Finally, we show via the AverageOrRandomRank mechanism that even stronger ex-post fairness guarantees can be achieved by weakening universal truthfulness to strategyproofness in expectation.

We study the polynomial-time approximability of the optimal online stochastic bipartite matching algorithm, initiated by Papadimitriou et al. (EC'21). Here, nodes on one side of the graph are given upfront, while at each time t, an online node and its edge weights are drawn from a time-dependent distribution. The optimal algorithm is PSPACE-hard to approximate within some universal constant. We refer to this optimal algorithm, which requires time to think (compute), as a philosopher, and refer to polynomial-time online approximations of the above as philosopher inequalities. The best known philosopher inequality for online matching yields a 0.652-approximation. In contrast, the best possible prophet inequality, or approximation of the optimum offline solution, is 0.5. Our main results are a 0.678-approximate algorithm and a 0.685-approximation for a vertex-weighted special case. Notably, both bounds exceed the 0.666-approximation of the offline optimum obtained by Tang, Wu, and Wu (STOC'22) for the vertex-weighted problem. Building on our algorithms and the recent black-box reduction of Banihashem et al. (SODA'24), we provide polytime (pricing-based) truthful mechanisms which 0.678-approximate the social welfare of the optimal online allocation for bipartite matching markets. Our online allocation algorithm relies on the classic pivotal sampling algorithm (Srinivasan FOCS'01, Gandhi et al. J.ACM'06), along with careful discarding to obtain negative correlations between offline nodes. Consequently, the analysis boils down to examining the distribution of a weighted sum X of negatively correlated Bernoulli variables, specifically lower bounding its mass below a threshold, E[min(1,X)], of possible independent interest. Interestingly, our bound relies on an imaginary invocation of pivotal sampling.

We present a framework for hedging a portfolio of derivatives in the presence of market frictions such as transaction costs, market impact, liquidity constraints or risk limits using modern deep reinforcement machine learning methods. We discuss how standard reinforcement learning methods can be applied to non-linear reward structures, i.e. in our case convex risk measures. As a general contribution to the use of deep learning for stochastic processes, we also show that the set of constrained trading strategies used by our algorithm is large enough to ε-approximate any optimal solution. Our algorithm can be implemented efficiently even in high-dimensional situations using modern machine learning tools. Its structure does not depend on specific market dynamics, and generalizes across hedging instruments including the use of liquid derivatives. Its computational performance is largely invariant in the size of the portfolio as it depends mainly on the number of hedging instruments available. We illustrate our approach by showing the effect on hedging under transaction costs in a synthetic market driven by the Heston model, where we outperform the standard "complete market" solution.

Personalized recommendation systems shape much of user choice online, yet their targeted nature makes separating out the value of recommendation and the underlying goods challenging. We build a discrete choice model that embeds recommendation-induced utility, low-rank heterogeneity, and flexible state dependence and apply the model to viewership data at Netflix. We exploit idiosyncratic variation introduced by the recommendation algorithm to identify and separately value these components as well as to recover model-free diversion ratios that we can use to validate our structural model. We use the model to evaluate counterfactuals that quantify the incremental engagement generated by personalized recommendations. First, we show that replacing the current recommender system with a matrix factorization or popularity-based algorithm would lead to 4% and 12% reduction in engagement, respectively, and decreased consumption diversity. Second, most of the consumption increase from recommendations comes from effective targeting, not mechanical exposure, with the largest gains for mid-popularity goods (as opposed to broadly appealing or very niche goods).

The escalating demand for Machine Learning (ML) training resources in recent years has resulted in a substantial gap between the high demand and the available supply. Efficient allocation of these scarce and expensive resources is crucial for organizations to maximize their return on investment. Existing resource allocation mechanisms, like Karma [OSDI'23], are designed to guarantee Pareto efficiency and max-min fairness in settings with dynamic (time-varying) user demands, but fail to preserve these key properties in the presence of demands with heterogeneous values. Given the ubiquity and inevitability of heterogeneity in organizational values of different workloads, effective resource allocation policies must accommodate these variations. In this paper, we describe the design, implementation, deployment, and theoretical analysis of Quota Marketplace, a market-based mechanism to efficiently allocate ML training chips (like GPUs), explicitly addressing scenarios with demands of heterogeneous value. We detail the implementation of this mechanism within Google and present metrics that demonstrate its impact. We also discuss many business-critical requirements that the Quota Marketplace handles quite effectively, and document the gains and opportunities it has unlocked. We establish theoretically how this market-based approach achieves the essential properties of Pareto efficiency and max-min fairness by allowing the users to express the value of their workloads and enabling dynamic resource pricing based on supply and demand fluctuations. Ultimately, the market facilitates resource allocation that aligns with organizational priorities.

The fractional Brownian motion (fBm) extends the standard Brownian motion by introducing some dependence between non-overlapping increments. Consequently, if one considers for example that log-prices follow an fBm, one can exploit the non-Markovian nature of the fBm to forecast future states of the process and make statistical arbitrages. We provide new insights into forecasting an fBm, by proposing theoretical formulas for accuracy metrics relevant to a systematic trader, from the hit ratio to the expected gain and risk of a simple strategy. In addition, we answer some key questions about optimizing trading strategies in the fBm framework: Which lagged increments of the fBm, observed in discrete time, are to be considered? If the predicted increment is close to zero, up to which threshold is it more profitable not to invest? We also propose empirical applications on high-frequency FX rates, as well as on realized volatility series, exploring the rough volatility concept in a forecasting perspective.

Online marketplaces will be transformed by autonomous AI agents acting on behalf of consumers. Rather than humans browsing and clicking, vision-language-model (VLM) agents can parse webpages, evaluate products, and transact. This raises a fundamental question: what do AI agents buy, and why? We develop ACES, a sandbox environment that pairs a platform-agnostic VLM agent with a fully programmable mock marketplace to study this question. We first conduct basic rationality checks in the context of simple tasks, and then, by randomizing product positions, prices, ratings, reviews, sponsored tags, and platform endorsements, we obtain causal estimates of how frontier VLMs actually shop. Models show strong but heterogeneous position effects: all favor the top row, yet different models prefer different columns, undermining the assumption of a universal "top" rank. They penalize sponsored tags and reward endorsements. Sensitivities to price, ratings, and reviews are directionally human-like but vary sharply in magnitude across models. Motivated by scenarios where sellers use AI agents to optimize product listings, we show that a seller-side agent that makes minor tweaks to product descriptions, targeting AI buyer preferences, can deliver substantial market-share gains if AI-mediated shopping dominates. We also find that modal product choices can differ across models and, in some cases, demand may concentrate on a few select products, raising competition questions. Together, our results illuminate how AI agents may behave in e-commerce settings and surface concrete seller strategy, platform design, and regulatory questions in an AI-mediated ecosystem.

Training classifiers is difficult with severe class imbalance, but many rare events are the culmination of a sequence with much more common intermediate outcomes. For example, in online marketing a user first sees an ad, then may click on it, and finally may make a purchase; estimating the probability of purchases is difficult because of their rarity. We show both theoretically and through data experiments that the more abundant data in earlier steps may be leveraged to improve estimation of probabilities of rare events. We present PRESTO, a relaxation of the proportional odds model for ordinal regression. Instead of estimating weights for one separating hyperplane that is shifted by separate intercepts for each of the estimated Bayes decision boundaries between adjacent pairs of categorical responses, we estimate separate weights for each of these transitions. We impose an L1 penalty on the differences between weights for the same feature in adjacent weight vectors in order to shrink towards the proportional odds model. We prove that PRESTO consistently estimates the decision boundary weights under a sparsity assumption. Synthetic and real data experiments show that our method can estimate rare probabilities in this setting better than both logistic regression on the rare category, which fails to borrow strength from more abundant categories, and the proportional odds model, which is too inflexible.

In reinforcement learning an agent interacts with the environment by taking actions and observing the next state and reward. When sampled probabilistically, these state transitions, rewards, and actions can all induce randomness in the observed long-term return. Traditionally, reinforcement learning algorithms average over this randomness to estimate the value function. In this paper, we build on recent work advocating a distributional approach to reinforcement learning in which the distribution over returns is modeled explicitly instead of only estimating the mean. That is, we examine methods of learning the value distribution instead of the value function. We give results that close a number of gaps between the theoretical and algorithmic results given by Bellemare, Dabney, and Munos (2017). First, we extend existing results to the approximate distribution setting. Second, we present a novel distributional reinforcement learning algorithm consistent with our theoretical formulation. Finally, we evaluate this new algorithm on the Atari 2600 games, observing that it significantly outperforms many of the recent improvements on DQN, including the related distributional algorithm C51.

Designing robust frameworks for precise prediction of future prices of stocks has always been considered a very challenging research problem. The advocates of the classical efficient market hypothesis affirm that it is impossible to accurately predict the future prices in an efficiently operating market due to the stochastic nature of the stock price variables. However, numerous propositions exist in the literature with varying degrees of sophistication and complexity that illustrate how algorithms and models can be designed for making efficient, accurate, and robust predictions of stock prices. We present a gamut of ten deep learning models of regression for precise and robust prediction of the future prices of the stock of a critical company in the auto sector of India. Using a very granular stock price collected at 5 minutes intervals, we train the models based on the records from 31st Dec, 2012 to 27th Dec, 2013. The testing of the models is done using records from 30th Dec, 2013 to 9th Jan 2015. We explain the design principles of the models and analyze the results of their performance based on accuracy in forecasting and speed of execution.

We design efficient approximation algorithms for maximizing the expectation of the supremum of families of Gaussian random variables. In particular, let OPT:=max_{σ_1,cdots,σ_n}Eleft[sum_{j=1}^{m}max_{iin S_j} X_iright], where X_i are Gaussian, S_jsubset[n] and sum_iσ_i^2=1, then our theoretical results include: - We characterize the optimal variance allocation -- it concentrates on a small subset of variables as |S_j| increases, - A polynomial time approximation scheme (PTAS) for computing OPT when m=1, and - An O(log n) approximation algorithm for computing OPT for general m>1. Such expectation maximization problems occur in diverse applications, ranging from utility maximization in auctions markets to learning mixture models in quantitative genetics.

We introduce a novel hybrid approach that augments Agent-Based Models (ABMs) with behaviors generated by Large Language Models (LLMs) to simulate human trading interactions. We call our model TraderTalk. Leveraging LLMs trained on extensive human-authored text, we capture detailed and nuanced representations of bilateral conversations in financial trading. Applying this Generative Agent-Based Model (GABM) to government bond markets, we replicate trading decisions between two stylised virtual humans. Our method addresses both structural challenges, such as coordinating turn-taking between realistic LLM-based agents, and design challenges, including the interpretation of LLM outputs by the agent model. By exploring prompt design opportunistically rather than systematically, we enhance the realism of agent interactions without exhaustive overfitting or model reliance. Our approach successfully replicates trade-to-order volume ratios observed in related asset markets, demonstrating the potential of LLM-augmented ABMs in financial simulations

Economic World Models (EWMs) are generative economic models that simulate how economies evolve from within by modeling heterogeneous agents, their beliefs and actions, and the market and institutional mechanisms through which their interactions produce aggregate outcomes. This paper develops an implementation roadmap for building economic world models as generative engines in which heterogeneous agents act, interact, adapt, and co-evolve with markets and institutions, thereby producing economic dynamics from the inside. We organize EWM systems into a six-level capability ladder, from fixed rule-based agent worlds to adaptive and LLM-based agent worlds, self-evolving agents, evolving institutional worlds, and sim-to-real economic twins aligned with real observations. A systematic literature survey across these levels reveals that existing work remains concentrated in lower-level agent and simulation environments, while systems with self-evolving agents, endogenous institutions, persistent empirical alignment, and validated economic mechanisms remain rare. By translating the EWM agenda into an implementation blueprint, this paper aims to accelerate the development of the next generation of economic simulation environments that can serve as high-fidelity sandboxes for human decision-makers and as training, planning, evaluation, and safety substrates for AI agents. We release a curated paper list and related resources to support future research.

Large language models (LLMs) achieve strong performance across benchmarks--from knowledge quizzes and math reasoning to web-agent tasks--but these tests occur in static settings, lacking real dynamics and uncertainty. Consequently, they evaluate isolated reasoning or problem-solving rather than decision-making under uncertainty. To address this, we introduce LiveTradeBench, a live trading environment for evaluating LLM agents in realistic and evolving markets. LiveTradeBench follows three design principles: (i) Live data streaming of market prices and news, eliminating dependence on offline backtesting and preventing information leakage while capturing real-time uncertainty; (ii) a portfolio-management abstraction that extends control from single-asset actions to multi-asset allocation, integrating risk management and cross-asset reasoning; and (iii) multi-market evaluation across structurally distinct environments--U.S. stocks and Polymarket prediction markets--differing in volatility, liquidity, and information flow. At each step, an agent observes prices, news, and its portfolio, then outputs percentage allocations that balance risk and return. Using LiveTradeBench, we run 50-day live evaluations of 21 LLMs across families. Results show that (1) high LMArena scores do not imply superior trading outcomes; (2) models display distinct portfolio styles reflecting risk appetite and reasoning dynamics; and (3) some LLMs effectively leverage live signals to adapt decisions. These findings expose a gap between static evaluation and real-world competence, motivating benchmarks that test sequential decision making and consistency under live uncertainty.

A variety of recent papers discuss the application of Shapley values, a concept for explaining coalitional games, for feature attribution in machine learning. However, the correct way to connect a machine learning model to a coalitional game has been a source of controversy. The two main approaches that have been proposed differ in the way that they condition on known features, using either (1) an interventional or (2) an observational conditional expectation. While previous work has argued that one of the two approaches is preferable in general, we argue that the choice is application dependent. Furthermore, we argue that the choice comes down to whether it is desirable to be true to the model or true to the data. We use linear models to investigate this choice. After deriving an efficient method for calculating observational conditional expectation Shapley values for linear models, we investigate how correlation in simulated data impacts the convergence of observational conditional expectation Shapley values. Finally, we present two real data examples that we consider to be representative of possible use cases for feature attribution -- (1) credit risk modeling and (2) biological discovery. We show how a different choice of value function performs better in each scenario, and how possible attributions are impacted by modeling choices.

We introduce a Path Shadowing Monte-Carlo method, which provides prediction of future paths, given any generative model. At any given date, it averages future quantities over generated price paths whose past history matches, or `shadows', the actual (observed) history. We test our approach using paths generated from a maximum entropy model of financial prices, based on a recently proposed multi-scale analogue of the standard skewness and kurtosis called `Scattering Spectra'. This model promotes diversity of generated paths while reproducing the main statistical properties of financial prices, including stylized facts on volatility roughness. Our method yields state-of-the-art predictions for future realized volatility and allows one to determine conditional option smiles for the S\&P500 that outperform both the current version of the Path-Dependent Volatility model and the option market itself.

We introduce the Polymarket-v1 Database: the complete on-chain trade archive of Polymarket's first-generation CTF Exchange on Polygon, spanning 2022-11-21 to 2026-04-28 and covering the full contract lifecycle from first settlement to natural termination. The dataset comprises 1.20 billion trade records across 1.30 million markets with $61 billion in nominal volume. Its defining feature is 100% ground-truth aggressor direction derived from the blockchain settlement layer, a property unavailable in existing prediction market archives, which rely on heuristic inference. We use this truth-aligned archive to benchmark standard microstructure tools and document three findings. First, the tick rule and bulk volume classification achieve near-random aggregate accuracy (49.83% and 50.51%), but this masks a systematic, correctable price-level gradient driven by positive trade direction autocorrelation and concentrated market-making -- two structural features of prediction markets that violate the mean-reversion assumption embedded in classical classifiers. Second, these classification errors propagate into downstream metrics: inferred VPIN diverges substantially from ground-truth VPIN, and OFI estimates are directionally biased, with material consequences for Transaction Cost Analysis. Third, ground-truth microstructure quality predicts forecasting performance in ways that classification-based proxies cannot recover: True VPIN positively predicts Brier scores, while Gibbs spread negatively predicts them -- a selection effect reflecting that high-spread niche markets attract informed specialists rather than noise traders. Replacing ground-truth metrics with classified proxies attenuates both relationships, illustrating that measurement accuracy at the transaction level is a prerequisite for reliable inference about prediction market design and probability calibration.

Vegetable prices in Sri Lanka are highly volatile because the market is largely import-isolated, so supply disruptions quickly drive prices up. This study develops a machine learning framework to forecast such volatility by incorporating supply-chain-aware features and explicitly modelling the country's two cultivation seasons, Maha (October-April) and Yala (May-September). An integrated dataset was constructed by combining retail and farmer-gate prices with origin-aligned weather variables, diesel costs, and exchange rates across 12 vegetable varieties and 14 market centres from 2013 to 2019. A gradient-boosted ensemble model (XGBoost and LightGBM) was trained and optimised using Optuna, and unified and season-specific configurations were compared. Results show that season-specific models improve within-season fit, with the Yala-specific model achieving the highest R2 of 0.9420 (95% CI [0.690, 1.000]), while the unified model delivers the best overall predictive accuracy of 90.84% (95% CI [88.34%, 91.52%]) and an R2 of 0.9281 (95% CI [0.760, 1.000]). Notably, the unified model maintains 85.96% accuracy on a completely unseen 2024 hyperinflationary period without retraining, successfully tracking major price surges. These findings suggest that agricultural price movements in import-constrained markets are meaningfully predictable when models capture supply-chain dynamics, offering practical value for early warning and decision making by farmers, traders, and policymakers. Existing studies on Sri Lankan vegetable prices are confined to Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) and Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) applied to single markets, with no supply-chain features, seasonal segmentation, or cross-regime validation.

The square-root impact law (SRIL), I = YσQ/V, bundles two facts that a single mechanism must explain at once: a shape (impact proportional to square-root of traded volume Q) and an amplitude (Y=O(1), independent of the participation rate φ). Bonart has recently proposed an elegant solution: if realized and counterfactual prices are both diffusive, information-neutral impact must have white increments and the SRIL follows without the wart. We reformulate and simplify his argument, and foreground the ingredient he himself regards as essential --- that the market whitens the stationary stream of each participant's metaorders, not any isolated one. The Lillo--Mike--Farmer model satisfies his premises, yet gives an isolated metaorder the super-square-root impact φ^{(1-γ)/2}Q^{(1+γ)/2}, γin(0,1), because single metaorders (i.e. not part of a stream) are statistically invisible and thus priced mechanically. We then construct an explicit multi-agent propagator that realizes Bonart's whitening, and show it reproduces the clean SRIL precisely when the market can attribute trades to their issuer. But correct re-attribution of anonymous trades is a formidable task, which requires markets to behave as implausibly efficient signal processing machines. The stream hypothesis makes a sharp, falsifiable prediction --- isolated metaorders, well separated in time, should not obey the SRIL --- that does not seem agree with empirical data known to us. Independently, a volume-conservation argument singles out the square-root law and lays bare the step the diffusivity route must assume: diffusivity fixes the variance of impact --- an additive, stationary, age-blind quantity --- whereas the SRIL is a law for the mean impact, which marginally decays as 1/text{age} and therefore demands an origin of time.

Multi-armed bandit problems are the predominant theoretical model of exploration-exploitation tradeoffs in learning, and they have countless applications ranging from medical trials, to communication networks, to Web search and advertising. In many of these application domains the learner may be constrained by one or more supply (or budget) limits, in addition to the customary limitation on the time horizon. The literature lacks a general model encompassing these sorts of problems. We introduce such a model, called "bandits with knapsacks", that combines aspects of stochastic integer programming with online learning. A distinctive feature of our problem, in comparison to the existing regret-minimization literature, is that the optimal policy for a given latent distribution may significantly outperform the policy that plays the optimal fixed arm. Consequently, achieving sublinear regret in the bandits-with-knapsacks problem is significantly more challenging than in conventional bandit problems. We present two algorithms whose reward is close to the information-theoretic optimum: one is based on a novel "balanced exploration" paradigm, while the other is a primal-dual algorithm that uses multiplicative updates. Further, we prove that the regret achieved by both algorithms is optimal up to polylogarithmic factors. We illustrate the generality of the problem by presenting applications in a number of different domains including electronic commerce, routing, and scheduling. As one example of a concrete application, we consider the problem of dynamic posted pricing with limited supply and obtain the first algorithm whose regret, with respect to the optimal dynamic policy, is sublinear in the supply.

We consider strategy proof mechanisms for facility location which maximize equitability between agents. As is common in the literature, we measure equitability with the Gini index. We first prove a simple but fundamental impossibility result that no strategy proof mechanism can bound the approximation ratio of the optimal Gini index of utilities for one or more facilities. We propose instead computing approximation ratios of the complemented Gini index of utilities, and consider how well both deterministic and randomized mechanisms approximate this. In addition, as Nash welfare is often put forwards as an equitable compromise between egalitarian and utilitarian outcomes, we consider how well mechanisms approximate the Nash welfare.

Paper 1 of this research programme develops a resolution-aware risk-design framework for the simplest event-linked perpetual: a contract whose underlying tracks a single binary prediction-market probability through resolution. The instrument class is broader. Variants span conditional probabilities P(A|B), spreads p^A - p^B, weighted baskets sum w_i p^(i), derivatives on variance or entropy of the probability process, contracts on liquidity itself, perpetual-on-expiring-event roll structures, and funding-only derivatives with no settlement. Each variant inherits some framework components from the single-market binary case and requires its own design adaptations. This paper develops a formal taxonomy of seven pure-form canonical variants beyond the probability-index perpetual of Paper 1, organised along four orthogonal design axes: underlying geometry, temporal structure, settlement structure, and venue composition. The list is not exhaustive; combinations are not treated separately. For each variant we provide a precise payoff definition; an inheritance map identifying which Paper 1 components carry over, are modified, or fail; variant-specific design constraints; microstructure properties; empirical evaluability on the PMXT v2 archive; and limitations. Notable findings: the conditional variant admits a candidate non-portability proposition (denominator instability as the conditioning event becomes improbable); the spread variant requires a three-channel decomposition of resolution risk; the volatility/entropy variant avoids random binary terminal-collapse but introduces estimator-convention and entropy-decay issues; the basket variant requires multi-period jump-aware margin whose aggregation is correlation-dependent. The paper is theoretical primarily; it specifies how demonstrative time series can be constructed and provides evaluability criteria to guide future work.

The game show Lucky 13 differs from other television game shows in that contestants are required to place a bet on their own knowledge of trivia by selecting a range that contains the number of questions that they answered correctly. We present a model for this game show using binomial random variables and generate tables outlining the optimal range the player should select based on maximization of two different utility functions. After analyzing the decisions made by some actual contestants on this show, we present a numerical simulation for how many questions an average player is expected to answer correctly based on question categories observed for two sample contestants.

This study addresses the challenge of estimating average treatment effects (ATEs) for advertising campaigns in online marketplaces where complete randomized experimentation is infeasible. We propose two key innovations: (1) a shrinkage estimator that optimally combines observational and experimental data without assuming smooth treatment effects across campaigns, and (2) a Bayesian adaptive experimental design framework that efficiently selects campaigns for randomized evaluation that minimizes cumulative risk. Our shrinkage estimator achieves lower risk compared to existing methods by balancing bias-variance tradeoffs, while our adaptive design significantly reduces the costs of campaign randomization. We establish theoretical guarantees including asymptotic normality and regret bounds. In an application to Amazon Ads data analyzing 2,583 campaigns, our approach achieves equivalent estimation precision while requiring only half of the randomized experiments needed by random sampling, the standard method widely used in practice today. The proposed method serves as a practical solution for marketplace platforms to efficiently measure advertising effectiveness while managing experimentation costs.

Many applications involve estimating the mean of multiple binomial outcomes as a common problem -- assessing intergenerational mobility of census tracts, estimating prevalence of infectious diseases across countries, and measuring click-through rates for different demographic groups. The most standard approach is to report the plain average of each outcome. Despite simplicity, the estimates are noisy when the sample sizes or mean parameters are small. In contrast, the Empirical Bayes (EB) methods are able to boost the average accuracy by borrowing information across tasks. Nevertheless, the EB methods require a Bayesian model where the parameters are sampled from a prior distribution which, unlike the commonly-studied Gaussian case, is unidentified due to discreteness of binomial measurements. Even if the prior distribution is known, the computation is difficult when the sample sizes are heterogeneous as there is no simple joint conjugate prior for the sample size and mean parameter. In this paper, we consider the compound decision framework which treats the sample size and mean parameters as fixed quantities. We develop an approximate Stein's Unbiased Risk Estimator (SURE) for the average mean squared error given any class of estimators. For a class of machine learning-assisted linear shrinkage estimators, we establish asymptotic optimality, regret bounds, and valid inference. Unlike existing work, we work with the binomials directly without resorting to Gaussian approximations. This allows us to work with small sample sizes and/or mean parameters in both one-sample and two-sample settings. We demonstrate our approach using three datasets on firm discrimination, education outcomes, and innovation rates.

Mehta and Panigrahi (2012) proposed Online Matching with Stochastic Rewards, which generalizes the Online Bipartite Matching problem of Karp, Vazirani, and Vazirani (1990) by associating the edges with success probabilities. This new feature captures the pay-per-click model in online advertising. Recently, Huang and Zhang (2020) studied this problem under the online primal dual framework using the Configuration Linear Program (LP), and got the best known competitive ratios of the Stochastic Balance algorithm. Their work suggests that the more expressive Configuration LP is more suitable for this problem than the Matching LP. This paper advances the theory of Configuration LP in two directions. Our technical contribution includes a characterization of the joint matching outcome of an offline vertex and all its neighbors. This characterization may be of independent interest, and is aligned with the spirit of Configuration LP. By contrast, previous analyses of Ranking generally focus on only one neighbor. Second, we designed a Stochastic Configuration LP that captures a stochastic benchmark proposed by Goyal and Udwani (2020), who used a Path-based LP. The Stochastic Configuration LP is smaller and simpler than the Path-based LP. Moreover, using the new LP we improved the competitive ratio of Stochastic Balance from 0.596 to 0.611 when the success probabilities are infinitesimal, and to 0.613 when the success probabilities are further equal.

The inherent non-stationarity of financial markets and the complexity of multi-modal information pose significant challenges to existing quantitative trading models. Traditional methods relying on fixed structures and unimodal data struggle to adapt to market regime shifts, while large language model (LLM)-driven solutions - despite their multi-modal comprehension - suffer from static strategies and homogeneous expert designs, lacking dynamic adjustment and fine-grained decision mechanisms. To address these limitations, we propose MM-DREX: a Multimodal-driven, Dynamically-Routed EXpert framework based on large language models. MM-DREX explicitly decouples market state perception from strategy execution to enable adaptive sequential decision-making in non-stationary environments. Specifically, it (1) introduces a vision-language model (VLM)-powered dynamic router that jointly analyzes candlestick chart patterns and long-term temporal features to allocate real-time expert weights; (2) designs four heterogeneous trading experts (trend, reversal, breakout, positioning) generating specialized fine-grained sub-strategies; and (3) proposes an SFT-RL hybrid training paradigm to synergistically optimize the router's market classification capability and experts' risk-adjusted decision-making. Extensive experiments on multi-modal datasets spanning stocks, futures, and cryptocurrencies demonstrate that MM-DREX significantly outperforms 15 baselines (including state-of-the-art financial LLMs and deep reinforcement learning models) across key metrics: total return, Sharpe ratio, and maximum drawdown, validating its robustness and generalization. Additionally, an interpretability module traces routing logic and expert behavior in real time, providing an audit trail for strategy transparency.

Online allocation problems with resource constraints are central problems in revenue management and online advertising. In these problems, requests arrive sequentially during a finite horizon and, for each request, a decision maker needs to choose an action that consumes a certain amount of resources and generates reward. The objective is to maximize cumulative rewards subject to a constraint on the total consumption of resources. In this paper, we consider a data-driven setting in which the reward and resource consumption of each request are generated using an input model that is unknown to the decision maker. We design a general class of algorithms that attain good performance in various input models without knowing which type of input they are facing. In particular, our algorithms are asymptotically optimal under independent and identically distributed inputs as well as various non-stationary stochastic input models, and they attain an asymptotically optimal fixed competitive ratio when the input is adversarial. Our algorithms operate in the Lagrangian dual space: they maintain a dual multiplier for each resource that is updated using online mirror descent. By choosing the reference function accordingly, we recover the dual sub-gradient descent and dual multiplicative weights update algorithm. The resulting algorithms are simple, fast, and do not require convexity in the revenue function, consumption function and action space, in contrast to existing methods for online allocation problems. We discuss applications to network revenue management, online bidding in repeated auctions with budget constraints, online proportional matching with high entropy, and personalized assortment optimization with limited inventory.

Binary options trading is often marketed as a field where predictive models can generate consistent profits. However, the inherent randomness and stochastic nature of binary options make price movements highly unpredictable, posing significant challenges for any forecasting approach. This study demonstrates that machine learning algorithms struggle to outperform a simple baseline in predicting binary options movements. Using a dataset of EUR/USD currency pairs from 2021 to 2023, we tested multiple models, including Random Forest, Logistic Regression, Gradient Boosting, and k-Nearest Neighbors (kNN), both before and after hyperparameter optimization. Furthermore, several neural network architectures, including Multi-Layer Perceptrons (MLP) and a Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) network, were evaluated under different training conditions. Despite these exhaustive efforts, none of the models surpassed the ZeroR baseline accuracy, highlighting the inherent randomness of binary options. These findings reinforce the notion that binary options lack predictable patterns, making them unsuitable for machine learning-based forecasting.

This paper generalises the treatment of compositional game theory as introduced by the second and third authors with Ghani and Winschel, where games are modelled as morphisms of a symmetric monoidal category. From an economic modelling perspective, the existing notion of an open game is not expressive enough for many applications. This includes stochastic environments, stochastic choices by players, as well as incomplete information regarding the game being played. The current paper addresses these three issue all at once. To achieve this we make significant use of category theory, especially the 'coend optics' of Riley.

OpenMarket began as an attempt to trade Polymarket's BTC 15-minute binary markets against Binance BTC/USDT order flow. The attempt did not produce a tradable edge: out-of-sample, a walk-forward logistic model over 43 microstructure features does not beat, and slightly underperforms, the probability already implied by Polymarket's own order book, and simulated trading nets -0.116 normalized payoff units per attempted trade under stated fee and slippage assumptions. We release the synchronized corpus and infrastructure that attempt produced and, to our knowledge, the first public millisecond-level Polymarket BTC / Binance BTC-USDT paired corpus with explicit pairing metadata. The frozen archive (tag v0.5.2) contains 727,098,247 deduplicated rows across 202 archival snapshots, with event data on 54 observed Polymarket days (57 Binance days) between 2026-02-12 and 2026-05-15, including 2,936,031 explicit lead-lag pairs, alongside a reproducible Rust pipeline for collection, millisecond pairing, Parquet export, and walk-forward calibration. Initial analyses establish Polymarket stylized facts (one-tick top-of-book spreads) and characterize cross-venue timing: an apparent 16 ms median lag on venue source clocks, with relative clock drift bounded to at most 6 ms over the archive but a remaining single-vantage constant-offset ambiguity of approximately plus or minus 99 ms. A synchronization-free event study, measured only on the collector clock, independently shows that Polymarket quotes respond to large Binance moves after a median 347 ms. We position this work as a data-and-methods release whose central empirical result is a null out-of-sample forecasting result.

In this paper we argue for the fundamental importance of the value distribution: the distribution of the random return received by a reinforcement learning agent. This is in contrast to the common approach to reinforcement learning which models the expectation of this return, or value. Although there is an established body of literature studying the value distribution, thus far it has always been used for a specific purpose such as implementing risk-aware behaviour. We begin with theoretical results in both the policy evaluation and control settings, exposing a significant distributional instability in the latter. We then use the distributional perspective to design a new algorithm which applies Bellman's equation to the learning of approximate value distributions. We evaluate our algorithm using the suite of games from the Arcade Learning Environment. We obtain both state-of-the-art results and anecdotal evidence demonstrating the importance of the value distribution in approximate reinforcement learning. Finally, we combine theoretical and empirical evidence to highlight the ways in which the value distribution impacts learning in the approximate setting.

Classical estimators for ARIMA parameters (MLE, CSS, OLS) assume Gaussian innovations, an assumption frequently violated in financial and economic data exhibiting asymmetric distributions with heavy tails. We develop and validate the second-order polynomial maximization method (PMM2) for estimating ARIMA(p,d,q) models with non-Gaussian innovations. PMM2 is a semiparametric technique that exploits higher-order moments and cumulants without requiring full distributional specification. Monte Carlo experiments (128,000 simulations) across sample sizes N in {100, 200, 500, 1000} and four innovation distributions demonstrate that PMM2 substantially outperforms classical methods for asymmetric innovations. For ARIMA(1,1,0) with N=500, relative efficiency reaches 1.58--1.90 for Gamma, lognormal, and χ^2(3) innovations (37--47\% variance reduction). Under Gaussian innovations PMM2 matches OLS efficiency, avoiding the precision loss typical of robust estimators. The method delivers major gains for moderate asymmetry (|γ_3| geq 0.5) and N geq 200, with computational costs comparable to MLE. PMM2 provides an effective alternative for time series with asymmetric innovations typical of financial markets, macroeconomic indicators, and industrial measurements. Future extensions include seasonal SARIMA models, GARCH integration, and automatic order selection.

This study develops and empirically validates a Mixture of Experts (MoE) framework for stock price prediction across heterogeneous volatility regimes using real market data. The proposed model combines a Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) optimized for high-volatility stocks with a linear regression model tailored to stable equities. A volatility-aware gating mechanism dynamically weights the contributions of each expert based on asset classification. Using a dataset of 30 publicly traded U.S. stocks spanning diverse sectors, the MoE approach consistently outperforms both standalone models. Specifically, it achieves up to 33% improvement in MSE for volatile assets and 28% for stable assets relative to their respective baselines. Stratified evaluation across volatility classes demonstrates the model's ability to adapt complexity to underlying market dynamics. These results confirm that no single model suffices across market regimes and highlight the advantage of adaptive architectures in financial prediction. Future work should explore real-time gate learning, dynamic volatility segmentation, and applications to portfolio optimization.

This research employs quantitative techniques interpreted through relevant economic theories to analyze a proposed U.S. "Discounted Reciprocal Tariff" structure. Statistical modeling (linear regression) quantifies the policy's consistent 'discounted reciprocity' pattern, which is interpreted using a Game Theory perspective on strategic interaction. Machine learning (K-Means clustering) identifies distinct country typologies based on tariff exposure and Economic Complexity Index (ECI), linking the policy to Economic Complexity theory. The study's primary application focuses on the major coffee exporting sector, utilizing simulation modeling grounded in principles of demand elasticity and substitution to project potential trade flow impacts. Specifically, for coffee, this simulation demonstrates how the proposed tariff differentials can induce significant substitution effects, projecting a potential shift in U.S. import demand away from high-tariff origins toward lower-tariff competitors. This disruption, stemming from the tariffs impacting exporting countries, is projected to ultimately increase coffee prices for consumers in the United States. Findings throughout are contextualized within Political Economy considerations. Overall, the study demonstrates how integrating regression, clustering, and simulation with economic theory exemplified through the coffee sector analysis provides a robust framework for assessing the potential systemic impacts, including consumer price effects, of strategic trade policies.

We introduce a new class of algorithms, Stochastic Generalized Method of Moments (SGMM), for estimation and inference on (overidentified) moment restriction models. Our SGMM is a novel stochastic approximation alternative to the popular Hansen (1982) (offline) GMM, and offers fast and scalable implementation with the ability to handle streaming datasets in real time. We establish the almost sure convergence, and the (functional) central limit theorem for the inefficient online 2SLS and the efficient SGMM. Moreover, we propose online versions of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman and Sargan-Hansen tests that can be seamlessly integrated within the SGMM framework. Extensive Monte Carlo simulations show that as the sample size increases, the SGMM matches the standard (offline) GMM in terms of estimation accuracy and gains over computational efficiency, indicating its practical value for both large-scale and online datasets. We demonstrate the efficacy of our approach by a proof of concept using two well known empirical examples with large sample sizes.

Integrated autoregressive conditional duration (ACD) models serve as natural counterparts to the well-known integrated GARCH models used for financial returns. However, despite their resemblance, asymptotic theory for ACD is challenging and also not complete, in particular for integrated ACD. Central challenges arise from the facts that (i) integrated ACD processes imply durations with infinite expectation, and (ii) even in the non-integrated case, conventional asymptotic approaches break down due to the randomness in the number of durations within a fixed observation period. Addressing these challenges, we provide here unified asymptotic theory for the (quasi-) maximum likelihood estimator for ACD models; a unified theory which includes integrated ACD models. Based on the new results, we also provide a novel framework for hypothesis testing in duration models, enabling inference on a key empirical question: whether durations possess a finite or infinite expectation. We apply our results to high-frequency cryptocurrency ETF trading data. Motivated by parameter estimates near the integrated ACD boundary, we assess whether durations between trades in these markets have finite expectation, an assumption often made implicitly in the literature on point process models. Our empirical findings indicate infinite-mean durations for all the five cryptocurrencies examined, with the integrated ACD hypothesis rejected -- against alternatives with tail index less than one -- for four out of the five cryptocurrencies considered.

We study a model of innovation with a large number of firms that create new technologies by combining several discrete ideas. These ideas are created via private investment and spread between firms. Firms face a choice between secrecy, which protects existing intellectual property, and openness, which facilitates learning from others. Their decisions determine interaction rates between firms, and these interaction rates enter our model as link probabilities in a learning network. Higher interaction rates impose both positive and negative externalities, as there is more learning but also more competition. We show that the equilibrium learning network is at a critical threshold between sparse and dense networks. At equilibrium, the positive externality from interaction dominates: the innovation rate and welfare would be dramatically higher if the network were denser. So there are large returns to increasing interaction rates above the critical threshold. Nevertheless, several natural types of interventions fail to move the equilibrium away from criticality. One effective policy solution is to introduce informational intermediaries, such as public innovators who do not have incentives to be secretive. These intermediaries can facilitate a high-innovation equilibrium by transmitting ideas from one private firm to another.

We study a strategic variant of the multi-armed bandit problem, which we coin the strategic click-bandit. This model is motivated by applications in online recommendation where the choice of recommended items depends on both the click-through rates and the post-click rewards. Like in classical bandits, rewards follow a fixed unknown distribution. However, we assume that the click-rate of each arm is chosen strategically by the arm (e.g., a host on Airbnb) in order to maximize the number of times it gets clicked. The algorithm designer does not know the post-click rewards nor the arms' actions (i.e., strategically chosen click-rates) in advance, and must learn both values over time. To solve this problem, we design an incentive-aware learning algorithm, UCB-S, which achieves two goals simultaneously: (a) incentivizing desirable arm behavior under uncertainty; (b) minimizing regret by learning unknown parameters. We characterize all approximate Nash equilibria among arms under UCB-S and show a mathcal{O} (KT) regret bound uniformly in every equilibrium. We also show that incentive-unaware algorithms generally fail to achieve low regret in the strategic click-bandit. Finally, we support our theoretical results by simulations of strategic arm behavior which confirm the effectiveness and robustness of our proposed incentive design.

Generative modeling of high-frequency limit order book (LOB) dynamics is a critical yet unsolved challenge in quantitative finance, essential for robust market simulation and strategy backtesting. Existing approaches are often constrained by simplifying stochastic assumptions or, in the case of modern deep learning models like Transformers, rely on tokenization schemes that affect the high-precision, numerical nature of financial data through discretization and binning. To address these limitations, we introduce ByteGen, a novel generative model that operates directly on the raw byte streams of LOB events. Our approach treats the problem as an autoregressive next-byte prediction task, for which we design a compact and efficient 32-byte packed binary format to represent market messages without information loss. The core novelty of our work is the complete elimination of feature engineering and tokenization, enabling the model to learn market dynamics from its most fundamental representation. We achieve this by adapting the H-Net architecture, a hybrid Mamba-Transformer model that uses a dynamic chunking mechanism to discover the inherent structure of market messages without predefined rules. Our primary contributions are: 1) the first end-to-end, byte-level framework for LOB modeling; 2) an efficient packed data representation; and 3) a comprehensive evaluation on high-frequency data. Trained on over 34 million events from CME Bitcoin futures, ByteGen successfully reproduces key stylized facts of financial markets, generating realistic price distributions, heavy-tailed returns, and bursty event timing. Our findings demonstrate that learning directly from byte space is a promising and highly flexible paradigm for modeling complex financial systems, achieving competitive performance on standard market quality metrics without the biases of tokenization.

Multilevel data are prevalent in many real-world applications. However, it remains an open research problem to identify and justify a class of models that flexibly capture a wide range of multilevel data. Motivated by the versatility of the mixture of experts (MoE) models in fitting regression data, in this article we extend upon the MoE and study a class of mixed MoE (MMoE) models for multilevel data. Under some regularity conditions, we prove that the MMoE is dense in the space of any continuous mixed effects models in the sense of weak convergence. As a result, the MMoE has a potential to accurately resemble almost all characteristics inherited in multilevel data, including the marginal distributions, dependence structures, regression links, random intercepts and random slopes. In a particular case where the multilevel data is hierarchical, we further show that a nested version of the MMoE universally approximates a broad range of dependence structures of the random effects among different factor levels.

The Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing states that a market is free of arbitrage exactly when it admits an equivalent martingale measure. We formalize it in Lean 4 over Mathlib in three settings: a finite-state market over a finite horizon (Harrison-Pliska), a one-period market on an arbitrary probability space with a single scalar return (Follmer-Schied), and a one-period market with finitely many assets. The finite case is the geometry of a separating hyperplane; the scalar one-period case is an elementary change of measure. In the d-asset case the equivalent martingale measure is constructed explicitly, as the minimiser of the smooth convex potential E[log(1+e^{langleθ,Yrangle})]: absence of arbitrage is precisely coercivity of the potential, its first-order condition is the martingale property, and the minimiser's logistic weight is the density of the measure. The construction uses no Hahn-Banach theorem, no L^0-closedness argument, no measurable selection, and no non-redundancy hypothesis. To our knowledge this is the first machine-checked Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing in any proof assistant. The boundary is explicit: the general multi-period Dalang-Morton-Willinger theorem lies outside the development. Every theorem is sorry-free, each headline result's axioms are pinned to Mathlib's classical defaults by a build-enforced gate, and the whole is reproducible from a pinned toolchain.

Intermittent demand forecasting poses unique challenges due to sparse observations, cold-start items, and obsolescence. Classical models such as Croston, SBA, and the Teunter-Syntetos-Babai (TSB) method provide simple heuristics but lack a principled generative foundation. Deep learning models address these limitations but often require large datasets and sacrifice interpretability. We introduce TSB-HB, a hierarchical Bayesian extension of TSB. Demand occurrence is modeled with a Beta-Binomial distribution, while nonzero demand sizes follow a Log-Normal distribution. Crucially, hierarchical priors enable partial pooling across items, stabilizing estimates for sparse or cold-start series while preserving heterogeneity. This framework yields a fully generative and interpretable model that generalizes classical exponential smoothing. On the UCI Online Retail dataset, TSB-HB achieves lower RMSE and RMSSE than Croston, SBA, TSB, ADIDA, IMAPA, ARIMA and Theta, and on a subset of the M5 dataset it outperforms all classical baselines we evaluate. The model provides calibrated probabilistic forecasts and improved accuracy on intermittent and lumpy items by combining a generative formulation with hierarchical shrinkage, while remaining interpretable and scalable.

This paper presents a Bayesian nonparametric latent feature model specially suitable for exploratory analysis of high-dimensional count data. We perform a non-negative doubly sparse matrix factorization that has two main advantages: not only we are able to better approximate the row input distributions, but the inferred topics are also easier to interpret. By combining the three-parameter and restricted Indian buffet processes into a single prior, we increase the model flexibility, allowing for a full spectrum of sparse solutions in the latent space. We demonstrate the usefulness of our approach in the analysis of countries' economic structure. Compared to other approaches, empirical results show our model's ability to give easy-to-interpret information and better capture the underlying sparsity structure of data.

The estimation of loss distributions for dynamic portfolios requires the simulation of scenarios representing realistic joint dynamics of their components. We propose a novel data-driven approach for simulating realistic, high-dimensional multi-asset scenarios, focusing on accurately representing tail risk for a class of static and dynamic trading strategies. We exploit the joint elicitability property of Value-at-Risk (VaR) and Expected Shortfall (ES) to design a Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) that learns to simulate price scenarios preserving these tail risk features. We demonstrate the performance of our algorithm on synthetic and market data sets through detailed numerical experiments. In contrast to previously proposed data-driven scenario generators, our proposed method correctly captures tail risk for a broad class of trading strategies and demonstrates strong generalization capabilities. In addition, combining our method with principal component analysis of the input data enhances its scalability to large-dimensional multi-asset time series, setting our framework apart from the univariate settings commonly considered in the literature.

Macroeconomic data is characterized by a limited number of observations (small T), many time series (big K) but also by featuring temporal dependence. Neural networks, by contrast, are designed for datasets with millions of observations and covariates. In this paper, we develop Bayesian neural networks (BNNs) that are well-suited for handling datasets commonly used for macroeconomic analysis in policy institutions. Our approach avoids extensive specification searches through a novel mixture specification for the activation function that appropriately selects the form of nonlinearities. Shrinkage priors are used to prune the network and force irrelevant neurons to zero. To cope with heteroskedasticity, the BNN is augmented with a stochastic volatility model for the error term. We illustrate how the model can be used in a policy institution by first showing that our different BNNs produce precise density forecasts, typically better than those from other machine learning methods. Finally, we showcase how our model can be used to recover nonlinearities in the reaction of macroeconomic aggregates to financial shocks.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards can in principle train calibrated probabilistic forecasters, since a proper scoring rule such as the Brier score is computed from outcomes alone and is minimized in expectation by the true probability. In practice it degrades calibration, and existing remedies address epistemic uncertainty, where a model's confidence accompanies a verifiably correct or incorrect answer. We study aleatoric forecasting, where the forecast itself is the output and the label is one stochastic outcome, taking NFL in-game win probability as a testbed with the betting market as a reference. Rewarding the realized per-play outcome fails, because the single outcome is a noisy target and the policy gradient corrupts the chain of thought. We introduce a verifiable, label-free reward, a state-conditioned empirical win rate estimated from past outcomes, that removes the label noise, and we keep the gradient off the reasoning, by direct prediction or a gradient mask, so it cannot be corrupted. Trained with this reward alone, without human labels or supervised fine-tuning, a 7B model reaches the calibration of the betting market by direct prediction and is better calibrated than a zero-shot frontier model. That frontier model and a tabular estimator reach the same Brier score as this model, identifying the market's small remaining edge as live in-game information beyond their shared inputs. Masking the gradient, rather than dropping the chain of thought, preserves reasoning from which the forecast follows, which ordinary chain-of-thought training corrupts.

In this paper, we establish an analytic framework for studying set-valued backward stochastic differential equations (set-valued BSDE), motivated largely by the current studies of dynamic set-valued risk measures for multi-asset or network-based financial models. Our framework will make use of the notion of Hukuhara difference between sets, in order to compensate the lack of "inverse" operation of the traditional Minkowski addition, whence the vector space structure in set-valued analysis. While proving the well-posedness of a class of set-valued BSDEs, we shall also address some fundamental issues regarding generalized Aumann-Itô integrals, especially when it is connected to the martingale representation theorem. In particular, we propose some necessary extensions of the integral that can be used to represent set-valued martingales with non-singleton initial values. This extension turns out to be essential for the study of set-valued BSDEs.

Prediction markets are designed to aggregate dispersed information about future events, yet today's ecosystem is fragmented across heterogeneous operator-run platforms and blockchain-based protocols that independently list economically identical events. In the absence of a shared notion of event identity, liquidity fails to pool across venues, arbitrage becomes capital-intensive or unenforceable, and prices systematically violate the Law of One Price. As a result, market prices reflect platform-local beliefs rather than a single, globally aggregated probability, undermining the core information-aggregation function of prediction markets. We address this gap by introducing a semantic alignment framework that makes cross-platform event identity explicit through joint analysis of natural-language descriptions, resolution semantics, and temporal scope. Applying this framework, we construct the first human-validated, cross-platform dataset of aligned prediction markets, covering over 100 000 events across ten major venues from 2018 to 2025. Using this dataset, we show that roughly 6% of all events are concurrently listed across platforms and that semantically equivalent markets exhibit persistent execution-aware price deviations of 2-4% on average, even in highly liquid and information-rich settings. These mispricings give rise to persistent cross-platform arbitrage opportunities driven by structural frictions rather than informational disagreement. Overall, our results demonstrate that semantic non-fungibility is a fundamental barrier to price convergence, and that resolving event identity is a prerequisite for prediction markets to aggregate information at a global scale.

Major Internet advertising platforms offer budget pacing tools as a standard service for advertisers to manage their ad campaigns. Given the inherent non-stationarity in an advertiser's value and also competing advertisers' values over time, a commonly used approach is to learn a target expenditure plan that specifies a target spend as a function of time, and then run a controller that tracks this plan. This raises the question: how many historical samples are required to learn a good expenditure plan? We study this question by considering an advertiser repeatedly participating in T second-price auctions, where the tuple of her value and the highest competing bid is drawn from an unknown time-varying distribution. The advertiser seeks to maximize her total utility subject to her budget constraint. Prior work has shown the sufficiency of Tlog T samples per distribution to achieve the optimal O(T)-regret. We dramatically improve this state-of-the-art and show that just one sample per distribution is enough to achieve the near-optimal tilde O(T)-regret, while still being robust to noise in the sampling distributions.

Existing auto-bidding algorithms in digital advertising often treat the value of an ad opportunity as the revenue obtained when an ad is shown and/or clicked, and bid accordingly. This can lead to wasteful spending because the true value is the marginal gain from paid exposure: even without winning a sponsored slot, an advertiser may still earn revenue via an organic search result (e.g., on Google or Amazon). Motivated by recent work, we model ad value as a treatment effect--the outcome difference between winning and losing the auction--and study online learning for bidding in second-price (Vickrey) auctions under this causal perspective. We develop algorithms that attain rate-optimal regret under several feedback models. A key ingredient exploits the information revealed by the second-price payment rule, which strictly improves regret relative to analogous learning problems in first-price auctions.

We propose a structural default model for portfolio-wide valuation adjustments (xVAs) and represent it as a system of coupled backward stochastic differential equations. The framework is divided into four layers, each capturing a key component: (i) clean values, (ii) initial margin and Collateral Valuation Adjustment (ColVA), (iii) Credit/Debit Valuation Adjustments (CVA/DVA) together with Margin Valuation Adjustment (MVA), and (iv) Funding Valuation Adjustment (FVA). Because these layers depend on one another through collateral and default effects, a naive Monte Carlo approach would require deeply nested simulations, making the problem computationally intractable. To address this challenge, we use an iterative deep BSDE approach, handling each layer sequentially so that earlier outputs serve as inputs to the subsequent layers. Initial margin is computed via deep quantile regression to reflect margin requirements over the Margin Period of Risk. We also adopt a change-of-measure method that highlights rare but significant defaults of the bank or counterparty, ensuring that these events are accurately captured in the training process. We further extend Han and Long's (2020) a posteriori error analysis to BSDEs on bounded domains. Due to the random exit from the domain, we obtain an order of convergence of O(h^{1/4-epsilon}) rather than the usual O(h^{1/2}). Numerical experiments illustrate that this method drastically reduces computational demands and successfully scales to high-dimensional, non-symmetric portfolios. The results confirm its effectiveness and accuracy, offering a practical alternative to nested Monte Carlo simulations in multi-counterparty xVA analyses.

Most recommendation benchmarks evaluate how well a model imitates user behavior. In financial advisory, however, observed actions can be noisy or short-sighted under market volatility and may conflict with a user's long-term goals. Treating what users chose as the sole ground truth, therefore, conflates behavioral imitation with decision quality. We introduce Conv-FinRe, a conversational and longitudinal benchmark for stock recommendation that evaluates LLMs beyond behavior matching. Given an onboarding interview, step-wise market context, and advisory dialogues, models must generate rankings over a fixed investment horizon. Crucially, Conv-FinRe provides multi-view references that distinguish descriptive behavior from normative utility grounded in investor-specific risk preferences, enabling diagnosis of whether an LLM follows rational analysis, mimics user noise, or is driven by market momentum. We build the benchmark from real market data and human decision trajectories, instantiate controlled advisory conversations, and evaluate a suite of state-of-the-art LLMs. Results reveal a persistent tension between rational decision quality and behavioral alignment: models that perform well on utility-based ranking often fail to match user choices, whereas behaviorally aligned models can overfit short-term noise. The dataset is publicly released on Hugging Face, and the codebase is available on GitHub.

We introduce Minary, a computational framework designed as a candidate for the first formally provable autopoietic primitive. Minary represents interacting probabilistic events as multi-dimensional vectors and combines them via linear superposition rather than multiplicative scalar operations, thereby preserving uncertainty and enabling constructive and destructive interference in the range [-1,1]. A fixed set of ``perspectives'' evaluates ``semantic dimensions'' according to hidden competencies, and their interactions drive two discrete-time stochastic processes. We model this system as an iterated random affine map and use the theory of iterated random functions to prove that it converges in distribution to a unique stationary law; we moreover obtain an explicit closed form for the limiting expectation in terms of row, column, and global averages of the competency matrix. We then derive exact formulas for the mean and variance of the normalized consensus conditioned on the activation of a given semantic dimension, revealing how consensus depends on competency structure rather than raw input signals. Finally, we argue that Minary is organizationally closed yet operationally open in the sense of Maturana and Varela, and we discuss implications for building self-maintaining, distributed, and parallelizable computational systems that house a uniquely subjective notion of identity.

This paper studies the use of randomized neural networks for the estimation of exposure profiles and unilateral CVA of American options within a Monte Carlo framework. The analysis is carried out separately under both Black-Scholes and Heston dynamics, combining American option valuation, expected exposure and potential future exposure estimation, and unilateral CVA calculation with portfolio netting effects. The numerical experiment compares this approach with the classical Least-Squares Monte Carlo (LSM) used as a benchmark in both low-dimensional single-asset and high-dimensional multi-asset scenarios, and also includes a path convergence test and a sensitivity analysis. The results show that the randomized feedforward neural network approach preserves convergence to the LSM benchmark when it is extended from pricing to exposure and CVA estimation, while its main advantage appears in high-dimensional problems, where it scales more efficiently and leads to lower computational cost. These results support the use of randomized neural networks as a useful alternative for exposure and CVA estimation in high-dimensional American-style options.

Predicting click and conversion probabilities when bidding on ad exchanges is at the core of the programmatic advertising industry. Two separated lines of previous works respectively address i) the prediction of user conversion probability and ii) the attribution of these conversions to advertising events (such as clicks) after the fact. We argue that attribution modeling improves the efficiency of the bidding policy in the context of performance advertising. Firstly we explain the inefficiency of the standard bidding policy with respect to attribution. Secondly we learn and utilize an attribution model in the bidder itself and show how it modifies the average bid after a click. Finally we produce evidence of the effectiveness of the proposed method on both offline and online experiments with data spanning several weeks of real traffic from Criteo, a leader in performance advertising.

We propose a credit risk model for portfolios composed of green and brown loans, extending the ASRF framework via a two-factor copula structure. Systematic risk is modeled using potentially skewed distributions, allowing for asymmetric creditworthiness effects, while idiosyncratic risk remains Gaussian. Under a non-uniform exposure setting, we establish convergence in quadratic mean of the portfolio loss to a limit reflecting the distinct characteristics of the two loan segments. Numerical results confirm the theoretical findings and illustrate how value-at-risk is affected by portfolio granularity, default probabilities, factor loadings, and skewness. Our model accommodates differential sensitivity to systematic shocks and offers a tractable basis for further developments in credit risk modeling, including granularity adjustments, CDO pricing, and empirical analysis of green loan portfolios.

Electricity systems are key to transforming today's society into a carbon-free economy. Long-term electricity market mechanisms, including auctions, support schemes, and other policy instruments, are critical in shaping the electricity generation mix. In light of the need for more advanced tools to support policymakers and other stakeholders in designing, testing, and evaluating long-term markets, this work presents a multi-agent reinforcement learning model capable of capturing the key features of decarbonizing energy systems. Profit-maximizing generation companies make investment decisions in the wholesale electricity market, responding to system needs, competitive dynamics, and policy signals. The model employs independent proximal policy optimization, which was selected for suitability to the decentralized and competitive environment. Nevertheless, given the inherent challenges of independent learning in multi-agent settings, an extensive hyperparameter search ensures that decentralized training yields market outcomes consistent with competitive behavior. The model is applied to a stylized version of the Italian electricity system and tested under varying levels of competition, market designs, and policy scenarios. Results highlight the critical role of market design for decarbonizing the electricity sector and avoiding price volatility. The proposed framework allows assessing long-term electricity markets in which multiple policy and market mechanisms interact simultaneously, with market participants responding and adapting to decarbonization pathways.

The online knapsack problem is a classic problem in the field of online algorithms. Its canonical version asks how to pack items of different values and weights arriving online into a capacity-limited knapsack so as to maximize the total value of the admitted items. Although optimal competitive algorithms are known for this problem, they may be fundamentally unfair, i.e., individual items may be treated inequitably in different ways. We formalize a practically-relevant notion of time fairness which effectively models a trade off between static and dynamic pricing in a motivating application such as cloud resource allocation, and show that existing algorithms perform poorly under this metric. We propose a parameterized deterministic algorithm where the parameter precisely captures the Pareto-optimal trade-off between fairness (static pricing) and competitiveness (dynamic pricing). We show that randomization is theoretically powerful enough to be simultaneously competitive and fair; however, it does not work well in experiments. To further improve the trade-off between fairness and competitiveness, we develop a nearly-optimal learning-augmented algorithm which is fair, consistent, and robust (competitive), showing substantial performance improvements in numerical experiments.

A service system may use the same categories to assign standard allocations and to check whether each service is fulfilled. Finer categories can match individual needs more closely, but they divide the observations available for monitoring. We study this conflict for a fixed menu from which participants select by declaring a category, with fulfilment assessed from each category's aggregate outcomes during a fixed period. We relate allocation loss to variation in preferred allocations within categories and identify conditions under which aggregate observations preserve the verification performance of individual records. For nested refinements under stated utility and observation assumptions, an allocation-loss tolerance and a per-category detection target define a feasibility band. Categories must be fine enough to provide suitable allocations but sufficiently populated to support verification. A source-dependent lower bound on declaration entropy and a minimum contributor requirement give necessary information and population constraints. For an explicit finite population with quadratic utility and binary service outcomes, we prove the exact feasible range across all categorical designs and exhibit designs attaining the information lower bound at specified tolerances. The results provide conditions for choosing categories jointly for allocation and verification.

In liberalised railway systems, operators must set prices dynamically in an environment with partial observability, as they retain private information about their objectives and performance, where regulatory constraints prohibit communication or direct information exchange between competitors to prevent explicit collusion. Consequently, agents must learn to infer strategic interactions only from observable market data which presents a significant challenge for multi-agent reinforcement learning, where standard approaches typically treat observations as unstructured vectors, ignoring the underlying market topology that governs strategic interactions. To address this, an entity graph modelling approach is proposed, which represents the environment as a graph of operational units, rather than decision-making agents or static infrastructure, encoding competition, coordination, and connectivity relations between entities. Then, an extension of the multi-agent twin delayed deep deterministic policy gradient algorithm with graph-based representation learning processes the features of the entities through a multi-layer relational graph convolutional network and aggregates them via a learnt attention mechanism. Experimental results in a rail pricing reinforcement learning environment show that this novel framework achieves higher revenue and stability in two different settings of increasing market complexity compared to a representative selection of relational and non-relational baselines. The code is publicly available at: https://github.com/Kinrre/RelationalRailPricing-RL

Diffusion models are often introduced from multiple perspectives, such as VAEs, score matching, or flow matching, accompanied by dense and technically demanding mathematics that can be difficult for beginners to grasp. One classic question is: how does the reverse process invert the forward process to generate data from pure noise? This article systematically organizes the diffusion model from a fresh Langevin perspective, offering a simpler, clearer, and more intuitive answer. We also address the following questions: how can ODE-based and SDE-based diffusion models be unified under a single framework? Why are diffusion models theoretically superior to ordinary VAEs? Why is flow matching not fundamentally simpler than denoising or score matching, but equivalent under maximum-likelihood? We demonstrate that the Langevin perspective offers clear and straightforward answers to these questions, bridging existing interpretations of diffusion models, showing how different formulations can be converted into one another within a common framework, and offering pedagogical value for both learners and experienced researchers seeking deeper intuition.

Score-based diffusion models generate samples from an unknown target distribution using a time-reversed diffusion process. While such models represent state-of-the-art approaches in industrial applications such as artificial image generation, it has recently been noted that their performance can be further improved by considering injection noise with heavy tailed characteristics. Here, I present a generalization of generative diffusion processes to a wide class of non-Gaussian noise processes. I consider forward processes driven by standard Gaussian noise with super-imposed Poisson jumps representing a finite activity Levy process. The generative process is shown to be governed by a generalized score function that depends on the jump amplitude distribution and can be estimated by minimizing a simple MSE loss as in conventional Gaussian models. Both probability flow ODE and SDE formulations are derived using basic technical effort. A detailed implementation for a pure jump process with Laplace distributed amplitudes yields a generalized score function in closed analytical form and is shown to outperform the equivalent Gaussian model in specific parameter regimes.

In this paper, we focus on quantifying model stability as a function of random seed by investigating the effects of the induced randomness on model performance and the robustness of the model in general. We specifically perform a controlled study on the effect of random seeds on the behaviour of attention, gradient-based and surrogate model based (LIME) interpretations. Our analysis suggests that random seeds can adversely affect the consistency of models resulting in counterfactual interpretations. We propose a technique called Aggressive Stochastic Weight Averaging (ASWA)and an extension called Norm-filtered Aggressive Stochastic Weight Averaging (NASWA) which improves the stability of models over random seeds. With our ASWA and NASWA based optimization, we are able to improve the robustness of the original model, on average reducing the standard deviation of the model's performance by 72%.

Systemic financial risk refers to the simultaneous failure or destabilization of multiple financial institutions, often triggered by contagion mechanisms or common exposures to shocks. In this paper, we present a dynamical model of bank leverage (the ratio of asset holdings to equity) a quantity that both reflects and drives risk dynamics. We model how banks, constrained by Value-at-Risk (VaR) regulations, adjust their leverage in response to changes in the price of a single asset, assumed to be held in fixed proportion across banks. This leverage-targeting behavior introduces a procyclical feedback loop between asset prices and leverage. In the dynamics, this can manifest as logistic-like behavior with a rich bifurcation structure across model parameters. By analyzing these coupled dynamics in both isolated and interconnected bank models, we outline a framework for understanding how systemic risk can emerge from seemingly rational micro-level behavior.