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BCCA	2003 BCCA 554	Skoreyko v. Skoreyko	2003-10-06T00:00:00	https://www.bccourts.ca/jdb-txt/ca/03/05/2003bcca0554.htm	2026-01-18T10:40:02.028000	2003BCCA0554 Court of Appeal for British Columbia Citation: Skoreyko v. Skoreyko, 2003 BCCA 554 Date: 20031006 Docket: CA030028 Between: Tracy Rosalie Skoreyko Appellant (Plaintiff) And Richard Mike Skoreyko Respondent (Defendant) Before: The Honourable Madam Justice Prowse The Honourable Madam Justice Ryan The Honourable Mr. Justice Thackray Oral Reasons for Judgment K.M. Birney Counsel for the Appellant W.K. Zimmerman Counsel for the Respondent Place and Date: Victoria, British Columbia October 6, 2003 [1] PROWSE J.A.: Ms. Skoreyko is appealing from the order of a chambers judge, made July 12, 2002, providing that Mr. Skoreyko pay spousal support to Ms. Skoreyko in the amount of $400 per month, commencing on August 1, 2002, and continuing on the first day of each and every month thereafter. [2] Ms. Skoreyko submits that the chambers judge misapprehended the evidence as to Mr. Skoreyko's income, gave too much weight to Mr. Skoreyko's debts and insufficient weight to his means, and failed to exercise his discretion judicially in making an award of spousal maintenance which was inadequate. [3] By way of background, the parties were married in 1978, separated for three years in 1987, resumed living together in 1990 and finally separated in 1993. The parties both worked at remunerative employment during the marriage and following their separation. They had no children. [4] Ms. Skoreyko petitioned for divorce in 1998. By that time the parties had been living independently for approximately five years. Subsequently, Ms. Skoreyko suffered a profound loss of vision in both of her eyes which ultimately led to her being dependent on a disability pension in the amount of $22,500 per year. She is now 46 years of age. [5] Mr. Skoreyko entered into another relationship following the separation, but that relationship had ended by the time of the chambers application. The chambers judge estimated Mr. Skoreyko's income at approximately $66,000 per year but noted that he had substantial debt. Most of that debt apparently related to a condominium Mr. Skoreyko owns, which is fully financed, and to a vehicle he bought, which he uses in his employment. The nature of his debt is set out in the materials. Mr. Skoreyko is 49 years of age. [6] The parties were divorced on February 5, 2001. The terms of the consent order of that date provided that Ms. Skoreyko would share in Mr. Skoreyko's pension, but that she would retain her RRSP investment in the amount of approximately $48,000. The parties had very little else by way of assets upon their separation. [7] The chambers judge reviewed the evidence before him and observed that this was a case which engaged the principles set forth by the Supreme Court of Canada in Bracklow v. Bracklow, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 420. He noted that the foundation for spousal support in this case was non-compensatory, and arose primarily from Ms. Skoreyko's financial need related to the onset of her physical disability following the separation. Based on an analysis of the Bracklow decision, and with particular reference to s. 15.2(6)(c) of the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.), the chambers judge concluded that Ms. Skoreyko was entitled to support based on the pattern of mutual economic dependency generated during the marriage, and the need to relieve against the economic hardship Ms. Skoreyko suffered as a result of the breakdown of the marriage. In the result, having regard to all of the circumstances, including, but not limited to, the length of the marriage, the length of the separation, the nature of the parties' relationship and the roles they played during the marriage, the fact that Ms. Skoreyko's disability arose five years after the parties had separated, and the respective financial circumstances of the parties, the chambers judge determined that an award of support in the amount of $400 per month for an indefinite duration was appropriate. [8] I have reviewed all of the materials which were before the chambers judge. I am not persuaded that he misapprehended the evidence relating to Mr. Skoreyko's finances or that he overemphasized Mr. Skoreyko's debts. Nor am I persuaded that he erred in determining the quantum of support. As Bracklow makes clear, cases of this nature are very difficult and, more importantly, are fact-driven. In this case, the chambers judge could have made an award for a greater amount of spousal support for a shorter period of time. Instead, he chose to make an award which would top up Ms. Bracklow's disability income over the long term. Despite the excellent submissions of counsel for Ms. Skoreyko, I am unable to conclude that the chambers judge erred in principle or otherwise in making his determination as to an appropriate award of spousal support on these facts. I would, therefore, dismiss the appeal. [9] RYAN J.A.: I agree. [10] THACKRAY J.A.: I agree. [11] PROWSE J.A.: The appeal is dismissed. [DISCUSSION WITH COUNSEL] [12] There is nothing extraordinary about this case that brings it outside of the normal rules of costs following the event. "The Honourable Madam Justice Prowse"	null	null	null	null	null	null	null	See upstream license, including non-commercial use and other restrictions: https://perma.cc/EA5C-R5DK. Note: This is an unofficial reproduction of a British Columbia Court of Appeal decision, without endorsement or affiliation by the British Columbia courts.
BCCA	2003 BCCA 563	R. v. S.L.	2003-10-24T00:00:00	https://www.bccourts.ca/jdb-txt/ca/03/05/2003bcca0563.htm	2026-01-18T10:38:03.831000	2003BCCA0563.htm COURT OF APPEAL FOR BRITISH COLUMBIA Citation: R. v. S.L., 2003 BCCA 563 Date: 20031024 Docket: CA031115 Between: Regina Respondent And S.L. (Youth Criminal Justice Act) Appellant Before: The Honourable Mr. Justice Esson The Honourable Mr. Justice Donald The Honourable Madam Justice Levine P.E. Briggs Counsel for the Appellant J. Duncan Counsel for the Respondent Place and Date of Hearing: Vancouver, British Columbia September 23, 2003 Place and Date of Judgment: Vancouver, British Columbia October 24, 2003 Written Reasons by: The Honourable Madam Justice Levine Concurred in by: The Honourable Mr. Justice Esson The Honourable Mr. Justice Donald Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Madam Justice Levine: Introduction [1] The appellant was convicted on February 17, 2003 under the Young Offenders Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. Y-1, as amended ("YOA"), of one count of aggravated assault contrary to s. 268(2) of the Criminal Code. He appeals his sentence of six months' imprisonment, imposed on July 17, 2003, under the Youth Criminal Justice Act, S.C. 2002, c. 1 ("YCJA"), which came into effect on April 1, 2003. [2] This is the first case in which this Court (and, to my knowledge, any appeal court in Canada) has been called upon to consider the sentencing provisions in the YCJA. [3] The YCJA emphasizes accountability, rehabilitation, reintegration of the young person into society, and most important in this appeal, alternatives to custodial sentences. These principles are foreshadowed in the following paragraph of the Preamble: AND WHEREAS Canadian society should have a youth criminal justice system that commands respect, takes into account the interests of victims, fosters responsibility and ensures accountability through meaningful consequences and effective rehabilitation and reintegration, and that reserves its most serious intervention for the most serious crimes and reduces the over-reliance on incarceration for non-violent young persons; [4] The question on this appeal is whether the trial judge properly considered the policy and principles of sentencing set out in the YCJA in sentencing the appellant to six months in custody. Background [5] The assault occurred on July 26, 2001, when the appellant was 17 years old. The evidence of the assault and the appellant's role in it came primarily from a statement made by the appellant to police. The trial judge ruled the statement to be admissible. The appellant did not testify at the trial. [6] The appellant had known the victim for years. He thought the victim had stolen money from him. The appellant, his mother and a group of friends went to confront the victim at his house. The appellant's mother swung a crutch at the victim, but did not make contact. One person in the group pushed the victim. The appellant picked up a rock and threw it at the victim, striking him on the head. [7] The appellant was asked by police: When you threw the rock at him, did you intend to, to, cause some, some damage to him, or was this kind of a, you know, a parting shot sort of thing, or what happened there? [8] He responded: Oh it was just like, I don't know, I just, threw it and you know, like, didn't mean like to do any damage. [9] He told the police he felt "pretty shitty" about what happened. He told the probation officer who prepared the pre-sentence report that "it was all so stupid; I should have just walked away; I'm sorry for hurting him that badly". [10] The victim suffered a skull fracture, for which emergency surgery was performed. In his victim impact statement, prepared October 11, 2001, the victim reported that ongoing physical effects of his injury have impaired his ability to work and reduced his sense of personal security and emotional well-being. [11] The results of a neuropsychological assessment, completed June 12, 2003, indicate that the victim's cognitive abilities have not changed substantially since the injury, but that there has likely been an increase in irritability, including "increased anger and a reduction in anger control". [12] The trial judge found: It would appear not only has he sustained a permanent physical injury that will affect him for the rest of his life, but that he has ongoing neuropsychological problems as a result of this aggravated assault. [13] The appellant was raised by his mother, who was a user of alcohol and drugs. He was in foster care from ages five through nine. His mother reported to a probation officer that the appellant was mentally abused by a foster parent. [14] The appellant has completed grade 11 and part of grade 12. He has had one job at a restaurant, between June and July 2001. He uses alcohol and marijuana regularly. [15] The appellant had a history of youth court offences prior to the assault. In 2000, he was convicted of possession of stolen property and sentenced to probation for six months with 30 hours of community work service. He breached his probation order and in 2001 was sentenced to six months probation and 15 hours of community work service. These terms were completed in August 2001. His probation officer commented that his "performance on probation was not satisfactory...a breach report has been submitted for failure to report...." [16] At the time of sentencing, in addition to having been convicted of aggravated assault, the appellant had pleaded guilty to two other charges: breach of probation between February 15 and May 26, 2001, and theft of $2.49 worth of merchandise from Zeller's on or about April 27, 2002. [17] The last offence was committed while the appellant was on bail following the assault on July 26, 2001, with the result that strict bail terms were imposed on August 12, 2002. He was subject to "house arrest" for 24 hours a day, except for being required to report to his probation officer daily from Monday to Friday. He complied with these conditions until sentencing on July 17, 2003. The trial judge gave him six months credit for this pre-sentencing period. The Sentencing Provisions of the YCJA [18] The "Declaration of Principle" of the YCJA sets out the "Policy For Canada With Respect To Young Persons" in s. 3. The sentencing provisions are in Part 4, including the purpose and principles of "youth sentences" in ss. 38 and 39. (These provisions are reproduced in Appendix A to these reasons for judgment. The comparable provisions, ss. 3 and 24, of the YOA, are included for convenience in Appendix B.) [19] These statements of policy, purpose and principles focus on accountability, rehabilitation, reintegration of the young person into society, and alternatives to custodial sentences. The YCJA prohibits the youth justice court from committing a young person to custody except in certain circumstances and contains multiple provisions requiring the youth justice court to consider sanctions other than custody. [20] The Declaration of Principle addresses accountability in ss. 3(1)(a)(iii), (b)(ii), (iv), (v), (c)(i), (ii), (iii). These principles provide that the youth justice system is intended to ensure that the consequences of an offence are meaningful to a young person and is to emphasize fair and proportionate accountability. Intervention is to be timely and prompt to reinforce the link between the offending behaviour and the consequences. The measures taken against young persons who commit offences should reinforce respect for societal values; encourage the repair of harm done to the victim and the community; and involve the young person's family, community and social agencies. [21] Sections 3(1)(a)(ii), (b)(i), and (c)(iii) emphasize rehabilitation and reintegration of the young person. [22] The comparable Policy in s. 3 of the YOA puts more emphasis on crime prevention, the protection of society and imposing responsibility on young persons for their offences (see R. v. J.J.M. (1993), 81 C.C.C. (3d) 487 at 492 (S.C.C.)). [23] Section 38, which sets out the purpose of sentencing under the YCJA, echoes the statements of principle in section 3, emphasizing accountability, "through the imposition of just sanctions that have meaningful consequences" and promoting "rehabilitation and reintegration into society, thereby contributing to the long-term protection of the public". [24] Sections 38(2)(a) through (c) state the principles of proportionality, reflecting the principle of fair and proportionate accountability as set out in s. 3. [25] Sections 38(2)(d) and (e)(i) address alternative sanctions, discouraging the imposition of custody and encouraging rehabilitation and accountability. Section 38(2)(d) provides that "all available sanctions other than custody that are reasonable in the circumstances should be considered". Section 38(2)(e)(i) requires that the sentence be the least restrictive that is capable of achieving the purpose set out in s. 38(1). Sections 38(2)(e)(ii) and (iii) require that the sentence be the one that is most likely to rehabilitate the young person, reintegrate him into society and promote a sense of responsibility and an acknowledgement of the harm done. [26] Section 38(3) requires the youth justice court to take into account various factors in sentencing, including the degree of participation of the young person in the commission of the offence; the harm done to victims and whether it was intentional and foreseeable; any reparation made by the young person; the time spent in detention; previous findings of guilt; and any other aggravating and mitigating circumstances relevant to the purpose and principles set out in s. 38. [27] Section 39 specifically addresses custodial sentences. Section 39(1) prohibits a youth justice court from sentencing a young person to custody unless one of four conditions is met: the young person has committed a violent offence; has failed to comply with non-custodial sentences; has committed an indictable offence for which an adult would be liable to imprisonment for a term of more than two years and has a history of findings of guilt under the YOA; or in exceptional cases the aggravating circumstances of an indictable offence are such that the imposition of a non-custodial sentence would be inconsistent with the purpose and principles set out in s. 38. [28] Under the YOA, the direction to the youth court with respect to custody was more general and emphasized the protection of society: see s. 24(1). [29] Section 39(2) requires the youth justice court to consider all reasonable alternatives to custody where any of the conditions in s. 39(1)(a) through (c) is met. A youth justice court must consider all available alternatives to custody raised at the sentencing hearing that are reasonable in the circumstances and determine that there is not a reasonable alternative or combination of alternatives that is in accordance with the purpose and principles set out in s. 38. Section 39(3) requires the youth justice court to consider submissions relating to available alternatives to custody; the likelihood that the young person will comply with a non-custodial sentence, taking into account previous compliance; and alternatives to custody that have been used in similar circumstances. [30] Section 39(5) prohibits a youth justice court from using custody as a substitute for appropriate child protection, mental health or other social measures. By comparison, under s. 24(1.1)(a) of the YOA, a youth court was required to take this principle into account, but was not prohibited from using a custodial sentence for these purposes. [31] Section 39(8) addresses the length of a custodial sentence. It directs a youth justice court to be guided by the purpose and principles of sentencing, and prohibits it from taking into consideration that part of the sentence may not be served in custody. [32] Section 39(9) requires a youth justice court that imposes a custodial sentence to state the reasons why it has determined that a non-custodial sentence is not adequate to achieve the purpose set out in s. 38(1), including, where applicable, why the case is an exceptional case under paragraph 39(1)(d). A similar requirement was imposed under s. 24(4) of the YOA. [33] Sections 42(2)(a) through (s) set out a wide range of alternative sanctions available to the sentencing judge. Sections 42(2)(n), (o), (q) and (r) deal with custodial sentences. The other alternatives include a reprimand, discharge, fine, restitution, community service and various supervisory sentences. Submissions at the Sentencing Hearing [34] Three alternative forms of sentence were raised in submissions on sentencing in this case: probation (provided for in s. 42(2)(k)); an "intensive support and supervision program" or "ISSP" (provided for in s. 42(2)(l)); and a "custody and supervision order" (provided for in s. 42(2)(n)). A custody and supervision order cannot exceed two years (three years if the offence is punishable under the Criminal Code or any other Act of Parliament by life imprisonment), and must provide that a period be served in custody and a second period - one-half as long as the first - be served under supervision in the community subject to conditions. [35] Crown counsel submitted that a custody and supervision sentence of six to twelve months - two thirds in custody and one third under supervision - was appropriate. [36] Defence counsel submitted that a custodial sentence was unwarranted and suggested that "six months to a year probation with relatively light terms would be more than sufficient", in light of the restrictive conditions of the appellant's bail with which he had complied for eleven months. [37] A pre-disposition report was prepared, describing the appellant's background and reaction to the offence. That report was updated after the YCJA came into effect. In the updated report, the probation officer referred to portions of ss. 38 and 39 of the YCJA. She specifically mentioned one of the factors s. 38(3) requires the court to take into account, "the harm done to the victims and whether it was intentional or reasonably foreseeable". She stated that a custodial sentence may be considered, describing the conditions in s. 39(1). She noted that the YCJA "specifies that the youth justice court consider available and appropriate sentencing alternatives...before imposing a custodial sentence", and suggested that the court may consider an ISSP to be suitable in this case. She advised that: "ISSP services could be provided [for the appellant] for a short, specific period of time." [38] Crown counsel referred to s. 38 of the YCJA in his submissions. He stated that the proportionality principles would be met by a term of imprisonment: it would not be greater than what an adult convicted of a similar offence would receive "where there has been what amounts to gratuitous violence of a horrendous nature", and it would be proportionate to the seriousness of the offence and the degree of the responsibility of the appellant. He stated that the probation officers "have looked at all available sanctions other than custody." He submitted that, "given the accused's failure to respond to even a reporting condition on probation,...a term of incarceration...is the least restrictive sentence that is capable of achieving a purpose". [39] Crown counsel submitted further that "nothing short of a period of incarceration" would achieve the object of promoting a sense of responsibility and an acknowledgement of the harm done to the victim and the community. He stated that rehabilitation would be achieved because "any programs that are available to him on probation are available to him in custody", and the supervisory portion of the sentence would serve to reintegrate the appellant back into society. [40] Defence counsel argued that the offence was not a case of gratuitous violence, or premeditated or predatory behaviour, but an act of "impulsive, unwise, youthful, bad judgment". He pointed out that the appellant expressed remorse at the time of the offence. He also noted that the appellant had complied with the strict conditions of his bail for eleven months. Reasons for Sentencing [41] The trial judge relied extensively on the reports of the probation officers, who suggested that he consider a custodial sentence. He referred to the outline in the report of the appellant's background and the nature of his upbringing and expressed concern about his alcohol and drug use. He quoted the probation officer's report of the appellant's comments expressing remorse and that the appellant had suggested that nine months of house arrest was a sufficient sanction for his actions. He noted the failures of the appellant to comply with previous probationary sentences, and defence counsel's submissions that his compliance with his bail terms should be taken into account. [42] The trial judge referred to the YCJA, noting that s. 38(3) invites the court to consider the harm done to the victim and whether the offence was intentional or reasonably foreseeable. He found that the offence was intentional or reasonably foreseeable and caused serious bodily harm. [43] The trial judge quoted the probation officer's comment concerning s. 39(1) of the YCJA. She suggested a custodial sentence may be considered to be appropriate because the offence met two of the conditions in s. 39(1) of the YCJA: the appellant was convicted of committing a violent offence and he committed an indictable offence for which an adult would be liable to receive a sentence of more than two years and had a "youth court justice history". [44] The trial judge found there was "some merit" in the suggestion of the probation officer that: The court may wish to declare this an exceptional case where the youth has committed an indictable offence and the aggravating circumstances are such that a non-custodial sentence would be inconsistent with the purposes and principles of sentencing set out in s. 38. He continued: [The appellant] was with a group of people who attended a residence [the victim] was visiting. They were looking to collect money or seek the return of money that allegedly was taken by [the victim] from the mother of the accused. [45] The trial judge quoted the portion of the probation officer's report where she discussed the requirement that the court consider appropriate sentencing alternatives to custody and the availability of an ISSP. [46] The trial judge concluded that he would have had "little hesitation" sentencing the appellant to a period of custody under the YOA. He observed that "different considerations apply" under the YCJA, but nevertheless, based on the appellant's background, the evidence, s. 38 and the aim of Parliament in relation to offences of this nature, determined that a custodial sentence was "entirely warranted". He again referred to the report of the probation officer which set out the circumstances in which a custodial sentence might be justified, and found it was justified in this case. [47] The trial judge stated that a sentence of one year was justifiable, but reduced the term in custody to six months, giving six months credit for the eleven months of house arrest. He added a term of probation for one year. Grounds of Appeal [48] The appellant appeals on the grounds that the trial judge failed to consider the provisions of the YCJA. He claims in particular that the trial judge erred: · in failing to fully consider and apply the provisions of the YCJA, and in particular ss. 38(1) and (2) which emphasize the rehabilitative provisions of the Act; · in failing to appreciate the meaningful consequences of the eleven months of house arrest; · in failing to find that a non-custodial sentence with appropriate terms could address the principles set out in ss. 38(1) to (3); · in failing to consider that the appellant could comply with a non-custodial disposition because he had complied with his bail terms; · in failing to give emphasis to the principle of the YCJA and case law that custody should be used as a last resort and that there were measures short of custody that could address the nature of the offence and the rehabilitation of the offender; · in failing to find pursuant to s. 38(2)(e) that a non-custodial disposition could meet the objectives of sentencing required under s. 39(1); · in failing to find that an intensive supervision order, as outlined by the youth worker, could have been imposed instead of custody, as provided for in s. 42(2)(l) of the YCJA; · in failing to find that the actions of the appellant were more akin to "youthful bad judgment"; · in failing to take into account the appellant's minimal youth court history and the absence of any violent offences; · in failing to take into account the appellant's remorse. [49] The appellant submits that the appropriate disposition was time spent in custody and a reduced period of probation, with an order that he participate in an intensive supervision program as directed by the Provincial Director. [50] Crown counsel summarizes the grounds of appeal as complaints about first, the range of sentence and second, the misapplication of the purposes and principles of sentencing under the YCJA. She points out that the standard of appellate review of a sentence under the YCJA is the same as on a sentencing appeal under the Criminal Code: the appeal is not a fresh sentencing proceeding and the sentencing judge's decision is entitled to great deference. This Court is entitled to intervene only if the trial judge erred in principle or the sentence is unfit. [51] Crown counsel submits that the sentence is fit for this offender in these circumstances and is within the range of available sentences under the YCJA. She also says that the trial judge properly considered the purpose and principles of sentencing set out in the YCJA: this was a violent offence; the appellant has a youth court record; the sentencing judge agreed with the probation officer who suggested there were aggravating circumstances such that a non-custodial sentence would be inconsistent with the purpose and principles of sentencing set out in s. 38. She maintains that the trial judge acknowledged the availability of alternative sentences by quoting from the report of the probation officer concerning an ISSP. Crown counsel submits that this would not be an appropriate case for a community-based disposition because the appellant committed this violent offence while on probation and committed other offences while awaiting trial for the aggravated assault. He admitted to smoking marijuana on a daily basis while under house arrest and was neither gainfully employed nor seeking employment. Analysis [52] In my view, in sentencing the appellant to a term of imprisonment, the trial judge did not give sufficient weight to the purpose and principles of sentencing set out in the YCJA, and in particular, the repeated mandatory directions not to sentence young persons to time in custody if there is any other available alternative. Nor did he give any, or adequate, consideration to the available alternatives that would meet the purpose and principles of sentencing in this case. [53] The trial judge accepted the probation officer's analysis of the provisions of the YCJA as they applied to this case, without analysis or comment, in particular with respect to the alternative of an ISSP. It is an error in principle, in my opinion, not to comply with the specific directions in the YCJA that require a youth justice court to consider all available alternatives to custody and state the reasons why the suggested non-custodial alternative was not adequate and would not meet the purpose set out in s. 38 of making the appellant accountable for the offence and promote his rehabilitation and reintegration into society, thereby contributing to the protection of the public. [54] In my opinion, the evidence did not support the trial judge's conclusion that the harm done to the victim was "intentional and foreseeable". The appellant's statement to police concerning throwing the rock, the only evidence of his intention, was that he "just threw it and...didn't mean to do any damage." The trial judge appeared to place great significance on the fact that the appellant was part of a group that went to the victim's residence to collect a debt, implying that the act of throwing the rock and harming the victim was in some manner premeditated. He did not consider, however, that the appellant did not take a weapon with him and there was no evidence that the appellant was involved in any direct confrontation with the victim. [55] Defence counsel provided the Court with two cases in which far more aggravating circumstances were characterized as "youthful bad judgment". In R. v. J.C., [1998] B.C.J. No. 969 (Y.C.)(QL), the accused removed a knife from a sheath stored in his sock and stabbed the victim in the back during a fight. The victim suffered a punctured lung. The action of the accused in carrying the knife was premeditated. The trial judge accepted the accused's statement overheard by police that he could not believe he had stabbed someone as supporting "the theory that this was something done in the heat of the moment". The trial judge distinguished J.C. on the grounds that the trial judge in that case found the fight to be consensual. [56] In R. v. H.(A.) (1991), 65 C.C.C. (3d) 116 (B.C.C.A.), [1991] B.C.J. No. 1019 (C.A.)(QL), (not cited to the trial judge), the appellant stabbed the victim in the chest during a fight. McEachern C.J.B.C (as he then was) agreed with the trial judge that the offence was committed with "dreadful deliberateness" in the sense that the appellant removed the knife from his pocket with some difficulty, partly opened the blade and actually stabbed the victim in the chest. Nonetheless, the Chief Justice found that "however horrible, [the incident] was still youthful bad judgment in the heat of a tragic moment." [57] The incidents in these cases were far more aggravating than the appellant's spontaneous act of picking up and throwing the rock in this case. Yet the trial judge appears to have concluded that the fact that the appellant was part of a group that went to the victim's house to collect a debt made this case an "exceptional case" for the purpose of s. 39(1)(d), where the aggravating circumstances are such that a non-custodial sentence would be inconsistent with the purpose and principles of sentencing set out in s. 38. In so concluding, in my opinion the trial judge imposed a sentence that was disproportionate to the seriousness of the offence and the responsibility of the offender. [58] The trial judge expressed concern about the appellant's use of alcohol and drugs, suggesting that he needed "intensive assistance" with a substance abuse problem and other problems in his background. In concluding that a custodial sentence was appropriate to address those mental health or social problems, he failed to heed the direction in s. 39(5). [59] In summary, the trial judge erred in law and in principle in failing to fully consider and apply the purpose and principles of sentencing set out in ss. 38 and 39 of the YCJA. This is new legislation that places increased emphasis on non-custodial sentences for young persons. It is incumbent on trial judges to adhere to the directions in the statute and state the reasons for not imposing a non-custodial sentence. (For two examples of carefully considered reasons for judgment under the YCJA see R. v. C.L.D., [2003] B.C.J. No. 1286 (P.C.)(QL) and R. v. T.E.F., [2003] B.C.J. No. 1558 (P.C.)(QL)). [60] A fit sentence in all of the circumstances would have been one of the alternatives to custody raised at the sentencing hearing, either an ISSP or a period of probation. The appellant had no history of violent offences and he had complied with the strict conditions of his bail for eleven months. He expressed remorse for his act and acknowledged the terrible consequences to the victim. On the evidence, throwing the rock was properly characterized as an act of bad judgment rather than as an act intended to cause harm to the victim. The appellant's problems of substance abuse and his background, and finding programs to assist him with further education and employment, could be addressed by appropriate terms and conditions of an ISSP or probation, such as the terms imposed by the trial judge for the one year of probation to follow the period in custody. [61] In addition to the time spent under house arrest between August 12, 2002 and July 17, 2003, the appellant has been in custody since sentencing on July 17, 2003, for an offence that occurred on July 26, 2001. The lapse of time between the offence and sentencing contradicts the principles that intervention should be timely and prompt (see s. 3(1)(b)(iv) and (v)). [62] Adding together the period of house arrest and the time he has spent in custody, the appellant has been severely sanctioned for this offence. Nonetheless, I am of the opinion that a term of probation following his release from custody will assist the appellant with his rehabilitation and reintegration into society. Conclusion [63] I would grant leave to appeal the sentence, allow the appeal, and vary the sentence to time served in custody, plus one year of probation on the terms and conditions imposed by the trial judge. "The Honourable Madam Justice Levine" I AGREE: "The Honourable Mr. Justice Esson" I AGREE: "The Honourable Mr. Justice Donald" APPENDIX A Youth Criminal Justice Act, S.C. 2002, c. 1 DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLE Policy for Canada with respect to young persons 3. (1) The following principles apply in this Act: (a) the youth criminal justice system is intended to (i) prevent crime by addressing the circumstances underlying a young person's offending behaviour, (ii) rehabilitate young persons who commit offences and reintegrate them into society, and (iii) ensure that a young person is subject to meaningful consequences for his or her offence in order to promote the long-term protection of the public; (b) the criminal justice system for young persons must be separate from that of adults and emphasize the following: (i) rehabilitation and reintegration, (ii) fair and proportionate accountability that is consistent with the greater dependency of young persons and their reduced level of maturity, (iii) enhanced procedural protection to ensure that young persons are treated fairly and that their rights, including their right to privacy, are protected, (iv) timely intervention that reinforces the link between the offending behaviour and its consequences, and (v) the promptness and speed with which persons responsible for enforcing this Act must act, given young persons' perception of time; (c) within the limits of fair and proportionate accountability, the measures taken against young persons who commit offences should (i) reinforce respect for societal values, (ii) encourage the repair of harm done to victims and the community, (iii) be meaningful for the individual young person given his or her needs and level of development and, where appropriate, involve the parents, the extended family, the community and social or other agencies in the young person's rehabilitation and reintegration, and (iv) respect gender, ethnic, cultural and linguistic differences and respond to the needs of aboriginal young persons and of young persons with special requirements; and (d) special considerations apply in respect of proceedings against young persons and, in particular, (i) young persons have rights and freedoms in their own right, such as a right to be heard in the course of and to participate in the processes, other than the decision to prosecute, that lead to decisions that affect them, and young persons have special guarantees of their rights and freedoms, (ii) victims should be treated with courtesy, compassion and respect for their dignity and privacy and should suffer the minimum degree of inconvenience as a result of their involvement with the youth criminal justice system, (iii) victims should be provided with information about the proceedings and given an opportunity to participate and be heard, and (iv) parents should be informed of measures or proceedings involving their children and encouraged to support them in addressing their offending behaviour. Act to be liberally construed (2) This Act shall be liberally construed so as to ensure that young persons are dealt with in accordance with the principles set out in subsection (1). PART 4 SENTENCING Purpose and Principles Purpose 38. (1) The purpose of sentencing under section 42 (youth sentences) is to hold a young person accountable for an offence through the imposition of just sanctions that have meaningful consequences for the young person and that promote his or her rehabilitation and reintegration into society, thereby contributing to the long-term protection of the public. Sentencing principles (2) A youth justice court that imposes a youth sentence on a young person shall determine the sentence in accordance with the principles set out in section 3 and the following principles: (a) the sentence must not result in a punishment that is greater than the punishment that would be appropriate for an adult who has been convicted of the same offence committed in similar circumstances; (b) the sentence must be similar to the sentences imposed in the region on similar young persons found guilty of the same offence committed in similar circumstances; (c) the sentence must be proportionate to the seriousness of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the young person for that offence; (d) all available sanctions other than custody that are reasonable in the circumstances should be considered for all young persons, with particular attention to the circumstances of aboriginal young persons; and (e) subject to paragraph (c), the sentence must (i) be the least restrictive sentence that is capable of achieving the purpose set out in subsection (1), (ii) be the one that is most likely to rehabilitate the young person and reintegrate him or her into society, and (iii) promote a sense of responsibility in the young person, and an acknowledgement of the harm done to victims and the community. Factors to be considered (3) In determining a youth sentence, the youth justice court shall take into account (a) the degree of participation by the young person in the commission of the offence; (b) the harm done to victims and whether it was intentional or reasonably foreseeable; (c) any reparation made by the young person to the victim or the community; (d) the time spent in detention by the young person as a result of the offence; (e) the previous findings of guilt of the young person; and (f) any other aggravating and mitigating circumstances related to the young person or the offence that are relevant to the purpose and principles set out in this section. Committal to custody 39. (1) A youth justice court shall not commit a young person to custody under section 42 (youth sentences) unless (a) the young person has committed a violent offence; (b) the young person has failed to comply with non-custodial sentences; (c) the young person has committed an indictable offence for which an adult would be liable to imprisonment for a term of more than two years and has a history that indicates a pattern of findings of guilt under this Act or the Young Offenders Act, chapter Y-1 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1985; or (d) in exceptional cases where the young person has committed an indictable offence, the aggravating circumstances of the offence are such that the imposition of a non-custodial sentence would be inconsistent with the purpose and principles set out in section 38. Alternatives to custody (2) If any of paragraphs (1)(a) to (c) apply, a youth justice court shall not impose a custodial sentence under section 42 (youth sentences) unless the court has considered all alternatives to custody raised at the sentencing hearing that are reasonable in the circumstances, and determined that there is not a reasonable alternative, or combination of alternatives, that is in accordance with the purpose and principles set out in section 38. Factors to be considered (3) In determining whether there is a reasonable alternative to custody, a youth justice court shall consider submissions relating to (a) the alternatives to custody that are available; (b) the likelihood that the young person will comply with a non-custodial sentence, taking into account his or her compliance with previous non-custodial sentences; and (c) the alternatives to custody that have been used in respect of young persons for similar offences committed in similar circumstances. Imposition of same sentence (4) The previous imposition of a particular non-custodial sentence on a young person does not preclude a youth justice court from imposing the same or any other non-custodial sentence for another offence. Custody as social measure prohibited (5) A youth justice court shall not use custody as a substitute for appropriate child protection, mental health or other social measures. Pre-sentence report (6) Before imposing a custodial sentence under section 42 (youth sentences), a youth justice court shall consider a pre-sentence report and any sentencing proposal made by the young person or his or her counsel. Report dispensed with (7) A youth justice court may, with the consent of the prosecutor and the young person or his or her counsel, dispense with a pre-sentence report if the court is satisfied that the report is not necessary. Length of custody (8) In determining the length of a youth sentence that includes a custodial portion, a youth justice court shall be guided by the purpose and principles set out in section 38, and shall not take into consideration the fact that the supervision portion of the sentence may not be served in custody and that the sentence may be reviewed by the court under section 94. Reasons (9) If a youth justice court imposes a youth sentence that includes a custodial portion, the court shall state the reasons why it has determined that a non-custodial sentence is not adequate to achieve the purpose set out in subsection 38(1), including, if applicable, the reasons why the case is an exceptional case under paragraph (1)(d). APPENDIX B Young Offenders Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. Y-1 DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLE Policy for Canada with respect to young offenders 3. (1) It is hereby recognized and declared that (a) crime prevention is essential to the long-term protection of society and requires addressing the underlying causes of crime by young persons and developing multi-disciplinary approaches to identifying and effectively responding to children and young persons at risk of committing offending behaviour in the future; (a.1) while young persons should not in all instances be held accountable in the same manner or suffer the same consequences for their behaviour as adults, young persons who commit offences should nonetheless bear responsibility for their contraventions; (b) society must, although it has the responsibility to take reasonable measures to prevent criminal conduct by young persons, be afforded the necessary protection from illegal behaviour; (c) young persons who commit offences require supervision, discipline and control, but, because of their state of dependency and level of development and maturity, they also have special needs and require guidance and assistance; (c.1) the protection of society, which is a primary objective of the criminal law applicable to youth, is best served by rehabilitation, wherever possible, of young persons who commit offences, and rehabilitation is best achieved by addressing the needs and circumstances of a young person that are relevant to the young person's offending behaviour; (d) where it is not inconsistent with the protection of society, taking no measures or taking measures other than judicial proceedings under this Act should be considered for dealing with young persons who have committed offences; (e) young persons have rights and freedoms in their own right, including those stated in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms or in the Canadian Bill of Rights, and in particular a right to be heard in the course of, and to participate in, the processes that lead to decisions that affect them, and young persons should have special guarantees of their rights and freedoms; (f) in the application of this Act, the rights and freedoms of young persons include a right to the least possible interference with freedom that is consistent with the protection of society, having regard to the needs of young persons and the interests of their families; (g) young persons have the right, in every instance where they have rights or freedoms that may be affected by this Act, to be informed as to what those rights and freedoms are; and (h) parents have responsibility for the care and supervision of their children, and, for that reason, young persons should be removed from parental supervision either partly or entirely only when measures that provide for continuing parental supervision are inappropriate. Act to be liberally construed (2) This Act shall be liberally construed to the end that young persons will be dealt with in accordance with the principles set out in subsection (1). DISPOSITIONS Conditions for custody 24. (1) The youth court shall not commit a young person to custody under paragraph 20(1)(k) unless the court considers a committal to custody to be necessary for the protection of society having regard to the seriousness of the offence and the circumstances in which it was committed and having regard to the needs and circumstances of the young person. Factors (1.1) In making a determination under subsection (1), the youth court shall take the following into account: (a) that an order of custody shall not be used as a substitute for appropriate child protection, health and other social measures; (b) that a young person who commits an offence that does not involve serious personal injury should be held accountable to the victim and to society through non-custodial dispositions whenever appropriate; and (c) that custody shall only be imposed when all available alternatives to custody that are reasonable in the circumstances have been considered. Pre-disposition report (2) Subject to subsection (3), before making an order of committal to custody, the youth court shall consider a pre-disposition report. Report dispensed with (3) The youth court may, with the consent of the prosecutor and the young person or his counsel, dispense with the pre-disposition report required under subsection (2) if the youth court is satisfied, having regard to the circumstances, that the report is unnecessary or that it would not be in the best interests of the young person to require one. Reasons (4) Where the youth court makes a disposition in respect of a young person under paragraph 20(1)(k), the youth court shall state the reasons why any other disposition or dispositions under subsection 20(1), without the disposition under paragraph 20(1)(k), would not have been adequate.	null	null	null	null	null	null	null	See upstream license, including non-commercial use and other restrictions: https://perma.cc/EA5C-R5DK. Note: This is an unofficial reproduction of a British Columbia Court of Appeal decision, without endorsement or affiliation by the British Columbia courts.
BCCA	2003 BCCA 562	R. v. Gustavson	2003-10-09T00:00:00	https://www.bccourts.ca/jdb-txt/ca/03/05/2003bcca0562.htm	2026-01-18T10:39:28.640000	2003BCCA0562 COURT OF APPEAL FOR BRITISH COLUMBIA Citation: R. v. Gustavson, 2003 BCCA 562 Date: 20031009 Docket: CA030521; CA030538; CA030850; CA031174 Between: Regina Respondent (Applicant) And Orville John Gustavson Appellant (Respondent) Before: The Honourable Mr. Justice Lambert The Honourable Madam Justice Huddart The Honourable Mr. Justice Mackenzie Oral Reasons for Judgment Appellant appearing in person W. Bansley M.A. Barker Counsel for the (Crown) Respondent Place and Date: Vancouver, British Columbia October 9, 2003 [1] LAMBERT, J.A.: These are four separate appeals, each brought by Mr. Gustavson from orders in relation to habeas corpus. It is easiest to identify them by the Court of Appeal numbers. [2] On CA31174, Mr. Gustavson, who is present in court in person, described a conversation that he had in late September with a member of the staff of the Court of Appeal Registry. He says that he understood that that appeal was not to be heard this morning and, in consequence, he has not brought in the documents that are necessary for him to make his case if he is given leave to refer to those documents as fresh evidence. In view of that submission, it seems that there may have been a misunderstanding about which matters were to be on the list this morning. In consequence, I would adjourn CA31174 to a date to be set between the Crown and Mr. Gustavson and the Registry subject only to this, that it should not be brought on before but should be brought on with the bulk of the arguments to be made by Mr. Gustavson on CA30521 and CA30538, to which I will come in a moment. [3] The second appeal which I would like to deal with is CA30850. We are told by counsel for the Crown that that purports to be an appeal from a decision of Mr. Justice Curtis made in New Westminster on a habeas corpus application made by Mr. Gustavson. We are told by counsel for the Crown that Mr. Justice Curtis simply adjourned the habeas corpus application and perhaps has adjourned it several times since. We are told that is now due to be heard on November 12. [4] Since no order has yet been made by Mr. Justice Curtis, there is no basis for an appeal and, accordingly, I would order that the application and the appeal under CA30850 be struck out as revealing no basis for appeal. That, of course, would be without prejudice to any rights Mr. Gustavson may have after Mr. Justice Curtis has made a decision. (discussion with the appellant) [5] LAMBERT, J.A.: To revert to my reasons, I turn now to CA30521 and CA30538. These are two separate appeals in relation to habeas corpus applications. They raise a number of points that Mr. Gustavson wants to make. The Crown says that the appeals are frivolous and vexatious and wholly without merit and should be struck out for that reason. [6] Part of the basis for the appeal is that the rejection of the habeas corpus applications occurred after a hearing by a Supreme Court judge where Mr. Gustavson was not present and was not given an opportunity to be present, whereas counsel for the Crown was given an opportunity to be present and was given an opportunity to argue orally that the applications were wholly without merit. [7] We understand that there has been a practice of dealing with habeas corpus applications in the first instance in that way and we were referred to the reasons of Madam Justice Ryan in Woodhouse v. William Head Institution [1999] B.C.J. No. 1604. Madam Justice Ryan refers to R. v. Olsen (1968), 63 W.W.R. 446 (B.C.S.C.) and to ex parte Johnson (1969), 4 C.C.C. 223 (B.C.C.A.). [8] In my opinion, the question of the compliance with the rules of natural justice and the principle of audi alteram partem implicit in that practice merit reconsideration. For that reason I would order the appointment of counsel to be retained and remunerated through the Legal Services Society to argue a preliminary point on behalf of Mr. Gustavson on these two appeals solely in relation to the question of whether the practice of holding a hearing in which Crown counsel make submissions on questions of law and the applicant is not entitled to be present is a practice in accordance with the principles of natural justice, or whether either both should be allowed to be present in person or by counsel or, alternatively, neither should be allowed to be present in person or by counsel at that preliminary stage, with both being entitled to make submissions in writing on the preliminary question of whether the application is entirely devoid of merit. [9] Only after that point has been argued and decided would it be possible for this Court to consider properly the decisions in CA30521, CA30538 and CA31174. I would contemplate that they would be adjourned until this preliminary question has been argued by the counsel that I would appoint. [10] I would not regard this division of the court as seized of any of the deferred questions to which I have referred because it would be too cumbersome to bring this division together whenever the convenient time arises to have these questions argued. I would also add that Mr. Gustavson has said that on the question on which counsel would be appointed he would like to exercise his right to instruct counsel in person. He has been informed by the Court that if counsel were appointed then we would understand that Mr. Gustavson would have the right to talk directly to counsel and give him his instructions in relation to that question. [11] I would dispose of the four separate appeals that are before the Court this morning in the way I have described. [12] HUDDART, J.A.: I agree. [13] MACKENZIE, J.A.: I agree. [14] LAMBERT, J.A.: The four appeals are disposed of in accordance with those reasons. (discussion with counsel and appellant) [15] LAMBERT, J.A.: Mr. Gustavson has raised the name of Garth Barriere as being counsel that he would be satisfied with for whatever the Legal Services Society would like to make of that. "The Honourable Mr. Justice Lambert"	null	null	null	null	null	null	null	See upstream license, including non-commercial use and other restrictions: https://perma.cc/EA5C-R5DK. Note: This is an unofficial reproduction of a British Columbia Court of Appeal decision, without endorsement or affiliation by the British Columbia courts.
BCCA	2003 BCCA 561	R. v. S.A.M.	2003-10-09T00:00:00	https://www.bccourts.ca/jdb-txt/ca/03/05/2003bcca0561.htm	2026-01-18T10:39:26.171000	2003BCCA0561 COURT OF APPEAL FOR BRITISH COLUMBIA (In the Matter of the Young Offenders Act) Citation: R. v. S.A.M., 2003 BCCA 561 Date: 20031009 Docket: CA030644 Between: Regina Respondent And S. A. M. Appellant Before: The Honourable Mr. Justice Lambert The Honourable Madam Justice Huddart The Honourable Mr. Justice Mackenzie Oral Reasons for Judgment L. Worth Counsel for the Appellant F. Tischler Counsel for the (Crown) Respondent Place and Date: Vancouver, British Columbia October 9, 2003 [1] HUDDART, J.A.: On 16 January 2003, the appellant, a 17-year old young offender, pled guilty to assault, two counts of credit card fraud, and one count of use or possession of a stolen credit card. [2] On 16 August 2002, he had exchanged words with a 12-year old neighbour riding his bicycle in a park. The appellant grabbed the younger boy's shirt, causing him to fall to the ground and suffer a serious head injury. Defence counsel explained the credit card offences were in aid of the appellant's drug addiction. The goods the appellant acquired by using the stolen credit cards were recovered. [3] On 5 February 2003 the trial judge sentenced the appellant to 21 days open custody to be served concurrently on all counts, plus time served of 21 days. The period of custody was to be followed by six months probation. He also ordered, without reasons, the collection, analysis, and retention, of the appellant's DNA. [4] The DNA order is the subject of this appeal. The appellant asks this court to set it aside and direct the destruction of the sample collected because it was neither necessary nor appropriate. [5] Section 487.051(1)(b) of the Criminal Code permits a trial judge who has convicted a young person of assault to authorize the taking of samples of bodily substances for the purpose of forensic DNA analysis "if the court is satisfied that it is in the best interests of the administration of justice to do so." When deciding whether to make such an order, s. 487.051(3) requires the trial judge to "consider the criminal record of the young person, the nature of the offence and the circumstances surrounding its commission and the impact such an order would have on the young person's privacy and security of the person." It also requires the trial judge to give reasons. [6] When Crown counsel applied for the DNA order, the trial judge asked defence counsel if he had any objection to the application. Counsel replied "a mild one." Anticipating a submission that the appellant was a young offender, who had turned his life around, who should not be required to give a DNA sample, Crown counsel made submissions based on R. v. M.(I.R.) 2002 BCSC 1746. [7] In M.(I.R.) Grist J. granted a DNA order on appeal that the Youth Court judge had denied because the young offender was turning his life around and because of the impact on the his privacy and security. The designated offence, as in this case, was common assault. The young offender's record resembled that of the appellant. [8] In reaching his conclusion, Grist J. noted that the legislation provided for the destruction of youth offenders' DNA samples and profiles after the same time periods stipulated for currency of youth records where there are no intervening convictions: five years after sentence completion in the case of indictable offences, and three years after sentence completion in the case of summary conviction offences. He did not see the recent changes in the young offender's life, or the extended privacy right afforded young offenders, as sufficient to found a reasonable basis for refusing the DNA order that would usually be in the interests of the administration of justice. [9] Following Crown counsel's submissions on sentence, defence counsel advised the sentencing judge that the appellant was "mildly opposed" to the DNA order because he felt his "privacy interests outweigh the need to take a DNA sample." [10] Crown counsel acknowledges the trial judge's error in failing to give reasons for making the DNA order. He asks this Court to determine afresh whether to impose the DNA order, and not to remit the matter to the authorizing judge with directions that he provide reasons for his order, nor to remit the matter to the Youth Court. Defence counsel agrees for practical reasons. [11] The Criminal Code provides for an appeal in s.487.054, but does not provide a remedy. This court has not addressed the issue of remedy directly. However, in R. v. Ku, (2002), 169 C.C.C.(3d) 535 (B.C.C.A.), where the constitutional validity of s. 487.052 was at issue, this Court did consider the matter afresh. In that case the trial judge erred by making a DNA order without providing defence counsel with the opportunity to make submissions. Because of that unfairness, this Court examined the order for correctness following full submissions. In doing so, this Court followed the approach the Courts of Appeal of Ontario, Alberta, and Manitoba had taken. [12] In R. v. Hendry (2001), 161 C.C.C.(3d) 275 the Ontario Court of Appeal considered five Crown appeals from decisions refusing DNA orders. At para. 12, Mr. Justice Rosenberg enunciated his view of the court's power on appeal: the Criminal Code is silent on the powers of the appellate court in dealing with an appeal from the decision concerning a DNA data bank order. Parliament could not have intended to provide a right of appeal, yet give the appellate court no power to correct the errors through an appropriate remedy. The appeal court must at least have the power to make the order that should have been made by the trial court. It may be that the appellate court also has the power to remit the matter back to the trial court. I would consider this a highly unusual order, involving as it would additional time and expense. [13] Less than a month later and without the benefit of the reasoning in Hendry, supra, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal found good reason to remit the matter to the trial court for a new hearing on the merits: R. v. Murrins (2002), 162 C.C.C. (3d) 412. Madam Justice Bateman explained at para. 110: In the absence of statutorily mandated reasons, I cannot conclude that there has been no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice. To apply s. 686(1)(b)(iii), here, would completely remove the effect of the legislative requirement for reasons in s. 487.052(2) of the Code. [14] She continued, at para. 111, to explain that not only had the trial judge not provided reasons, but his rationale was not discernible from his comments made during the hearing. Thus, the appeal court was unable to say what criteria the judge considered in arriving at his decision to make a DNA order, nor that he considered, at a minimum, the mandatory statutory criteria. [15] A few months later the Alberta Court of Appeal was called upon to consider the denial of an application for a DNA order in R. v. North (2002), 165 C.C.C.(3d) 393. The trial judge had not given reasons for declining the Crown's application. The court considered the failure to give reasons to be an error that required a remedy. At para. 37, after a brief reference to Murrins, supra, the court explained why it was granting a different remedy: In this case, we conclude that the appropriate remedy is for this court to consider the matter afresh, and render an appropriate decision. The issues were argued before the court and the relevant facts are not disputed. Thus, this court is in as good a position as the sentencing judge to decide the issue. [16] Last fall, the Manitoba Court of Appeal considered the same question. The sentencing judge did not provide reasons for refusing to make an order under s. 487.051(1)(b). The Court adopted the Alberta and Ontario approach. Thus, it considered afresh whether a DNA order should be made. In so doing it followed the reasoning of Weiler J.A. in R. v. Briggs (2001), 157 C.C.C.(3d) 38 (Ont.C.A.) and adopted the admonition of Rosenberg J.A. in Hendry, supra, that, in the case of an adult offender, it would usually be in the best interests of the administration of justice for the judge to make the DNA order for a secondary designated offence. It made the order because there was nothing in the case that took the accused outside of the "ordinary case." [17] Late last year the Ontario Court of Appeal affirmed its approach in R. v. Young [2002] O.J. No. 4359. The trial judge had erred in refusing to make the order on the sole basis that the offence had been committed before the Criminal Code provisions came into force. The Crown asked the court to consider the requisite factors and make an order. The respondent submitted the matter should be remitted to the trial judge because he did not have the opportunity to present relevant evidence. The court was not persuaded the evidentiary record was incomplete. The defence had notice of the Crown's intention to make the DNA application and had not sought to have any evidence led on it. The court commented that it was incumbent on a respondent to establish a basis for remitting the matter to the trial judge by way of fresh evidence. The admissibility of that evidence would be governed by the principles in R. v. Joanisse (1995), 102 C.C.C. (3d) 35 (Ont.C.A.), leave to appeal refused, [1996] S.C.C.A. No. 347. The Court then made the order because the evidence in support of it was "overwhelming. [18] I agree generally with the approach of the Ontario Court of Appeal to a remedy on appeal. If the record is complete and such that an appellate court is in as good a position as the sentencing judge to make a determination, I can see no reason why it should not consider the matter afresh and decide whether a DNA order should be made. Because counsel agree that is so in this case, I would accede to their request that we consider whether a DNA order should be made in this case. [19] In Ku, supra, at para. 45, this court agreed with the approach taken by Rosenberg, J.A. in Hendry, supra, at para. 18: The legislation offers significant protections against misuse of the DNA profile information, thus minimizing an improper intrusion into the offender's privacy. Having been convicted of a designated offence, the offender already has a reduced expectation of privacy. In the ordinary case of an adult offender the procedures for taking the sample have no, or at worst, a minimal impact on the security of the person. Thus, in the case of an ordinary adult offender there are important state interests served by the DNA data bank and few reasons based on privacy and security of the person for refusing to make the order. [20] Defence counsel sought to distinguish Hendry and Ku on the basis that the appellant is a young offender who is remorseful for the injury he caused unintentionally and dealing successfully with the drug addiction at the root of his property offences. In her view, a DNA order is neither necessary nor appropriate for a young offender. She submitted the proper approach would be that of the civil libertarians, to begin with the premise that young offender is entitled to be free of state intervention into his privacy and security of the person. She would have this court deny a DNA order because no intention to injure was established. [21] I am not persuaded to that view. The circumstances of this offence were not trivial, even if the appellant did not appreciate the consequences that befell his victim. Assault causing bodily harm is a primary designated offence for which a DNA order is mandatory, yet intention is not required. While the appellant avoided a conviction for that offence by the Crown's acceptance of his plea of guilty to a lesser and included offence of common assault, it is common ground that the circumstances of the offence are to be considered in assessing whether a DNA order should be made. This appellant caused serious bodily harm, however unthinkingly, to a younger boy the record establishes he had bullied on previous occasions. [22] The appellant's youth record includes previous convictions for breaking and entering in June 2001, for assault and possession of a weapon in November 2001, and for three breaches of probation in March 2002, as well as the current offences. While he expressed remorse for the assault and a determination to control his drug addiction, he was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon as an adult on 20 January 2003, while on bail awaiting sentence on the current offences. He is now facing a charge of assault of a female person in May 2003 and a charge of failing to appear with regard to that charge on 27 May 2003. A warrant for his arrest is currently outstanding. [23] The nature of the assault and this criminal record require, in my view, a DNA order. In the circumstances of this case there is little to place in the balance, other than the community's concern reflected in the special provision for a young offender with regard to primary designated offences, that a young offender be treated more leniently in appropriate cases than an adult offender. I see nothing in the record in the case of this 17-year old offender to merit any leniency. [24] Consequently I would affirm the order made by the sentencing judge. [25] LAMBERT, J.A.: I agree. [26] MACKENZIE, J.A.: I agree. [27] LAMBERT, J.A.: The order of the sentencing judge is affirmed. "The Honourable Madam Justice Huddart"	null	null	null	null	null	null	null	See upstream license, including non-commercial use and other restrictions: https://perma.cc/EA5C-R5DK. Note: This is an unofficial reproduction of a British Columbia Court of Appeal decision, without endorsement or affiliation by the British Columbia courts.
BCCA	2003 BCCA 560	Valera-Perez v. Berthelet	2003-10-23T00:00:00	https://www.bccourts.ca/jdb-txt/ca/03/05/2003bcca0560.htm	2026-01-18T10:38:17.127000	2003BCCA0560.htm COURT OF APPEAL FOR BRITISH COLUMBIA Citation: Valera-Perez v. Berthelet, 2003 BCCA 560 Date: 20031023 Docket: CA030961 Between: Monica Eugenia Valera-Perez Respondent (Plaintiff) And Robert A. Berthelet Appellant (Defendant) Before: The Honourable Madam Justice Southin (In Chambers) R. A. Berthelet appearing in person M. E. Valera-Perez appearing in person Place and Date of Hearing: Vancouver, British Columbia 30th June, 4th July, 8th July, 2003 Place and Date of Judgment: Vancouver, British Columbia 23rd October, 2003 Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Madam Justice Southin: [1] There came before me on 30th June, 2003, this application: TAKE NOTICE that a without notice application will be made on behalf of the Appellant/Defendant to the presiding Justice in Chambers at The Law Courts, 800 Smithe Street, in the City of Vancouver, in the Province of British Columbia, at 9:30 a.m. on Monday, June 30, 2003 for: 1. Directions as to whether leave is required to appeal the Order of the Honourable Mr. Justice Curtis made June 24, 2003 pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction of this Honourable Court; 2. An Order pursuant to Section 9 of the Court of Appeal Rules that the Appellant be granted a stay of the Order of the Honourable Mr. Justice Curtis made June 24, 2003 or in the alternative, a stay of execution of the Order of the Honourable Mr. Justice Curtis made June 24, 2003 pending appeal; [2] At the time, the applicant did not have, and so far as I know, it has never become available, the order of Curtis J. drawn up, signed by him and entered, but what appeared to be concerning the applicant was a provision that he pay by way of support for the child of the parties extraordinary expenses beyond, according to him, his ability to pay. [3] As it did not seem to me appropriate for the applicant's application to be heard ex parte, I stayed what appeared to be the term of the order in issue and required the applicant to give notice. [4] Because I was unable, when the parties first appeared before me on 4th July, 2003, to discern, although I was shown a draft in the possession of the respondent, whether the order complained of was final or interlocutory, I obtained the file from the New Westminster Registry. That file included the chambers sheets but I was not the wiser from reading them. [5] I was therefore driven to requesting of the Associate Chief Justice that he make inquiries from Mr. Justice Curtis as to what had happened. I attach a copy of his response for which I am most grateful. [6] Pending receiving a response to my request, I issued this memorandum dated the 7th July, 2003, to the Deputy Registrar of this Court: This matter is on the list before me for Tuesday, 8th July. I have been unable to sort out the proceedings even though I requested the Supreme Court file and have had it before me. Would you therefore please inform these litigants on Tuesday and give to each a copy of this memorandum and its attachment that this matter will be adjourned generally until I can get to the bottom of it. When I am able to get to the bottom of it, the application for a stay will be reset. In the meantime, proceedings on the order below are stayed upon the condition that on the first day of each month the defendant will pay to the plaintiff as a contribution to the support of these children the sum of $700 per month in lieu of all other amounts specified in the order. The payment is to be made on the first of each month beginning with 1st August. [7] Subsequently, on the 1st August, 2003, I asked the Registrar of this Court to communicate further with the parties by way of this memorandum: Would you please communicate with the parties to this appeal, by giving to each a copy of this memorandum and its attachment, as follows: As I was uncertain from the Supreme Court file exactly what had occurred in that court, I made inquiry of the Honourable Associate Chief Justice, who in turn made inquiry of the Honourable Mr. Justice Curtis. The Honourable Mr. Justice Curtis has responded to that inquiry and I attach a copy of his memorandum which fills in the "gaps" in the file. If either party has an understanding of the events in the Supreme Court different from that of the Honourable Mr. Justice Curtis, he or she should so inform me within two weeks. If the order pronounced 24th June has now been drawn up and entered, a copy should be forwarded to me. I also need to know whether Ms. Valera-Perez or Mr. Berthelet considers that the order of 24th June is a final order. In other words, what do the parties expect in the way of having a trial? [8] Mr. Berthelet has now replied to me that he considers the order pronounced below to be interlocutory rather than final. [9] I have come to the conclusion that the order in issue is not a final order and therefore leave is required. [10] As no application for leave is before me, the applicant, if he wishes to pursue an appeal in this Court, must bring not only the application for leave but also an application for an extension of time. [11] I should say, however, for the benefit of the parties, that it seems highly improbable to me that any judge of this Court would give leave, bearing in mind that Mr. Justice Curtis has expressly given leave to Mr. Berthelet to apply concerning the reasonableness of the extraordinary expenses upon his filing an affidavit setting out his current financial circumstances. [12] The order for a stay, which I pronounced on 7th July, 2003, is vacated. [13] No costs to either party of this application. "The Honourable Madam Justice Southin"	null	null	null	null	null	null	null	See upstream license, including non-commercial use and other restrictions: https://perma.cc/EA5C-R5DK. Note: This is an unofficial reproduction of a British Columbia Court of Appeal decision, without endorsement or affiliation by the British Columbia courts.
BCCA	2003 BCCA 56	Workshop Holdings v. CAE Machinery Ltd.	2003-01-28T00:00:00	https://www.bccourts.ca/jdb-txt/ca/03/00/2003bcca0056.htm	2026-01-18T11:03:31.758000	2003BCCA0056 Citation: Workshop Holdings v. CAE Machinery Ltd. Date: 20030128 2003 BCCA 56 Docket: CA029172 COURT OF APPEAL FOR BRITISH COLUMBIA BETWEEN: WORKSHOP HOLDINGS LTD. APPELLANT (Plaintiff) AND: CAE MACHINERY LTD., formerly known as CAE SUMNER LTD., formerly known as CANADIAN SUMNER IRON WORKS LIMITED RESPONDENT (RESPONDENT) AND: ATTORNEY GENERAL OF BRITISH COLUMBIA INTERVENOR Before: The Honourable Madam Justice Rowles The Honourable Madam Justice Huddart The Honourable Madam Justice Levine D.F. McCrimmon Counsel for the Appellant R.S. Anderson & T.M. Tomchak Counsel for the Respondent G. Morley & N. Brown Counsel for the Intervenor, Attorney General of B.C.. Place and Date of Hearing: Vancouver, British Columbia 28-30 October 2002 Place and Date of Judgment: Vancouver, British Columbia 28 January 2003 Written Reasons by: The Honourable Madam Justice Huddart Concurred in by: The Honourable Madam Justice Rowles The Honourable Madam Justice Levine TABLE OF CONTENTS Background 3 The Position of the Parties 7 Judicial Consideration 9 Legislative History 18 Discussion 28 APPENDIX A (Excerpts from the Waste Management Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 482 and Contaminated Sites Regulation, B.C. Reg. 375/96) 37 APPENDIX B (Excerpts from the U.S. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act) 55 APPENDIX C (Excerpts from Saskatchewan Environmental Management and Protection Act, S.S. 1983-84, c. E-10.2, s. 13(3)): 56 Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Madam Justice Huddart: Background [1] This appeal requires this Court to interpret a provision found in Part 4 of the Waste Management Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 482, giving a cause of action to a person who has incurred remediation costs in cleaning up a contaminated site. The particular question to be answered is whether a manager's final determination under s. 26.4 that a site is contaminated is a statutory prerequisite to a cost recovery claim under s. 27(4). [2] Section 27(4) provides: any person, including, but not limited to, a responsible person and a manager, who incurs costs in carrying out remediation at a contaminated site may pursue in an action or proceeding the reasonably incurred costs of remediation from one or more responsible persons in accordance with the principles of liability set out in this Part. [3] The appeal is from an order dismissing the appellant's action to recover costs it incurred in remediating a site. The reasons of the trial judge can be found at [2001] B.C.J. No. 2179 (S.C.) [Q.L.], 2001 BCSC 1470. In No. 158 Seabright Holdings Ltd. et al v. Imperial Oil Limited-Compagnie Petroliere Imperiale Ltee. et al, [2001] B.C.J. 1922 (S.C.) [Q.L.]; 2001 BCSC 1330, the trial judge refused similar relief to the two defendants. Appeals from his orders were heard together with this appeal (CA29081 and CA29082). [4] For ease of reference the relevant provisions of Part 4 of the Act and the Contaminated Sites Regulation, B.C. Reg 375/96 are set out in Appendix A to these reasons. For the purposes of this appeal, a brief summary of the facts will suffice. [5] The respondent, CAE, is alleged to have operated an iron and brass foundry at 1216 - 1224 East Pender Street, Vancouver, B.C. between 1924 and 1949. Subsequent owners of that property incorporated Workshop in 1997 to develop the site into commercial strata titles. Section 26.1 of the Act requires any person seeking approval for a subdivision of land that has been used for industrial or commercial activity to provide a site profile to the approving officer, and in some circumstances to the Regional Waste Manager. Workshop retained an environmental consulting firm to carry out a site investigation and prepare a site history. Copper and zinc pollution was found, likely caused by the dumping of those components of brass when the foundry was operated on the site. [6] Faced with the need to remediate this pollution in order to develop its property, Workshop considered its options under the Act. It saw two possible avenues to remediation: the independent remediation route or the administrative route. [7] On the independent remediation route permitted by s. 28, it could acknowledge the site was contaminated, take responsibility for the cleanup, seek an approval in principle from the manager under s. 27.6 of the Act, clean up the site, obtain a certificate of compliance, develop it, and subsequently bring a cost recovery action against other responsible persons under s. 27(4). Workshop saw no requirement along the independent remediation route for a final determination by the manager under s. 26.4(2) or (3) that the site was contaminated. It would, however, have understood its claim was subject to an application for minor contributor status by any responsible person, and to the manager's power to intervene in the process in a variety of ways. [8] To the extent the manager agreed, Workshop could avoid being forced to comply with the alternate administrative process it saw as designed to enable the manager to effect remediation fairly by way of an order to responsible persons under s. 27.1(1) in circumstances where neither the current owner nor anyone else was willing to accept responsibility for remediation. The absence of fair process from the previous regulatory mechanism (then s. 22 of the Act, now s. 31) was criticized in Imperial Oil v. British Columbia (Regional Waste Manager) (1998), 51 B.C.L.R. (3d) 93 (S.C.). [9] For business reasons, Workshop chose to remediate independently in co-operation with the Waste Management Branch so it could obtain an approval in principle for its remediation plan, and, ultimately a certificate of compliance. It did not seek, nor did the manager suggest, a final determination under s. 26.4(2) or (3). However, the manager did give the site a contaminated site designation and number and list it in the Contaminated Sites Registry on 3 February 1998, after granting approval in principle in January 1998, in compliance with his duty under s. 26.3 of the Act. By that approval, the manager was authorizing implementation of a "remediation plan for a contaminated site." Under the scheme of the Act, that authorization would be valid only for the use specified in the remediation plan. Workshop carried out the remediation, first informing CAE of this work in April 1998, after it had been completed. On 22 July 1998, the Assistant Regional Waste Manager issued a certificate of compliance under s. 27.6(2) of the Act. [10] He did not make a formal determination that the site was contaminated under s. 26.4 of the Act. However, in a letter dated 18 January 2001 to counsel for Workshop, he wrote, " despite the absence of a determination, site investigation information submitted to the ministry in 1997 and 1998 indicated that the site was contaminated at that time." [11] On 12 March 1999, Workshop commenced its cost recovery action under s. 27(4) claiming $119,000.00 from CAE as costs of remediation for which it is responsible. CAE applied by way of summary trial under Rule 18A for an order dismissing the action on the primary ground that the manager had not made the prior determinations of a "contaminated site" and "responsible person" required by s. 26.4, and the corollary ground that CAE had not received the notice prior to those determinations that would have permitted it to comment on a preliminary contaminated site determination under s. 26.4(2) and to appeal the final determination, whether made under s. 26.4(2) or (3), to the Environmental Appeal Board under s. 26.4(5). The Position of the Parties [12] The respondent maintains the statutory cause of action is available only if a final determination of a contaminated site is first obtained. In its view, any person who chooses to remediate independently under s. 28 is precluded from seeking contribution from third parties under s. 27(4). According to this interpretation, a person in the position of the appellant, who accepts responsibility as an owner of land and remediates under s. 28, may look only to the common law for a remedy against an earlier polluter. The respondent finds support for this position in three decisions: Swamy v. Tham Demolition Ltd. (2000), 81 B.C.L.R. (3d) 293, 2000 BCSC 1253 (Swamy No. 1); Beazer East Inc. v. British Columbia (Environmental Appeal Board) (2000), 84 B.C.L.R. (3d) 88, 2000 BCSC 1698; and Swamy v. Tham Demolition Ltd. 2001 BCSC 551 (Swamy No. 2), as well as the trial judge's reasons in this matter. [13] In contrast, Workshop considers the Legislature intended s. 27(4) to provide a private remedy independent of the administrative process that underlies a manager's power to issue a remediation or pollution abatement order. It finds support for its position in O'Connor v. Fleck (2000), 79 B.C.L.R. (3d) 280, the first decision considering s. 27(4), and in Seabright, supra. [14] For his part, the Attorney General agrees with Workshop's submission that a court has concurrent and complementary jurisdiction to make a finding that a site is contaminated. He notes that jurisdiction is subject to the doctrine of issue estoppel, as most recently explained in Danyluk v. Ainsworth Technologies Inc., [2001] 2 S.C.R. 460, 2001 SCC 44. If a final determination were a prerequisite to a cause of action under s. 27(4), it would also be a prerequisite to an approval in principle and certificate of compliance under s. 27.6. In such event, counsel for the Attorney submits, Clancy J. would have correctly found in Seabright, supra, that the assistant regional manager had made a final determination [under s. 26.4(3)], although he may not have been aware he was doing so and thus failed to fulfil his obligations under s. 26.4(2)(e) and (f). Responsibility for that error would fall to the manager, not deprive the appellant of a cause of action. The same inference would be open in this case. Judicial Consideration [15] In O'Connor, supra, D. Smith J. ordered a tenant to pay an owner of property compensation for the cost of remediating pollution on the site where the tenant had operated an aluminium and brass foundry under s. 27(4) of the Waste Management Act, as an alternative to damages for the breach of express covenants in the lease. The court's jurisdiction to make an order where the manager had not made a final determination of a contaminated site was not challenged. [16] In Beazer, supra, Tysoe J. reviewed an order of the Environmental Appeal Board varying a manager's order to remediate pollution at the site of a wood treatment business. The manager's order had named Beazer as a responsible person by virtue of being a "producer," as well as a "previous owner" and "operator." The Board concluded Beazer was not a "producer" but otherwise confirmed the order. Mr. Justice Tysoe concluded the Board had erred in finding Beazer to be a "previous owner," but upheld its decision not to set aside the remediation order as against Beazer because it was a "previous operator." In his discussion of the appropriate standard of review, he noted at para. 46 of his reasons that in an action under s. 27(4) to allocate the costs incurred to comply with the remediation order, a court would be required to determine the identity of the responsible persons. [17] That comment accords with the view expressed by the Environmental Appeal Board at pp. 38 and 39 of its reasons in Beazer East Inc. v. Assistant Regional Waste Manager (29 March 2000), No. 98WAS-01(b) (B.C.Env.App.Bd.) that a manager need not name all responsible persons in a remediation order, and that any person "may pursue the reasonably incurred costs of remediation from one or more responsible persons at a later date through a cost recovery action." That a cost recovery action will necessarily follow remediation under a manager's order says nothing about the issue on this appeal. [18] However, Justice Tysoe's comment that a court will have to determine the responsible persons in order to allocate responsibility among them for the costs of remediation is equally applicable to a cost recovery action following any remediation, and one would have thought, obvious from the words of s. 26.4(2) and s. 27(4). Justice Clancy expressed a similar view at para. 37 of his reasons in Seabright, supra: [19] Hunter J. [in Swamy No. 1] cannot be taken to have said that the court has no power to determine who are the persons responsible for the costs of remediation. Section 27(4) contemplates just such a finding. It refers to the pursuit of reasonably incurred costs of remediation from one or more responsible persons. Section 25 defines who are responsible persons. That section is not restricted to persons found to be responsible by the manager. [20] Sensibly, the respondent has abandoned the position it took at trial, that the court did not have the jurisdiction to determine who are responsible persons. [21] In both Swamy cases, one decided before and one after the Beazer case, the court concluded its role was restricted to the allocation of the costs of remediation after it had been determined the site was contaminated. A party could not thwart the administrative process by bringing a cost recovery claim without first obtaining a final determination under s. 26.4(2) or (3). [22] Before making a final determination of contamination under s. 26.4(2), the manager would have to make a preliminary determination (s. 26.4(2)(a)), give written notice to any person known to him or her who might be a responsible person (s. 26.4(2)(b)), and provide that person with an opportunity to comment on the preliminary determination (s. 26.4(2)(c)). After making the final determination he would be required to give written notice to the same people (s. 26.4(2)(e)(iv)), who would be able to appeal the determination under Part 7 of the Act (s. 26.4(5)). [23] Under s. 26.4 (3), the manager could dispense with the procedures under s. 26.4(2)(a) to (c) and move directly to a final determination if requested to do so by a person who agreed to be a responsible person for the contaminated site. In that event, he would be required to give written notice of his final determination to any person known to him to be a responsible person as defined by s. 26.5. [24] Influenced by an article by D. Belevsky and C. Tollefson, "Bill 26 Arrives" (1997), 55 The Advocate 185, an article by W. Braul "Liability Features of Bill 26" 4 Journal of Environmental Law & Practice 139, R. v. Consolidated Maybrun Mines Ltd., [1998] 1 S.C.R. 706, Ontario Hydro v. Kelly et al. (1998), 39 O.R. (3d) 107 (Gen.Div.), and Derivative Services Inc. v. Investment Dealers Assn. of Canada, [1999] O.J. No. 5307 (Gen.Div.) [Q.L.], Hunter J. in Swamy No. 1, supra, held the court could not determine any issue that fell within the jurisdiction of the Waste Management Branch, as a specialized administrative body. At para. 41 of his reasons for judgment he wrote that, as with the Ontario Environmental Protection Act being considered in Maybrun, the B.C. Waste Management Act was intended: to be set up as a "complete procedure, independent of any right to apply to a superior court for review, in order to ensure that there would be a rapid and effective means to resolve any disputes that might arise between the Director and the persons to whom an order is directed." Accordingly, the Waste Management Branch must be allowed to deal with issues within the Act's jurisdiction if the system is to be effective, rather than allow Ms. Swamy to seek from the court an independent determination of the issues that fall under the Act's jurisdiction. [25] Madam Justice Stromberg-Stein agreed in Swamy No. 2, supra. She also noted at para. 25 of her reasons that the truncated procedure under s. 26.4(3) Ms. Swamy used to obtain a final determination her property was a contaminated site could not be used to "thwart procedural fairness and the principles of natural justice." She went on to suggest that "it would be prudent" for anyone wishing a final determination "binding on others" to follow the procedure set out in s. 26.4(2) to ensure procedural fairness. [26] Because Ms. Swamy had not undertaken remediation before either decision, these holdings are obiter dicta. Moreover, the reasoning in these decisions was influenced by, if not predicated on, the doctrine of collateral attack, as enunciated in Maybrun, supra. That doctrine applies where an administrative order has been made, as it was in Beazer, supra. However, by way of extrapolation, the doctrine has been helpful to courts called upon to consider issues of deference to the jurisdiction of tribunals more generally, as Kelly and Derivative Services, suprae, illustrate. It is less helpful in considering a statutory scheme that provides a role for the judicial process by creating a new civil cause of action under which a remediator has the right to recover in a court. Nevertheless, the principles that underlie the doctrine are important, that a court's interpretation and application of any statutory scheme should advance not hobble the integrity of the scheme and that a legislature's intention as to who should decide what is to be respected. [27] Perhaps because Beazer, supra, concerned a manager's remediation order, that clearly required a determination of contamination under s. 26.4, and the Swamy cases concerned a claim to recover costs in advance of remediation, a remedy clearly not provided in the Act, the courts did not consider how independent remediation procedures or voluntary remediation agreements with the manager, might fit within their analyses of the statutory scheme the Legislature enacted to identify and remediate contaminated sites at the polluter's expense. [28] Section 27.4(1) authorizes a manager to enter a voluntary remediation agreement with a person who agrees to be a "responsible person" under the Act. That voluntary agreement discharges the responsible person's further liability for the contamination. In effect, this procedure permits the fixing of a person's contribution to the remediation of a site. By s. 39(3) of the Contaminated Sites Regulation, B.C. Reg. 375/96, the manager must notify any persons identified as other potential responsible persons and allow those persons not less than 15 days to give notice if they wish to review or make representations about any proposed voluntary remediation agreement. [29] Section 28 permits a responsible person to carry out "independent remediation" upon notice to a manager when starting, and within 90 days of completing remediation, "whether or not a determination has been made as to whether the site is a contaminated site" (s.28(1)(a)), "whether or not a remediation order has been issued with respect to the site" (s. 28(1)(b)), or "whether or not a voluntary remediation agreement has been entered into" (s.28(1)(c)). It also authorizes the manager to issue an approval in principle and certification of compliance to a responsible person who wants to remediate independently. [30] Without mentioning either s. 27.4 or s. 28, Mr. Justice Ralph considered the interpretation of s. 27(4) by Hunter and Stromberg-Stein JJ. binding on him and thus on Workshop. In his reasons for judgment, he noted that Workshop did not undertake the remediation process to thwart the administrative procedure, had obtained an approval in principle and certificate of compliance, and had completed the remediation, but did not consider those differences sufficient to distinguish the Swamy cases. He saw an action without a final determination under s. 26.4 as taking away from potentially responsible persons not only the procedural protection provided by that section, but in addition, the opportunity to seek the appointment of an allocation panel under s. 27.2, and to request a minor contribution finding under s. 27.3. It is not clear from his reasons why he concluded a potentially responsible person could not take advantage of these provisions. Nothing in the Act precludes their use. Nor does there seem to be a practical impediment to recourse to them. If a defendant in a cost recovery action considers that action is interfering with its request for an allocation panel's advisory opinion or with a manager's designation of a minor contributor status, a stay of the action pending the receipt of such opinion or decision could provide appropriate relief. [31] In Seabright, supra, Clancy J. integrated the independent remediation procedure with the cost recovery provisions of the Act, while accepting the proposition that a final determination of a contaminated site was a precondition to private action under s. 27(4), by holding that such determination did not have to be made explicitly by government officials. He inferred from the manager's decision to grant an approval in principle for Workshop's remediation plan and a certificate of compliance that the site was contaminated and, therefore, refused CAE's application for dismissal of the cost recovery action. [32] With this history of judicial consideration of Part 4 of the Act, it is not surprising the Canadian Bar Association lobbied the government for clarification of its intention in enacting that part of the Act. That lobbying effort resulted in the Waste Management Amendment Act, 2002. The amendments will limit the reach of these reasons, and make this case of only historical interest. They are consistent with the decision of Clancy J. in Seabright, supra. However, no party to this appeal or to the Seabright appeals suggested the provisions of the Waste Management Amendment Act, 2002 amending Part 4 of the Act may have any effect on this appeal. I agree this is the effect of s. 4 of the Interpretation Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 238, in the absence of any assertion the amendments have retroactive or retrospective effect. [33] Before I turn to a consideration of the Act as it was before the 2002 amendments, it will be useful to review briefly its history and comparable Canadian legislation. Legislative History [34] The current waste management regime finds it origins in the Pollution-control Act, S.B.C. 1956, c.36. That statute established the Pollution-control Board, empowered to set pollution levels and to issue orders with a view to controlling water pollution. The bones of that administrative decision-making regime remained in place for 30 years, although the Act was amended several times, before the substantial changes with which this case is concerned were introduced in 1993. The intervening changes reflect a growing concern with the environment. [35] In 1967, the Legislature transferred responsibility for the Act from the Ministry of Municipal Affairs to the newly created Ministry of Environment. Three years later, the Act was made binding on the Crown and its scope was extended to include air and land pollution by the Pollution Control, 1967 (Amendment) Act, S.B.C. 1970, c. 36. The first cost recovery system for government was introduced 10 year later in 1977. The Minister was authorized to take immediate clean-up action in the event of an emergency and then recoup the costs by filing a certificate of costs in the Supreme Court. [36] In 1982, the Legislature amalgamated the Litter Act and the Pollution Control Act into the new Waste Management Act, S.B.C. 1982, c. 41. Two of the Bills stated rationales were the promotion of the identification, control, and storage of special wastes and the enhancement of spill prevention and disclosure mechanisms. (Hansard, 14 June 1982, p.8172). Other innovations included the imposition of strict liability for unauthorized discharge of pollution as well as a decentralized permit process. [37] The Waste Management Amendment Act, 1987, S.B.C., c. 51 created a Waste Management Fund to be used for environmental clean-up necessitated by inadequate closure of waste management facilities, and long-term care and maintenance of waste management facilities. The Minister could recover expenditures upon filing a certificate of costs in the Supreme Court, if the Court found the expenditure was not excessive or unnecessary. The Minister of Environment described the Bill's purpose this way: This bill will emphasize the need for greater care and control of special wastes, and the spill or escape of special wastes from such care and control could be subject to penalty even if pollution was not determined to have occurred. (Hansard, 25 June 1987, p.2029) [38] Enforcement mechanisms under the Act as it was in 1987 were entirely administrative. The manager could cancel or suspend permits and approvals under s. 23 (now s. 36), seek a restraining order from the court under s. 24 (now s. 37), or make a pollution abatement order under s. 22 (now s. 31). [39] The Waste Management Amendment Act, 1990, S.B.C. 1990, c. 74, introduced the first mention of a contaminated site to the Act: 7. where a contaminated site has been remediated to the satisfaction of a manager, the manager may issue a certificate of compliance [40] The Waste Management Amendment Act, 1993, S.B.C. 1993, c. 25, Part 4, built on that small beginning to create a statutory scheme to encourage identification and remediation of contaminated sites, and to allocate the financial burden that purpose would entail. Opposition by industry and business to the proposed changes led to a comprehensive external review with stakeholders before the amendments were declared in force on 1 April 1997. [41] Fundamental to the new scheme were three principles: absolute liability, retroactivity, and joint and several liability, all in aid of the underlying governmental policy of "polluter-pay," to which the Minister referred on first reading (Hansard, 19 May 1993, p. 6423). To permit public notice, a contaminated site registry was created, and as the Minister explained on second reading (Hansard, 8 June 1993, p.6946-7): The proposed amendments will maintain the principle that the polluter pays, but introduce fair and consistent administrative processes. An important feature of this bill is that it establishes an orderly process for the assessment and cleanup of contaminated sites. These amendments introduced consistency and fairness of process, which does not currently exist . There are also provisions to encourage voluntary and independent remediation of contaminated sites by responsible parties. [42] The amendments drew on United States Superfund legislation, The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, enacted in 1980 in response to the Love Canal scandal and intended to address U.S. contaminated sites. The U.S. statute also provided for absolute, retroactive joint and several liability; designated current or past owners or operators of contaminated sites as well as transporters as potentially responsible persons; and created a private cause of action: Ruth Crowley and Fred Thompson, Retroactive Liability, Superfund and the Regulation of Contaminated Sites in British Columbia, (1995) 29 U.B.C.L.Rev. 87-116, online Q.L. (JOUR) at paras. 5-7. [43] As with the Superfund legislation, the basic idea of Part 4 is that sites become contaminated over many years of use by many different users. The policy underlying the new scheme is to strive to hold those who benefited economically from that contamination responsible for its remediation. [44] As Professors Tollefson and Belevsky noted at p. 58 of their final report "External Review of Remediation Liability Provisions: The Waste Management Amendment Act, 1993" (31 July 1996), online: http://wlapwww.gov.bc.ca/epd/epdpa/ contam_sites/reports/external_review.html, traditional common law analysis was thought insufficient to allocate the costs of pollution remediation properly. Limitation periods were considered to pose a significant barrier to the recovery of damages at common law for historical pollution. Contract analysis focuses only on current and immediately previous owners of a site. Negligence imposes a burden on those bringing an environmental action to establish causation as well as the failure to meet the appropriate standard of care. This is a difficult burden when contamination is the result of the activities of many businesses over many years. At page 60, they noted that the principle of retrospectivity is important to ensure the net can be cast sufficiently widely to capture all previous polluters, not just the current or penultimate owners or operators of the land. [45] In these reasons I shall use the word "retroactive" because that is the word the Legislature used in s. 27(4). In doing so I should not be taken as expressing any opinion as to whether liability under that provision is retroactive or retrospective. That question was not before us. [46] The concepts of absolute and joint and several liability facilitate actions against alleged polluters, make recovery of damages from multiple defendants more likely, and remove the burden of proving causation or fault-based conduct. [47] In words the appellant would approve, District Court Judge Edward Weinfeld wrote of the comparable Superfund private cause of action (for its relevant provisions see Appendix B) in New York v. Exxon Corp. (1986, SD NY) 633 F Supp 609 at paras. 6 and 7: The private recovery provisions of the statute ... assure an incentive for private parties, including those who may themselves be subject to liability under the statute, to take a leading role in cleaning up hazardous waste facilities as quickly as possible. He went on to conclude that governmental approval or expenditure is not a condition precedent to the bringing of a private action under the statute because: to require private parties to await governmental approval would be to restrict the overall national effort to the volume of activity which the federal government could centrally supervise, and this would defeat the Act's basic intent. [48] In the same vein, District Judge Highsmith wrote in Marriott Corp. v. Simkins Industries Inc. (1993, SD Fla) 825 F Supp 1575 at para. 2: The shift in the regulation [as a result of a 1990 amendment] from agency to private party responsibility reinforces the prevailing judicial view that government approval prior to initiation of private action is not required Therefore, the Court concludes that Marriott did not need to obtain governmental approval prior to filing this private cost recovery action. [49] These authorities suggest the harnessing of market forces for environmental clean-up was the object of the inclusion of s. 27(4) in Part 4. But that is not the sole object of the contaminated sites provisions. Part 4 gives managers the statutory power to issue remediation orders to persons he determines are "responsible persons" and to enter into voluntary agreements with persons who acknowledge they are "responsible persons" under the Act for "contaminated sites," as well as providing the private cause of action so private parties will have an incentive not to pollute and to remediate when they do so. It does not create a fund for remediation of all types of contaminated sites, although it permits the Crown to remediate on its own account and collect from the polluters, either by certificate or by an action under s. 27(4). [50] The twin pillars of absolute liability and joint and several liability are not new to Canadian environmental legislation. Absolute liability provisions are found in the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. A-12, s. 7.(1); Fisheries Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-14, s. 42.(4) and the Clean Environment Act, S.N.B. 2002, c. C-6, s. 34. Joint and several liability provisions are contained in the Fisheries Act, supra, s. 42.(1) and (3); Environmental Protection Act, R.S.N.W.T., 1988, c. E-7, s. 16(2) and the Environmental Protection Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.19, s. 99(8). [51] The principle of retroactivity is more controversial. However, provisions with retroactive or retrospective effect can be found in other Canadian environmental legislation. For example, a proposed amendment in Bill 72, An Act to amend the Environment Quality Act and other legislative provisions with regard to land protection and rehabilitation, 2nd Session, 36th Leg., Quebec, 2002, s. 2 allows the Minister of Environment, when land contamination is "...likely to adversely affect the life, health, safety, welfare or comfort of human beings, other living species or the environment in general, or to be detrimental to property..." to issue an order for a "rehabilitation plan" against "any person or municipality that, -- even before the coming into force of this section, had emitted, deposited, released or discharged all or part of the contaminants or had allowed the contaminants to be emitted, deposited, released, or discharge..." Another example is the "responsible persons" provision of Manitoba's The Contaminated Sites Remediation Act, C.C.S.M., c. C205, s. 9(1). Subsections (b) and (d) refer respectively to "a person who was an owner or occupier of the site at a time when the contamination occurred or at any time thereafter" and "a person who owned or had possession, charge or control of a contaminant of the site immediately before or at the time of its release." [52] Similarly, statutory causes of action for damages suffered as a result of pollution are found in other Canadian environmental legislation. Section 42(3) of the federal Fisheries Act, supra, permits licensed commercial fishers to bring civil actions against owners or those who have the "charge, management or control" of a "deleterious substance" that has been "deposited in waters frequented by fish." A private cost recovery action is set out in s. 15(3) of Saskatchewan's Bill 71 Environmental Management and Protection Act, 2002, 3rd Session, 24th Leg., Saskatchewan, 2002 for unauthorized discharges which cause "loss or damage", including pecuniary loss. However, I have been unable to locate any provision comparable to s. 27(4) of the Act in any other Canadian legislation. It appears that only British Columbia has created a cause of action specific to contaminated sites. [53] With that review as background, I turn to the task at hand. Discussion [54] The ultimate question on this appeal is whether the Legislature intended to permit cost recovery actions without a final determination of contamination under s. 26.4 when it enacted s. 27(4) as part of the legislative scheme to identify and remediate contaminated sites contained in the contaminated site remediation provisions in Part 4 of the Act and the Contaminated Sites Regulation, B.C. Reg. 375/96. [55] This task of interpretation requires an analysis of that legislation following the principle mandated by the Interpretation Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 238, s.8: 8. Every enactment must be construed as being remedial, and must be given such fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objects. That principle accords with the rule of statutory interpretation most recently affirmed in Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, 2002 SCC 42 at para. 26, from Elmer Driedger's Construction of Statutes (2nd ed. 1983): Today there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament. [56] The first consideration must be the words of the Act, in this case of Part 4 because that Part encapsulates the entire scheme for the identification and remediation of contaminated sites. [57] An owner of land who learns that his land may be contaminated in the course of an investigation for the purpose of sale or development will look to Part 4 to determine how he might remediate the land. If he is concerned about business efficacy, on the plain words of Part 4, he is likely to choose the independent remediation route to an approval in principle and certificate of compliance. By taking responsibility for the remediation, an owner can carry out a speedy clean-up without the delay inherent in the administrative processes set down in ss. 26.4(2), 27.1 and 27.4. [58] The owner's cost recovery could be limited by a manager's determination under s. 27.3(1) that a responsible person is a minor contributor to the contamination and, thus, entitled to the benefit of a limitation of liability under s. 27.3(3). Aside from that statutory limitation, the owner would be taking the risk that he might not later be able to establish in an action under s. 27(4) that the site was contaminated, that his costs of remediation were reasonably incurred, or that another person should bear some or all the responsibility for the contamination. [59] This last risk befell the plaintiff in Busse Farms Ltd. v. Federal Business Development Bank, [1996] S.J. No. 780 (Q.B.), aff'd [1998] S.J. No. 786 (C.A.) [Q.L.], leave to appeal dismissed [1999] S.C.C.A. No. 73. The defendant bank, who had obtained a gas station site by foreclosure, paid $65,000 to remediate the site after its "as is" sale to Busse. Despite the remediation, no major gas company was willing to supply gas to the site for fear of potential liability stemming from the previous contamination. Busse's action for damages under the statutory cause of action provided by the Saskatchewan Environmental Management and Protection Act, S.S. 1983-84, c. E-10.2 was dismissed because the bank did not come within the definition of those responsible for pollution under that legislation. (For the wording of the relevant provision see Appendix C.) [60] This reading of Part 4 advances one purpose of the Act, the speedy cleanup of contamination. If a final determination under s. 26.4 is a prerequisite to a statutory cost recovery action by a person who remediates independently under s. 28, the advantage of that process to a non-polluting owner is lost. The practical effect of the interpretation the respondent would have this Court adopt is that any owner who wants to seek compensation for its costs of remediation would be required to take the administrative route to its end, potentially at judicial review in the Supreme Court and any further appeals, before commencing the process for an approval in principle of a remediation plan. This practical effect would subvert if not destroy the commercial attractiveness of the speedy clean-up the independent remediation procedure permits and must have been designed to encourage. [61] Section 27(4) does not contain any words that suggest a court cannot determine by application of the statutory definitions whether a site is a "contaminated site," any more than it contains words precluding a court from determining whether a defendant is a "responsible person." On a plain reading, it creates a statutory cause of action for any person who has remediated a contaminated site, -- defined in s. 26(1) to mean an area of land in which the soil or any groundwater lying beneath it, or the water or the underlying sediment, contains a special waste or other prescribed substance -- to recover its "reasonably incurred" clean-up costs from other "responsible persons". [62] The phrase "contaminated site" is defined in Part 4. The Legislature had the opportunity to specify that a manager's final determination that a site was contaminated was necessary to bring a piece of land within the meaning of that phrase, either as part of the general definition, or for the particular purpose of a particular provision. But there is no such provision or any provision anywhere in Part 4 that suggests a court is precluded from making a finding that a site is contaminated, as a fact incidental to a cost recovery action. Nor is there any provision in Part 4 expressly requiring a final contaminated site determination under s. 26.4 (or a responsible person ruling under s. 26.5) comparable to s. 27.1(6) requiring such a determination and ruling when the manager has made a remediation or pollution abatement order. There is no provision requiring an explicit contaminated site determination under s. 26.4 before a manager issues an approval in principle or a certificate of compliance under s. 27.6, although his authority must be read as limited to contaminated sites. [63] There are, moreover, provisions implying the contrary. Section 28 provides that the manager may issue a certificate of compliance under s. 27.6 to "the responsible person" who remediates under s. 28(1)(a) "whether or not" a contaminated site determination has been made. Section 26.4(4) provides that the lack of a final determination "does not mean that a site is not a contaminated site." [64] Importantly, s. 26.4(1) provides discretion to the manager to determine whether a site is contaminated. The exercise of that discretion triggers the mandatory requirements that provide the fair procedures to which the respondent considers all potentially responsible persons known to a manager are entitled. There is no similar protection for those ultimately found to be responsible in a cost recovery action, not known to the manager. It is difficult to conceive the Legislature would create a private cause of action and make any claim under it dependent on a discretionary decision of a public servant. I cannot find that intention in s. 27(4) when read alone or in the context of the entire Part 4. [65] This conclusion does not mean s. 26.4 has no utility. It provides a means of reducing risk for those owners who, like Ms. Swamy and unlike the appellant Workshop, are unwilling to remediate at their own risk. But that purpose is incidental to its primary function of providing the fair and consistent administrative process the Minister of Environment promised would give integrity to the remediation and pollution abatement orders missing from the regulatory mechanism in the Act as it was in October 1995 when the order at issue in Imperial Oil v. British Columbia, supra, was issued. [66] The court's process provides that integrity to the cost recovery action, as it does to the manager's recovery of expenditures from the Consolidated Revenue Fund to remediate contaminated sites under Division 6 of the Act. I see a remediation order under s.27.1, a cost recovery action under s. 27(4), and the manager's cost recovery power under s. 28.5(2) as alternate methods of achieving the legislative policy of "polluter pays." [67] That some known potentially responsible persons may lose procedural protections they would have if a responsible person had not undertaken remediation with the attendant benefits and risks, is insufficient reason to read into the statutory scheme an intention not plainly evident from an ordinary reading of Part 4 by an ordinary person affected by it. [68] It is not unusual for a statutory scheme to employ a number of policy instruments to pursue a common objective. Part 4 of the Act provides for mandatory remediation by the remediation order process set out in s. 27.1, voluntary or independent remediation by responsible persons, subject to approvals by the manager under ss. 27.4, 27.6, and 28, and a civil cost recovery process through the courts under s. 27(4). Each process serves a different purpose within the overall objective of promoting speedy remediation of contaminated sites at the polluter's expense. [69] The coercive remediation order is available to the manager to implement government's cleanup priorities. Voluntary and independent remediation permit private parties to remediate under the manager's supervision. The cost recovery action permits all those who remediate to recover their reasonably incurred costs of doing so, however they came to remediate, from those who a court finds were responsible for the pollution. [70] Simply put, s. 27 is not ambiguous when read alone. It does not become so when read in the context of Part 4, or its object or its purpose. It creates a new civil cause of action, entire unto itself, as a means of requiring the polluter to pay and encouraging an owner to remediate. It follows I would allow the appeal, set aside the order dismissing the action, and remit the matter to the Supreme Court. "The Honourable Madam Justice Huddart" I AGREE: "The Honourable Madam Justice Rowles" I AGREE: "The Honourable Madam Justice Levine" APPENDIX A Excerpts from the Waste Management Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 482 and Contaminated Sites Regulation, B.C. Reg. 375/96 Determination of contaminated sites 26 (1) In this Part: "contaminated site" means an area of land in which the soil or any groundwater lying beneath it, or the water or the underlying sediment, contains (a) a special waste, or (b) another prescribed substance in quantities or concentrations exceeding prescribed criteria, standards or conditions; "contamination" means the presence, in soil, sediment or groundwater, of special waste or another substance in quantities or concentrations exceeding prescribed criteria, standards or conditions; Site registry 26.3 (1) The minister must (a) establish a site registry, and (b) appoint a registrar to manage the site registry. (2) A manager must provide to the registrar, in a form suitable for inclusion in the site registry, information respecting (a) all site profiles, preliminary site investigations and detailed site investigations that the manager receives, (b) all orders, approvals, voluntary remediation agreements and decisions, including determinations under section 26.4 (3), made by the manager under this Part, (c) pollution abatement orders requiring remediation under section 31, (d) notifications of independent remediation under section 28 (2), (e) declarations and orders made by the minister under section 28.4, and (f) other information required by the regulations. *** (4) The registrar must enter by notation into the site registry information referred to in subsections (2) and (3) and decisions of the appeal board. (5) In accordance with the regulations, the registrar (a) must provide for reasonable public access to information in the site registry, and (b) may impose fees for providing services and supplying information from the site registry. 26.4 (1) A manager may determine whether a site is a contaminated site and, if the site is a contaminated site, the manager may determine the boundaries of the contaminated site. (2) Subject to subsection (3), in determining whether a site is a contaminated site, a manager must do all of the following: (a) make a preliminary determination of whether or not a site is a contaminated site, on the basis of a site profile, a preliminary site investigation, a detailed site investigation or other available information; (b) give notice in writing of the preliminary determination to (a) the person submitting a site profile, a preliminary site investigation or a detailed site investigation for the site, (iv) any person known to a manager who may be a responsible person under section 26.5 if the site is finally determined to be a contaminated site; (c) provide an opportunity for any person to comment on the preliminary determination; (d) make a final determination of whether or not a site is a contaminated site; (e) give notice in writing of the final determination to (a) the person submitting a site profile, a preliminary site investigation or a detailed site investigation for the site, (iv) any person known to the manager who may be a responsible person under section 26.5, and (v) any person who has commented under paragraph (v). (Regulation 15(1) requires 15 days' notice) (3) A manager, on request by any person, may dispense with the procedures set out in subsection (2) (a) to (c) and make a final determination that a site is a contaminated site if the person (a) provides reasonably sufficient information to determine that the site is a contaminated site, and (b) agrees to be a responsible person for the contaminated site. (4) The lack of a determination under subsection (2) or (3) does not mean that a site is not a contaminated site. (5) A final determination made under this section is a decision that may be appealed under Part 7 of this Act. Division 3 -- Liability Persons responsible for remediation at contaminated sites 26.5 (1) Subject to section 26.6, the following persons are responsible for remediation at a contaminated site: (a) a current owner or operator of the site; (b) a previous owner or operator of the site; General principles of liability for remediation 27 (1) A person who is responsible for remediation at a contaminated site is absolutely, retroactively and jointly and severally liable to any person or government body for reasonably incurred costs of remediation of the contaminated site, whether incurred on or off the contaminated site. (2) For the purpose of this section, "costs of remediation" means all costs of remediation and includes, without limitation, (a) costs of preparing a site profile, (b) costs of carrying out a site investigation and preparing a report, whether or not there has been a determination under section 26.4 as to whether or not the site is a contaminated site, (c) legal and consultant costs associated with seeking contributions from other responsible persons, and (3) Liability under this Part applies (a) even though the introduction of a substance into the environment is or was not prohibited by any legislation if the introduction contributed in whole or in part to the site becoming a contaminated site, and (b) despite the terms of any cancelled, expired, abandoned or current permit or approval or waste management plan and its associated operational certificate that authorizes the discharge of waste into the environment. (4) Subject to section 27.3 (3), any person, including, but not limited to, a responsible person and a manager, who incurs costs in carrying out remediation at a contaminated site may pursue in an action or proceeding the reasonably incurred costs of remediation from one or more responsible persons in accordance with the principles of liability set out in this Part. Remediation orders 27.1 (1) A manager may issue a remediation order to any responsible person. (2) A remediation order may require a person referred to in subsection (1) to do all or any of the following: (a) undertake remediation; (b) contribute, in cash or in kind, towards another person who has reasonably incurred costs of remediation; (c) give security in an amount and form, which can include real and personal property, subject to conditions the manager specifies. (3) When considering whether a person should be required to undertake remediation under subsection (2), a manager may determine whether remediation should begin promptly, and must particularly consider the following: (a) adverse effects on human health or pollution of the environment caused by contamination at the site; (b) the potential for adverse effects on human health or pollution of the environment arising from contamination at the site; (c) the likelihood of responsible persons or other persons not acting expeditiously or satisfactorily in implementing remediation; (d) in consultation with the chief inspector appointed under the Mines Act, the requirements of a reclamation permit issued under section 10 of that Act; (e) in consultation with a division head under the Petroleum and Natural Gas Act, the adequacy of remediation being undertaken under section 84 of that Act; (f) other factors, if any, prescribed in the regulations. (4) When considering who will be ordered to undertake or contribute to remediation under subsections (1) and (2), a manager must to the extent feasible without jeopardizing remediation requirements (a) take into account private agreements respecting liability for remediation between or among responsible persons, if those agreements are known to the manager, and (b) on the basis of information known to the manager, name one or more persons whose activities, directly or indirectly, contributed most substantially to the site becoming a contaminated site, taking into account factors such as (i) the degree of involvement by the persons in the generation, transportation, treatment, storage or disposal of any substance that contributed, in whole or in part, to the site becoming a contaminated site, and (ii) the diligence exercised by persons with respect to the contamination. (5) A remediation order does not affect or modify the right of a person affected by the order to seek or obtain relief under an agreement, other legislation or common law, including but not limited to damages for injury or loss resulting from a release or threatened release of a contaminating substance. (6) If a remediation order or a pollution abatement order requiring remediation under section 31 is issued, and a manager has not yet determined if a site is a contaminated site under section 26.4, the manager must, as soon as reasonably possible after the issuance of the order, (a) determine whether the subject site is a contaminated site, in accordance with section 26.4, and (b) make a ruling as to whether the person named in the order is a responsible person under section 26.5, and if the person is not found to be a responsible person under paragraph (b), the manager making the order must compensate, in accordance with the regulations, the person for any costs directly incurred by the person to comply with the order. (7) A person receiving a remediation order under subsection (1) or actual notice of a remediation order under subsection (11) must not, without the consent of a manager, knowingly do anything that diminishes or reduces assets that could be used to satisfy the terms and conditions of the remediation order, and if the person does so, the manager, despite any other remedy sought, may commence a civil action against the person for the amount of the diminishment or reduction. (8) A manager may provide in a remediation order that a responsible person at a contaminated site is not required to begin remediation for a specified period of time if the contaminated site does not present an imminent and significant threat or risk to (a) human health, given current and anticipated human exposure, or (b) the environment. (9) A person who has submitted a site profile under section 26.1 (8) must not directly or indirectly diminish or reduce assets at a site designated in the site registry as a contaminated site, including, without limitation, (a) disposition of real or personal assets, or (b) subdivision of land until he or she requests and obtains written notice from a manager that the manager does not intend to issue a remediation order, and if the manager gives notice of the intention to issue a remediation order, or if the manager issues a remediation order, subsection (7) applies. (10) A manager may amend or cancel a remediation order. (11) A manager making a remediation order must, within a reasonable time, provide notice of the order in writing to every person holding an interest with respect to the contaminated site that is registered in the land title office at the time of issuing the order. Allocation panel 27.2 (1) The minister may appoint up to 12 persons with specialized knowledge in contamination, remediation or methods of dispute resolution to act as allocation advisors under this section. (2) A manager may, on request by any person, appoint an allocation panel consisting of 3 allocation advisors to provide an opinion as to all or any of the following: (a) whether the person is a responsible person; (b) whether a responsible person is a minor contributor; (c) the responsible person's contribution to contamination and the share of the remediation costs attributable to this contamination if the costs of remediation are known or reasonably ascertainable. (3) When providing an opinion under subsection (2) (b) and (c), the allocation panel must, to the extent of available information, have regard to the following: (a) the information available to identify a person's relative contribution to the contamination; (b) the amount of substances causing the contamination; (c) the degree of toxicity of the substances causing the contamination; (d) the degree of involvement by the responsible person, compared with one or more other responsible persons, in the generation, transportation, treatment, storage or disposal of the substances that caused the site to become contaminated; (e) the degree of diligence exercised by the responsible person, compared with one or more other responsible persons, with respect to the substances causing contamination, taking into account the characteristics of the substances; (f) the degree of cooperation by the responsible person with government officials to prevent any harm to human health or the environment; (g) in the case of a minor contributor, factors set out in section 27.3 (1) (a) and (b); (h) other factors considered relevant by the panel to apportioning liability. (4) A manager may require, as a condition of entering a voluntary remediation agreement with a responsible person, that the responsible person, at his or her own cost, seek and provide to the manager an opinion from an allocation panel under subsection (2). (5) A manager may consider, but is not bound by, any allocation panel opinion. (6) Work performed by the allocation panel must be paid for by the person who requests the opinion. Minor contributors 27.3 (1) A manager may determine that a responsible person is a minor contributor if the person demonstrates that (a) only a minor portion of the contamination present at the site can be attributed to the person, (b) either (i) no remediation would be required solely as a result of the contribution of the person to the contamination at the site, or (ii) the cost of remediation attributable to the person would be only a minor portion of the total cost of the remediation required at the site, and (c) in all circumstances the application of joint and several liability to the person would be unduly harsh. (2) When a manager makes a determination under subsection (1) that a responsible person is a minor contributor, the manager must determine the amount or portion of remediation costs attributable to the responsible person. (3) A responsible person determined to be a minor contributor under subsection (1) is only liable for remediation costs in an action or proceeding brought by another person or the government under section 27 up to the amount or portion specified by a manager in the determination under subsection (2). Division 4 -- Implementation of Remediation Voluntary remediation agreements 27.4 (1) A manager may, on request by a responsible person including a minor contributor, enter into a voluntary remediation agreement consisting of (a) provisions for financial or other contributions by the responsible person, (b) a certification by the responsible person that the person has fully and accurately disclosed all information in the person's possession regarding site conditions and the person's activities respecting that site, (c) security in an amount and form which may include real and personal property, subject to conditions the manager specifies, (d) a schedule of remediation acceptable to the manager, and (e) requirements that the manager considers to be reasonably necessary to achieve remediation. (2) A voluntary remediation agreement discharges the responsible person who entered into the voluntary remediation agreement from further liability but does not (a) discharge from liability other responsible persons not named in the voluntary remediation agreement but reduces the total potential liability of other responsible persons by the amount, if any, specified in the voluntary remediation agreement, (b) affect or modify in any way any person's right to seek or obtain relief under other legislation or under the common law, including, but not limited to, damages for injury or loss resulting from contamination, or (c) prevent the manager from entering into a further voluntary remediation agreement. (3) A manager may stipulate in a voluntary remediation agreement that a responsible person at a contaminated site is not required to begin remediation for a specified period of time, if the responsible person demonstrates that the contaminated site does not present an imminent and significant threat or risk to (a) human health, given current and anticipated human exposure, or (b) the environment. Certificates of compliance 27.6 (1) On application by a responsible person, a manager may issue an approval in principle stating that a remediation plan for a contaminated site (a) has been reviewed by the manager, (b) has been approved by the manager, and (c) may be implemented in accordance with conditions specified by the manager. (2) A manager, in accordance with the regulations, may issue a certificate of compliance with respect to remediation of a contaminated site if (a) the contaminated site has been remediated in accordance with (i) prescribed numerical standards, (ii) any orders under this Act, (iii) any remediation plan approved by the manager, and (iv) any requirements imposed by the manager, and (b) any security in an amount and form, which may include real and personal property, required by the manager has been provided relative to the management of substances remaining on the site . Independent remediation procedures 28 (1) A responsible person may carry out independent remediation (a) whether or not a determination has been made as to whether the site is a contaminated site, (b) whether or not a remediation order has been issued with respect to the site, or (c) whether or not a voluntary remediation agreement with respect to the site has been entered into. (2) Any person undertaking independent remediation at a contaminated site must (a) notify a manager in writing promptly on initiating remediation, and (b) notify a manager in writing within 90 days of completing remediation. (3) A manager may at any time during independent remediation by any person (a) inspect and monitor any aspect of the remediation to determine compliance with the regulations, (b) issue a remediation order as appropriate, (c) order public consultation and review under section 27.5, or (d) impose requirements that the manager considers are reasonably necessary to achieve remediation. (4) On request from the responsible person, and on receiving information respecting independent remediation, suitable to a manager, the manager may (a) review the remediation in accordance with the regulations and any requirements imposed under subsection (3)(d), and (b) issue an approval in principle, a certificate of compliance or a conditional certificate of compliance under section 27.6. Part 8 - Miscellaneous Offences and Penalties 54. (20) A person who (c) fails to comply with a remediation order under section 27.1, (f) fails to comply with the terms and conditions required by a manager in a voluntary remediation agreement under section 27.4(1), (g) fails to notify a manager of independent remediation under section 28(2), (h) fails to comply with requirements of a manager regarding independent remediation under section 28, commits an offence and is liable to a penalty not exceeding $200 000. Contaminated site remediation regulations 58. Without limiting section 57, the Lieutenant Governor in Council may make regulations as follows: (f) respecting the content of the site registry and the management of and procedures relating to the site registry, including requirements for persons to submit information to the registrar, (k) respecting remediation orders, voluntary remediation agreements and voluntary remediation procedures, (s) respecting compensation payable under Part 4, (t) setting out the requirements for public notice and the opportunity for public comment that apply to particular initiatives under Part 4, Contaminated Sites Regulation, B.C. Reg. 375/96 Part 5 - Contaminated Site Definition and Determination Definition of contaminated site 11 (1) Subject to section 12 and subsections (2), (3) and (4) of this section, the definition of "contaminated site" in section 26 (1) of the Act, for the purposes of paragraph (b) of that definition, means a site at which (a) the land use is agricultural, commercial, industrial, urban park or residential, and the concentration of any substance in the soil at the site is greater than or equal to (i) the applicable generic numerical soil standard, or (ii) the lowest value of the applicable matrix numerical soil standards, (b) the surface water or groundwater which is located on the site, or flows from the site, is used, or has a reasonable probability of being used, for aquatic life, irrigation, livestock or drinking water use, and the concentration of any substance in the surface water or groundwater is greater than or equal to the concentration of that substance specified for that use in Schedule 6, (c) the concentration of any substance not specified in Schedule 4, 5 or 6 in soil, surface water or groundwater is greater than or equal to the concentration established in a standard for that substance and use by the director, or (2) A site is not a contaminated site with respect to a substance if the concentration of the substance in soil, surface water or groundwater at the site does not exceed the applicable site-specific numerical standard. (3) A site is not a contaminated site with respect to a substance in the soil, surface water or groundwater if the site does not contain any substance with a concentration greater than or equal to the local background concentration of that substance in the soil, surface water or groundwater respectively. (4) A site is not a contaminated site with respect to a substance in the soil if (a) the site has been used for the application of (i) sewage sludge, (ii) composted organic materials, or (iii) products derived from the materials described in subparagraphs (i) or (ii), in compliance with the Production and Use of Compost Regulation or an authorization given under the Act, and (b) the site has not been used for any commercial or industrial purpose or activity listed in Schedule 2. 15. (1) A manager must, after making a preliminary determination under section 26.4(2)(a) of the Act, provide an opportunity for written comments to be submitted to the manager during a period of not less than 30 days and not more than 60 days after delivering notice of a preliminary determination, with reasons for the preliminary determination, under section 26.4(2)(b) of the Act. (2) A manager must, within 15 days after making a final determination under s. 26.4(2) (d) or (3) of the Act, deliver notice of the final determination, with reasons for the final determination, to the persons described in section 26.4(2)(e) of the Act. Part 7 - Liability Compensation payable for actions under section 27(4) of the Act Clarification of liability principles 34 (1) Nothing in section 27 (1) of the Act shall be construed as prohibiting the apportionment of a share of liability to one or more responsible persons (a) by a manager through the issuance of an order under section 27.1 of the Act, or (b) in an action or judgement under section 27 (4) of the Act. (2) Apportionment under subsection (1) may be made only if it is justified by available evidence. 35. (1) For the purposes of determining compensation payable under section 27(4) of the Act, a defendant named in a cost recovery action under that section may assert all legal and equitable defences, including any right to obtain relief under an agreement, other legislation or the common law. (2) In an action between 2 or more responsible persons under section 27(4), the following factors must be considered when determining the reasonably incurred costs of remediation: Voluntary remediation agreements 39 (1) A responsible person requesting a voluntary remediation agreement under section 27.4 of the Act must provide all of the following information to a manager: (a) a detailed site investigation; (b) a remediation plan; (c) a detailed description of the responsible person's past and present activities on the site, including the amount and characteristics of contamination at the site attributable to that person's activities; (d) an estimate of the total cost of remediation; (e) an estimate of the responsible person's share of the total cost of remediation and justification for the estimate; (f) the name and address of any other person who the responsible person has reason to believe may, with respect to the subject contaminated site, be a responsible person as described in section 26.5 of the Act; (g) a statement describing the responsible person's ability and plans to conduct and finance the remediation. (2) For the purpose of section 27.4 (1) of the Act, a manager may enter into a voluntary remediation agreement with a responsible person to implement a wide area remediation plan. (3) Before a manager enters into a voluntary remediation agreement with a responsible person, the manager must notify any persons identified as other potential responsible persons under subsection (1) (f) and allow those persons not less than 15 days to give notice if they wish to review or make representations to the manager about the proposed voluntary remediation agreement. . Part 9 - Remediation Plan Approval and Completion Approval in Principle 47. (1) A responsible person may apply for an approval in principle of a proposed remediation plan under section 27.6(1) of the Act by submitting a request in writing to a manager and attaching or ensuring the manager already has (a) copies of any preliminary and detailed site investigation reports prepared for the site, (b) copies of any other site investigation and assessment reports prepared for the site, and (c) the proposed remediation plan for which the approval in principle is sought. 49. (1) A person may apply for a certificate of compliance under section 27.6(2) of the Act or a conditional certificate of compliance under section 27.6(3) of the Act by submitting a request in writing to the manager. (2) In support of the application referred to in subsection (1), the person requesting the certificate of compliance or conditional certificate of compliance must provide or ensure the manager already has information on all of the following: (b) compliance with all conditions set by a manager under section 47(3) if an approval in principle was issued prior to remediation; 51. When a responsible person applies for and a manager issues an approval in principle, a certificate of compliance or a conditional certificate of compliance for a part of a contaminated site under section 27.6(6) of the Act, a manager must (a) provide, to the registrar, information on the part of a site to which the approval in principle, certificate of compliance or conditional certificate of compliance applies, and... APPENDIX B Excerpts from the U.S. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 9607 Liability (a) Covered persons; scope; recoverable costs and damages; interest rate; "comparable maturity" date. Not withstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the defences set forth in subsection (b) of this section-- (4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance shall be liable for-- (B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with the national contingency plan APPENDIX C Excerpts from Saskatchewan Environmental Management and Protection Act, S.S. 1983-84, c. E-10.2, s. 13(3): (3) Subject to subsections (4) and (5), any person, including Her Majesty in right of Saskatchewan or in right of Canada, has a right to compensation from: (a) the owner of the pollutant and the person having control of the pollutant for loss or damage incurred as a result of: (i) the discharge of a pollutant; (ii) neglect or default in the execution of a duty imposed pursuant to section 9; or (iii) an investigation or action taken pursuant to section 3 or 8; and (b) any person to whom an order has been made pursuant to section 4 for loss or damage incurred as a result of the execution or intended execution, or neglect or default in the execution, of the order without proof of fault, negligence or wilful intent.	null	null	null	null	null	null	null	See upstream license, including non-commercial use and other restrictions: https://perma.cc/EA5C-R5DK. Note: This is an unofficial reproduction of a British Columbia Court of Appeal decision, without endorsement or affiliation by the British Columbia courts.
BCCA	2003 BCCA 559	BMF Trading, a Partnership v. Abraxis Holdings Ltd.	2003-10-23T00:00:00	https://www.bccourts.ca/jdb-txt/ca/03/05/2003bcca0559.htm	2026-01-18T10:38:14.421000	"\n2003BCCA0559.htm\nCOURT OF APPEAL FOR BRITISH COLUMBIA\nCitation:\nBMF Trading, a Partnership v. (...TRUNCATED)	null	null	null	null	null	null	null	"See upstream license, including non-commercial use and other restrictions: https://perma.cc/EA5C-R5(...TRUNCATED)
BCCA	2003 BCCA 558	R. v. McBurnie	2003-10-08T00:00:00	https://www.bccourts.ca/jdb-txt/ca/03/05/2003bcca0558.htm	2026-01-18T10:39:49.657000	"2003BCCA0558 COURT OF APPEAL FOR BRITISH COLUMBIA Citation: R. v. McBurnie,\n2003 BCCA 558 Date: 20(...TRUNCATED)	null	null	null	null	null	null	null	"See upstream license, including non-commercial use and other restrictions: https://perma.cc/EA5C-R5(...TRUNCATED)
BCCA	2003 BCCA 557	Pasnak v. Chura	2003-10-23T00:00:00	https://www.bccourts.ca/jdb-txt/ca/03/05/2003bcca0557.htm	2026-01-18T10:38:11.677000	"\n2003BCCA0557.htm\nCOURT OF APPEAL FOR BRITISH COLUMBIA\nCitation:\nPasnak et al. v. Chura et al.,(...TRUNCATED)	null	null	null	null	null	null	null	"See upstream license, including non-commercial use and other restrictions: https://perma.cc/EA5C-R5(...TRUNCATED)
BCCA	2003 BCCA 556	R. v. Nguyen & Bui	2003-10-08T00:00:00	https://www.bccourts.ca/jdb-txt/ca/03/05/2003bcca0556.htm	2026-01-18T10:39:46.015000	"\n2003 BCCA 556 R. v. Nguyen&Bui\nCOURT OF APPEAL FOR BRITISH COLUMBIA\nCitation:\nR. v. Nguyen & B(...TRUNCATED)	null	null	null	null	null	null	null	"See upstream license, including non-commercial use and other restrictions: https://perma.cc/EA5C-R5(...TRUNCATED)

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A2AJ Canadian Case Law

Last updated: 2026-02-15 Maintainer: Access to Algorithmic Justice (A2AJ)

Dataset Summary

The A2AJ Canadian Case Law dataset provides bulk, open-access full-text decisions from Canadian courts and tribunals. Each row corresponds to a single case and contains the English and French versions of the decision where both are publicly available. The project builds on an earlier version that was maintained by the Refugee Law Lab (RLL) and is now maintained by A2AJ, a research project co-hosted by York University's Osgoode Hall Law School and Toronto Metropolitan University's Lincoln Alexander School of Law. The dataset is intended to support empirical legal research, legal-tech prototyping, and language-model pre-training in the public interest—especially work that advances access to justice for marginalised and low-income communities.

Dataset Structure (~ 184k cases)

Code	Court / Tribunal / Reporter	First document - Last document	Rows
SCC	Supreme Court of Canada	1877-01-15 – 2026-02-13	10,867
FCA	Federal Court of Appeal	2001-02-01 – 2026-02-10	7,692
FC	Federal Court	2001-02-01 – 2026-02-13	35,063
TCC	Tax Court of Canada	2003-01-21 – 2026-02-10	8,007
CMAC	Court Martial Appeal Court of Canada	2001-01-19 – 2026-01-15	151
CHRT	Canadian Human Rights Tribunal	2003-01-10 – 2026-01-12	1,104
SST	Social Security Tribunal of Canada	2013-03-08 – 2026-01-09	17,274
RPD	Refugee Protection Division (IRB)	2002-07-16 – 2020-12-14	6,729
RAD	Refugee Appeal Division (IRB)	2013-02-19 – 2025-08-11	14,122
RLLR	Refugee Law Lab Reporter (RPD, IRB)	2019-01-07 – 2024-12-13	927
BCCA	British Columbia Court of Appeal	1999-01-04 – 2026-02-11	14,375
BCSC	British Columbia Supreme Court	2000-01-04 – 2026-02-12	50,598
ONCA	Ontario Court of Appeal	2007-01-02 – 2026-02-13	17,387
YKCA	Yukon Court of Appeal	2000-05-15 – 2026-01-19	269

Note: Counts are approximate and will drift as the dataset is updated.

Data Fields

Field	Type	Description
`dataset`	`string`	Abbreviation identifying the court/tribunal (see above)
`citation_en` / `citation_fr`	`string`	Neutral citation in English / French
`citation2_en` / `citation2_fr`	`string`	Secondary citation(s) where available
`name_en` / `name_fr`	`string`	Style of cause
`document_date_en` / `document_date_fr`	`datetime64[ns, UTC]`	Decision date
`url_en` / `url_fr`	`string`	Source URL for the official online version
`scraped_timestamp_en` / `scraped_timestamp_fr`	`datetime64[ns, UTC]`	Timestamp when the page was scraped
`unofficial_text_en` / `unofficial_text_fr`	`string`	Full unofficial text of the decision
`upstream_license`	`string`	License terms from the source court/tribunal

Missing values are represented as empty strings ("") or NaN.

Data Languages

Where availble, rows include both English and French texts. Where only one language is published, the fields for the other language are empty.

Data Splits

All rows are provided in a single train split.

Data Loading

from datasets import load_dataset
import pandas as pd

# load decisions for a specific court / tribunal (e.g. Supreme Court of Canada)
cases = load_dataset("a2aj/canadian-case-law", data_dir = "SCC", split="train")

## ALTERNATIVELY
## load the entire corpus
# cases = load_dataset("a2aj/canadian-case-law", split="train")

# covert to df
df = cases.to_pandas()
df.head(5)

The dataset is also offered in Parquet format for fast local use. Files are in subfolders with the court/tribunal names.

Dataset Creation

Curation Rationale

Building on the RLL's earlier bulk-data programme, A2AJ is collecting and sharing Canadian legal data to:

democratise access to Canadian jurisprudence;
enable large-scale empirical legal studies; and
support responsible AI development for the justice sector.

We scrape data only where we are permitted to do so by terms of service of websites that host the data. We also obtain some additional data directly from courts and tribunals.

Source Data & Normalisation

Cases are scraped directly from the official websites of the respective courts and tribunals, or is obtained directly from the tribunals through email or other distruction processes. Where possible, text is stored verbatim with minimal normalisation (e.g. HTML → plain text, whitespace cleanup).

Personal & Sensitive Information

Court and tribunal decisions can contain sensitive personal information. Although all documents are already public, easy bulk access increases privacy risk—particularly for refugees, criminal-justice-involved persons and other marginalised groups. Users who reproduce the data from this dataset are responsible for complying with relevant privacy laws, as well as other laws relating to disseminating information such as publication bans.

Non-Official Versions & Disclaimer

The texts here are unofficial copies. For authoritative versions, consult the URLs in url_en / url_fr.

Non-Affiliation / Endorsement

A2AJ and the production of this dataset are not affiliated with, nor endorsed by, the Government of Canada, provincial courts, or the listed tribunals.

Considerations for Using the Data

Social Impact. Open legal data can reduce information asymmetries but also facilitate surveillance or discriminatory profiling. We encourage downstream users to collaborate with community organisations and ensure that derivative tools advance—rather than undermine—access to justice.
Bias & Representativeness. Published decisions are not a random sample of disputes. For example, positive administrative decisions are less likely to be appealed and thus under-represented in court records. Models trained on this corpus may therefore skew negative.
Limitations. The dataset excludes annexes, schedules and appendices that are sometimes attached as separate PDFs. Long historical gaps exist for some courts (e.g. ONCA pre-1990).

Licensing Information

The code used to create the dataset by the A2AJ and any work on the dataset undertaken by the A2AJ is subject to an open source MIT license.

Users must also comply with upstream licenses found in the upstream_license field in the dataset for each document, which reflects the licenses through which the A2AJ obtained the document. These upstream licenses may include limits on commercial use, as well as other limitations.

The A2AJ is committed to open source methodologies, and we are actively working to obtain more permissive licenses for this data.

Warranties / Representations

While we make best efforts to ensure the completeness and accuracy of the dataset, we provide no warranties regarding completeness or accuracy. The data were collected through automated processes and may contain errors. Always verify data against the official source.

Dataset Curators

Sean Rehaag - Co-Diretor, A2AJ
Simon Wallace - Co-Director, A2AJ
Contact: a2aj@yorku.ca

Citation

Sean Rehaag & Simon Wallace, "A2AJ Canadian Case Law" (2025), online: Hugging Face Datasets https://huggingface.co/datasets/a2aj/canadian-case-law.

Acknowledgements

This research output is supported in part by funding from the Law Foundation of Ontario and the Social Scienes and Humanities Research Council of Canada, by in-kind compute from the Digital Research Alliance of Canada and by adminstrative support from the Centre for Refugee Studies, the Refugee Law Lab, and Osgoode Hall Law School. We also thank the Canadian judiciary and tribunal staff who publish decisions in open formats.

Downloads last month: 1,706

Size of downloaded dataset files:

3.45 GB

Size of the auto-converted Parquet files:

3.45 GB

Number of rows:

184,565